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Aviation History
1919
1919 - 0053.PDF
JANUARY 9, 1919 had been carried out exclusively by night it would not have caused the enemy to make such a large use of his men and material in defensive measures, and therefore it would not have affected the Western Front to such an extent as it did. Though night bombing is the safer, many mistakes are made at night in reaching the locality it has been decided to bomb. My Intelligence Department provided me with the most thorough information on all targets such as gas factories, aeroplane factories, engine factories, poison-gas factories, etc., each target having a complete detailed and illustrated plan, and maps were prepared of every target that was within reach. These were supplemented in a large way by the aerial photo graphs taken by reconnaissance machines. Before it was possible to attack Germany successfully it was necessary to attack the enemy's aerodromes heavily in order to prevent his attacking our aerodromes by night, and by destroying his machines to render his attacks by day less efficacious. I considered that it was probable during the spring and early summer of 1919 that at least half my force would be attacking the enemy's aerodromes, whilst the other half carried out attacks on long-distance targets in Germany. It was also necessary several times during the period the Force operated to carry out attacks in conjunction with the Armies on the enemy's communications. I also had to decide, when it was impossible for squadrons to reach their objectives well in the interior of Gennanv, what alternative objective should be attacked, and whicli attacks would have the greatest effect in hastening the end of hostilities. I decided that railways were first in order of importance, and next in importance the blast furnaces. The reason of my decision was that the Germans were ex tremely short of rolling stock, and also some of the main railways feeding the German Army in the West passed close to our front, and it was hoped that these communications could be seriously interfered with, and the rolling stock and trains carrying reinforcements or reliefs or munitions destroyed. They were also fairly easy to find at night. I chose blast furnaces for the second alternative targets, as they were also easy to find at night, although it was difficult to do any really serious damage to them owing to the smallness of the vital part of the works. On my arrival in the Nancy area the 8th Brigade consisted of those squadrons shown above. Additional squadrons arrived on the dates as shown :— No. 104 Squadron, De Hav. 9, B.H.P., 23rd May. No. 97 Squadron, Handley-Page, Rolls-Royce, 9th August. No.215 Squadron, Handley-Page, Rolls-Royce, 19th August. No. 115 Squadron, Handley-Page, Rolls-Royce, 31st August. No. no Squadron, De Hav. 10, Liberty, 31st August. No. 45 Squadron, Sopwith Camel, 22nd September. It must be remembered that new squadrons could not be used for work over the line until three weeks after their arrival, as during this period they were receiving their final training, which can only be carried out at the front. No. 45 Squadron was intended to attack the enemy's scouts many miles over the line. It was necessary to re- equip this squadron with longer-range scouts after I re ceived it, but as these machines did not arrive before the Armistice was signed the squadron was only used for attacking individual hostile machines which crossed our lines. During August No. 100 Squadron, which was armed with F.E. 2b short-distance machines, commenced re-equip ping with Handley-Pages. While it was being re-equipped —which process took nearly the whole month—scarcely any work could be carried out by the squadron. Below are a few interesting figures :— The total weight of bombs dropped between the 6th June and the 10th November was 550 tons, of which 160 tons were dropped by day and 390 tons by night. Of this amount no less than 22oJ tons were dropped on aerodromes. This large percentage was due to the necessity of preventing the enemy's bombing machines attacking our aerodromes and in order to destroy large numbers of the enemy's scouts on their aerodromes, as it was impracticable to deal with them on equal terms in the air. I think this large amount of bombing was thoroughly justified when it is taken into consideration that the enemy's attacks on our aerodromes were practically negligible, and not a single machine was destroyed by bombing during the period 5th June to nth November. In addition to this the following objectives were attacked :— Baalon, Baden, the Black Forest, Bonn, Cologne, Coblenz, Darmstadt, Duren, Dillingen, Frankfurt, Forbach, Hagen- dingen, Heidelberg, Hagenau, Kaiserlautem, Karthaus, Karls ruhe, Ludwigshafen, Landau, Mainz, Mannheim, Lahr, Lumes, Luxemburg, Oberndorf, Offenburg, Pforzheim, Pirmaisens, Rastatt, Rombas, Rottweil, Sallingen, Saarburg, Saar- brucken, Stuttgart, Treves, Wiesbaden, Worms, Voelkingen, Wadgassen, Zweibrucken, and other miscellaneous targets. It must also be remembered that of the 109 machines which were missing, the majority dropped bombs on targets before landing. The amount of bombs dropped by these machines is not included in the above figures. In June the longest distance flown out and back by dav was 272 miles,'and by night 240 miles. In July the longest distance flown out and back by day was 272 miles, and by night 300 miles. In August the longest distance flown out and back by day was 330 miles, and by night 342 miles. In September the longest distance flown out and back by day was 320 miles, and by night 320 miles. In October the longest distance flown out and back by day was 320 miles, and by night 272 miles. A large amount of photographic reconnaissance was done by individual machines at a great height. This work was nearly always successfully carried out, and only one photo- We stpK all a 0 \\ ^ \ \ ESSEN o Md*\ COLOt.,. .., I .. Hes s c- < *> Coblenzi Nass a.u." S-> JW1 ^•»jujxgmc.)rc'^,/s *>. "'Stag 5i*it" Hamburg \Wiesbadenj£AN KFURT Ma^^Til /^Darnistadt -C ."'V/T0 'onns •«*•••• iwi'gshsfenV^ 'EeitAeiberq Palatinate sdgji^" Spire -V K Haqenau'-vy °R8Statt<l ^5.^ * O V-.<£ • ••-.-STUTTGART oLahr ^J .., 2 •C <l • t/ *0bernaorf, ' • Vs iSBURGt vCoTmar/ SHE I BURG Mile3 0 tO 20 30 10 graphic machine was lost during the whole period of opera tions. Photographs have proved time and again the efficiency of the work of the bombing machines. Captured corre spondence testified to the great moral effect of the bombing attacks on Germany. It was apparent by the end of June that the enemy was increasing the number of fighting machines opposed to us. These machines were presumably being provided from squadrons he had withdrawn from the Russian Front and re-equipped for home defence work. In September and October our day bombing squadrons had to fight practically from the front line to their objective, and from there home again. In several cases they had to fight the whole way out and the whole way back. This necessitated the most careful keeping of formation in order to avoid undue casualties, as once the formation was split up the enemy's machines could attack individual machines at their leisure. When our machines were in formation he generally concentrated on the rear machines, occasionally making attacks on the machine in front. 53
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