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Aviation History
1919
1919 - 0953.PDF
JULY 17, 1919 SOME DEVELOPMENTS IN AIRCRAFT DESIGN AND APPLICATION DURING THE WAR* By the Right Hon. LORD WEIR OF EASTWOOD, P.C., Honorary Fellow ANY attempt to review the progress or development of aviation during the War, and to confine such a review to the permissible limits of a paper, involves a mere indication of some of the more salient features of the development. Moreover, it is difficult to confine any such review entirely to the scientific or engineering aspect of the problem, on account of the peculiarly close association of the technique of construction with the technique of use. The war developemnt of a technical product, such as an aeroplane, necessarily comprises the rapid embodiment of field experience in the design and pro duction of materiel, and this compelling influence during the War largelyjgoverned the policy of design, supply and production. In August, 1914, the British Air Services consisted of a Naval wing and a Military wing, the first controlled by the Admiralty, and the second by the War Office. The Naval wing, or Royal Naval Air Service as it was termed, possessed a total of 93 machines, the Military wing, or Royal Flying Corps, possessed a total of 179 machines. In October, 1918, just prior to the Armistice, the Royal Air Force possessed over 22,000 effective machines. For the first two years of the War, the supply organisations for aircraft were Departments of the War Offic and Ad miralty, and no distinct technical departments existed. In January, 1917, the second Air Board, under the chairman ship of Viscount Cowdray succeeded the original Air Board under Viscount Curzon, and was constituted with additional duties and responsibilities. The Board became responsible for the allocation of aeronautical supplies between the two Flying Services, and for the supervision of design of all aeronautical material, this latter responsibility being vested in the technical department of the Air Board under Brig.- Gen. Pitcher. Concurrently with this, the entire responsi bility for supply and production of all aircraft materiel was handed over by the War Office and Admiralty to the Ministry of Munitions. Towards the end of 1917, a movement in favour of concentrating the entire administration of every thing relating to War aviation in a single Government de partment crystallised in the constitution of the Air Ministry under a Secretary of State for Air, the Naval and Military- Air Services being amalgamated to form the Royal Air Force in April, 1918. The establishment of the Royal Air Force as an inde pendent fighting force of the Crown has been thoroughly well justified, and the progress with regard to civil aviation in this country since the Armistice is largely due to the existence of a single Air Authority. Concurrently with the institution of the Air Ministry, the necessity of placing design and supply under a single authority was recognised by the constitution, within the Ministry of Munitions, of the Aircraft Production Department, which assumed full responsibility for all questions ef design, supply and production. An appreciation of the progress made in the domain of supply and production can be obtained from the fact that the average monthly delivery of aeroplanes either from British or foreign sources to our flying service during the first twelve months of the War was 50 per month, while, during the last twelve months of the War, the average de liveries were 2,700 per month. The capacity of the facilities in this country for the production of aeroplanes at the date of the Armistice was approximately 3,500 complete machines per month. To those associated with marine engineering it may be of interest to state that the total horse-power of aero engines produced in the last twelve months of the War, approximated to 8,000,000 of brake horse-power, a figure quite comparable with the total horse-power of the marine engine output of the country. It may be of interest to recite some of the difficulties en countered in this work, although perhaps the more important of these difficulties were inseparable from the industrial position of the country at the period when the effort towards expansion was made :— 1. The lack of highly skilled labour, in particular that required for engine production, due to the almost complete absorption of such labour by other and earlier War enter prises. 2. The very high standard of material and workmanship involved so that safety might be ensured on the low per missible weight of the product. f* Paper read at the Victory Meeting of the North-East Coast Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders at Newcastle-on-Tyne on July ro, loip. 3. The necessity of creating and building up entirely new manufacturing facilities and organisations. 4. The grave influence on production of modifications in design shown necessary by field experience, and the necessity for the rapid embodiment of these in the product. 5. The inability to take the fullest advantages of stan dardisation, owing to the necessity of making continuous progress in design and performances of machines. 6. The extreme complexity and variety of the elements contributing to the provision and equipment of War aero planes. For example, the provision of satisfactory timber was a continual difficulty—at times an actual menace to the whole development. The textile , problem became very grave when the supplies of Russian flax were cut off, and we were compelled to develop additional sources in Ireland and in the Colonies. Acute difficulties were experienced in con nection with the development of the chemicals required for dope manufacture. At other times, the supply of machine guns gave much anxiety, while the development of the syn chronising gear for these guns necessitated very urgent treatment. The production of ball bearings involved the provision of new facilities on a colossal scale. The magneto supply involved the building up of an entirely new industry, while the manufacture of the numerous classes of instruments, cameras, radiators and other fittings in each case formed a problem by itself. The solution of these problems from a production point of view constitutes an outstanding example of the enterprise courage and ingenuity of British industry. Many mistakes were made, but most of the difficulties were solved and many valuable lessons have been learned. It is a matter of great regret that so many of these enterprises, built up for specific War requirements, cannot be maintained under peace con ditions. The development of civil aviation will not, for many years, absorb even a fraction of the War facilities, and a large amount of waste cannot be avoided in the reduction of these industries to a peace-time basis. The constitution in 1917 of the first Technical Department dealing with aircraft design represented one of the most valuable steps in advance of previous organisation, and the work of this department very largely contributed to the position of technical supremacy held by this country at the close of the War. One of the factors contributing to this success was undoubtedly the adoption of a policy of giving ample freedom of opportunity to private designers, because in the development of a new art, such as aircraft design, any adherence to a single school of thought is dangerous, and the basis of design and experiment should be broadened as much as possible. In the earlier days of the development the official Govern ment designs of the Royal Aircraft Factory at Farnborough predominated, but the change in policy should not be taken to represent a reflection on the many valuable designs pro duced at Farnborough. These designs exercised a great influence on all future designs, while the meticulous care in the details, which was the feature of Farnborough practice, has been wholly useful and valuable in its general influence. To the British aircraft designers as a whole, and in particular to the pioneer designers and manufacturers, the greatest credit is due for their courage, skill and ingenuity. Such is the briefest possible review of the political and administrative conditions under which the developments in War aviation have been carried out. In dealing with the salient features of progress and design two aspects have been separately treated—the aerodynamic aspect and the applica- tional aspect. As regards seaplanes it is not proposed to deal with their detail development, as this followed generally on the same lines as the aeroplanes with the special adapta tions to meet marine conditions. PART I.—Aerodynamical Aspect Loading.—The outstanding feature desired in War aero plane performance was expressed generally as the maximum of speed and climb, and it was soon perceived that this feature could be best achieved by a reduction of the weight carried per horse-power. The advance in other aerodynamic features such as wing section, reduction of air resistance, etc., was considerable, but could not be compared in importance with the reduction of weight per horse-power. At the beginning of the war, loadings were about 23 lbs. 955
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