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Aviation History
1920
1920 - 0686.PDF
JULY I, 1920 we have arrived at the conclusion that such air services would not in present conditions provide advantages so far superior to methods of transport already in existence as to warrant their establishment. In accordance with the historical development of new industries, however, it rests with British private enterprise to pioneer the way, to develop types of machines, and ta establish experimental and demonstration routes, in order that the experience so gained may serve as a guide for the development of' British civil aviation further afield. There can be no doubt that British aircraft constructors and designers can" interest and attract potential customers and capitalists not only in Europe, but also in the Dominions, Colonies and foreign countries more successfully and easily by showing demonstration services actually in operation and running regularly between London and other European capitals than by any other form of advertisement. It must be recognised, however, that the present reduction in aircraft manufacture automatically lessens the rate of progress in the development of design and the advantages attendant thereon, as designing staffs can only be kept in being to the extent that the demand for machines warrants. This demand should come from the Royal Air Force for machines of a military type and from the Transport Companies to a large extent for those of a commercial type. The R.A.F., however, are left with a large fleet of aeroplanes as the surplus of war, and can, at present, place orders only for experimental machines, wliile the placing of orders for civil machines by the Government cannot be justified. The demand and the specification of requirements must in every case emanate from the user, whether military or civil. There is good reason to fear that unless a sound nucleus of designing staff is retained by the aircraft constructors, this country will necessarily lose the pre-eminent position in design which it has occupied, and will soon lag behind better supported foreign competitors. We cannot ignore the progress of other nations in aircraft design, and this is a factor to be borne in mind in considering the extent to which the Government should place orders for experimental machines. We are therefore of the opinion that the Air Ministry should make every effort to maintain the designing staffs at anefficient level, by placing as many orders as possible for experimental military machines, coupled with every possible assistance to encourage firms to develop aerouautical research. 5. Evidence with regard to existing Transport Services.—With regard to the services already in existence between London and Paris and London and Brussels, we obtained evidence of the greatest value fromMajor-General SirS. Brancker, K.C.B., of the Aircraft Transport and Travel Co., and from Mr. Handley Page; -while Sir Evelyn Murray, K.C.B., Secretary of the General Post Office, gave much interesting information on the question of the carriage of mails by air. The evidence given by Sir S. Brancker and Mr. Handley Page afforded a complete endorsement of the views of the Committee on the value of demonstration services, and we desire to place on record our conviction that British civil aviation owes a real debt of gratitude to Mr. Holt Thomas and Mr. Handley Page for the pioneer efforts made by their companies in this new field of activity. From the evidence given, several important deductions may be drawn :— (i) Reliability and regularity of service involve the use of relatively high-speed machines, which in turn considerably increases the total cost of operation. (ii) A less regular service, that is, one which may not operate in bad weather, equipped with machines of a relatively low speed, can be maintained at running costs which appear to be even now commercially sound, provided that a guaran- teed cargo of either mails, passengers or goods can be secured. (iii) The service to Paris run by the Aircraft Transport and Travel Co. has been very reliable, and a comparison with the figures of the first mail service carried by rail, in the early days of railway development, would, it is thought, show to the advantage of the air mail service to Paris. (iv) One of the difficulties experienced by the services has been that of regularly filling a substantial percentage of the useful space. Passengers and goods come forward spas- modically, and there is not yet apparently any deep-seated confidence on the part of the public in the reliability of these services, which they have not yet learned to value. (v) The mail enterprise between London and Paris, which was of a provisional character, has proved to be a failure, but the failure does not reflect in any degree on the flying side of the service. It would appear rather to be due to three causes :— (a) Insufficient advertisement. (6) The inconvenience experienced by the public in being unable to post (air) letters except at certain specified Post Offices in London. (c) The prohibitive cost of 2s. 6d. per letter. There does not appear to be any great demand for a ' daylight exchange of letters between London and Paris, though it is a question how far this apparent absence of demand is due to the causes enumerated above. (vi) Experience has shown the necessity of special designs for commercial machines and engines. It is important to emphasise that the existing services have been carried out to a very large extent with surplus war machines acquired at a low valuation, and the replace- ment of these machines by others of new design, specially built to suit commercial conditions, will involve a further large increase in capital outlay and a consequent increase in the cost^of depreciation, thus adding to the total cost of operation. 6. Consideration of further Temporary State Assistance.— A We have carefully considered a memorandum prepared by ; the Controller-General of Civil Aviation containing recom- mendations for the assistance of civil aviation in different - directions, and have also had before us various suggestions ;[-„" from other sources ; but, bearing in mind the need for exer- :J. cising the utmost economy in framing our proposals, we have found the arguments insufficient to justify us in putting forward more extensive recommendations than those con- tained in this Report. From our review of the general situation, and from the evidence given before us, we have come definitely to the conclusion that, in spite of the indirect assistance so far recommended and in course of being provided, the develop- ; ment of civil aviation so far attained may yet stop short, and that the operational experience which is essential to that development may cease. We think that national interests .;• : demand that such a risk should be avoided, and we have s accordingly been led to consider whether the provision of •••' " a measure of direct assistance cannot be justified. P. We record at the outset that we should in no case contem- . '; plate the continuation of such assistance as part of the ,., permanent policy of the State. We have dealt with it ".-v solely as a matter for consideration during the present '-[-:: critical years when the fortunes of British civil aviation .; '-. hang in the balance. It may be held that there is no case for direct State aid •.-.•' at all, an that the proper course is to leave civil aviation ^~ to find its own way with the indirect assistance already "! recommended by the Committee and approved by the Government. '-' We have come to the conclusion that direct State aid is - - justified for reasons which have already been in part indicated, •• -^;. and also for the following reasons. .,:" The artificial impetus given by the War to the aircraft .;-! industry and the consequent influence on private enterprise -y' lay a responsibility on the State to continue its support -;- in some degree as a temporary measure until sufficient . experience has been gained either to place civil aviation, in a sound position or to establish that it is not a commercial possibility, or is of small practical value. Further, there arise considerations of national prestige and national defence which have in the past been held to ^.7 Vie strong enough to justify departure from the traditional -:.^ British policy of leaving trade and industry to take care ;.;;, of themselves. There is undoubtedly serious risk that the : -'• lead in aviation attained by this country during the War may be lost unless further assistance is forthcoming for civil aviation. The failure of civil aviation would result, not only in a loss of British prestige in a new and potentially important sphere of commercial activity, but would also react unfavourably on service aviation by depriving it of a reserve of personnel, material and constructional facilities from which to draw in the event of war. Accordingly, we recommend that the precedents of State aid to which we have alluded be followed in the case of civil aviation for a strictly limited period, and on such con- ditions as will ensure that, in return for State assistance, private enterprise spares no efforts to place civil aviation on an independent and self-supporting basis. We are persuaded that, whatever State aid be given, final success will depend on the courage, imagination and resource of those engaged in private enterprise and the measure of support , given by capital and the community as a whole. 7. Methods of Affording Direct Assistance.—We have considered various methods by which a direct grant might be given and the basis upon which it should be assessed, and have approached the problem as involving the transport by air of passengers, goods and mails. The question of the payment of grants on the basis of the 686
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