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Aviation History
1920
1920 - 1076.PDF
OCTOBER 14, 1920 ASPECTS OF SERVICE AVIATION \ By AIR-MARSHAL SIR H. M. TRENCHARD, (a) Introductory Remarks 1. Paper does not deal with details, but seeks to explain some of the principles which are governing the formation and employment of the R.A.F. (b) Peace Basis 2. The test of a fighting service .is war. This must be the governing factor of all peace organisation. 3. Modern war fought by nations in arms necessitates organisation of fighting services on the cadre principle, with great power of expansion. 4. These conditions are especially difficult for the R.A.F. Expansion very great. Wastage high. Rapid mobilisation essential, as aerial activity will precede contact by land or sea. 5. R.A.F. cannot of itself create reserve of personnel or maintain stocks of material to meet war on the grand scale. Material costly to provide, and to store ; also deteriorates and becomes obsolete quickly. 6. R.A.F. is therefore dependent on civil aviation as the Navy is on Mercantile Marine, but to much greater extent. 7. Present situation not satisfactory, but time has been short, and war on grand scale is improbable. Future lies in improvements of aeroplane as means of travel. (c) More Immediate Problems 8. More immediate problems are present organisation— provision and career of officers and men—distribution and principles of employment of R.A.F. (d) Organisation 9. Present organisation must meet present needs while keeping in' view future requirements. 10 Fighting service may be compared to fruit tree. Roots and trunk are raw material in officers, men and equipment, branches are train- ing and dep6t organisation, fruit are squadrons. Tree is at present young. To force the crop will retard growth. 11. Demobilisation left many difficulties and blanks. R,A,F, has practically no peace experience behind it, and must learn by trial and error. Critisism welcomed if instructed and constructive. (e) Provision of Personnel 12. Efficiency of a fighting service primarily depends on its personnel, their moral discipline, knowledge and content- ment. 13. Many questions being asked as to career offered to officers and men. These have been carefully considered, but it is difficult to spread knowledge to individuals. 14. As regards officers, R.A.F. cannot take all on permanent basis. Large number of junior officers required, and com- paratively small number of senior officers. Therefore, only proposed to take on permanent basis such number as will be assured of a career. Case would be the same if R.A.F. ceased to exist as a separate service. Original schemes of entry of officers both in R.N.A.S. and R.F.C. recognised this. 15. Disabled pilots not forgotten. Some can be absorbed. Others will obtain disability pensions. Large reduction in number of accidents expected in peace. Work not so in- tense. Strain less. 16. As regards other ranks, bulk of long, apprenticeship trades will be enlisted as boys and given Bart., K.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Air Staff three years' training. 17. Remainder will be enlisted as men, and given appropriate training. 18. General and vocation education catered for during service with R.A.F. 19. R.A.F. should not therefore be a blind alley, occupation for officers or men entered on a long service basis. 20. Entry of officers on short service basis a more difficult problem. Two sources, viz., direct from civil life and seconded from Army and Navy. 21. Short service officers direct from civil life essential to form reserve for small wars. May prove substitute in some cases for university career. 22. Seconding of officers from Army and Nayy as important to those service as to R.A.F. Co-operation fcetween services a certainty. Can only give best results if they know and understand each other. Also most necessary for Army and Navy to study effect of air on their own strategy and tactics. (/) Distribution 23. Present widespread unrest leads to dispersion which makes for inefficiency. Small detachments an evil in any fighting force. More than ever so in R.A.F. owing to absence of workshop facilities, difficulties as regards spares and want of supervision by senior officers. 24. Ideal is to concentrate in few centres with power to move rapidly. Latter condition" difficult. No air routes. Difficulty of establishing these over foreign countries. Movement by sea slow. Great bulk of material. Shortage of suitable shipping. 25. Attempt made to concentrate in United Kingdom, Egypt and India, but many detachments. It is hoped many of these are only temporary. 26. Importance of Egypt. Centre of unrest shifted from North Sea and Western Europe to Mediterranean and Middle East. Egypt obvious place for central reserve, and has excellent flying climate. [g) Employment 27. Absence of literature on the subject. We have, how- ever, experience of the War to guide us, though it is not yet accessible on paper to any* extent. Need of R.A.F. Staff College to analyse principles and create school of thought. 28. First principle evolved during War is that multifarious duties of Air Service must be regarded and carried out as single co-ordinated effort. Any other system leads to waste of resources and loss of effect. 29. Second principle is that role of aeroplane is essentially offensive. Practically powerlesa for defensive action. Aerial predominance depends on moral predominance, which can only be acquired and maintained by incessant attack. 30. Constant attack also increases the- wearing down effect on enemy's ground troops, and weakens their moral and powers of resistance. 31. Third principle- is value of surprise. Difficult to attain. Aircraft must be- pushed close up behind the advanced troops to be in readiness-. to take immediate advantage of fleeting opportunities. 32. Negative principles also evolved. Range of aircraft, readiness for action, independence of communications and absence of obstacles tend to encourage their use. If used without forethought and understanding, and without power of sustained action, aircraft lose their moral effect and achieve- small, if any, material results. THE COMMERCIAL AIRSHIP—ITS OPERATION AND CONSTRUCTION BY COMMANDER SIR A TREVOR DAWSON, Bart., R.N., M.Inst.C.E., M.I.Mech.E. I. Introduction " , . II. The Case for the Airship The advantage of the large rigid airship for long-distance communications. The non-rigid airship also useful for surveying and exploration. The respective spheres of the aeroplane and airship ; they will not conflict, but co-operate. The airship not yet used for commercial purposes by this country. Experience with passenger airships in Germany before and since the War. III. The Operation of Airship Services The traffic possibilities—passengers and mails ; and most suitable routes. The size of airship required. Vital require- ments—safety and dependability. Accommodation and comfort. The influence of weather. The development of the- mooring tower. The necessity of training airship pilots. The life and maintenance of airships. Will the cost of opera- • tion be reasonable Need for experiment on a commercial, scale. State ownership or private enterprise. IV. Airship Construction and Development The airship suitable for commercial transport has still to- be developed. Type of airship required. The need for more- reliable engines. The possibility of using less inflammable- fuel. Outer cover fabric and gasbags required to withstand tropical conditions. Subjects for experiment and research.. The need for cheap production of hydrogen. Time required for construction. Reduction in cost of construction. German Aerodrome Buildings at Gotha IT is stated that after protracted discussions with the representatives of the German Government, the Inter-Allied Commission has now agreed that two of the extensive buildings at the aerodrome at Gotha are to be allowed to remain on the condition that they are converted into factory premises. The Germans desired to retain the buildings for ivil aviation. The "L.I 13 " arrives at Maubeuge FRANCE has now received the second Zeppelin awarded . under the Treaty of Versailles, the "L.113 " arriving at Maubeuge on the morning of October 9. The mist was so . thick when the airship arrived at 6 a.m. it was decided to» postpone the actual landing for three hours. Capt. Huon..' de Kermadu was in command, and there were 17 Germans officers and men on board. ^^ IO78
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