FlightGlobal.com
Home
Premium
Archive
Video
Images
Forum
Atlas
Blogs
Jobs
Shop
RSS
Email Newsletters
You are in:
Home
Aviation History
1920
1920 - 1147.PDF
NOVEMBER 4, 1920 THE SOMAL1LAND OPERATIONS !*•_•- SOME further details regarding the part played by the R.A.F.in destroying the power of the Mad Mullah in Somaliland in the early part of this year are contained in a dispatchdated May 15, 1920, from Mr. G. F. Archer, the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Somaliland Protectorate,just published in the London Gazette. The following are some extracts from this dispatch, setting/forth the salient points :— " Early in October, 1919, His Majesty's Government- accorded their sanction to the expedition, and the general scope oi, and responsibility for, the operations were, underagreement between the Air Ministry and the Colonial Office, defined as follows : An independent Air Force, self-containedin all respects, under the command of Group-Captain Gordon, taking his orders from the Air Ministry, was to attack theMullah, his followers and his stock, and to disperse them. In the event of these independent operations proving success-ful the rounding up of the Dervishes would be undertaken by the ground troops, when independent operations wouldcease and the Air Force would co-operate with the military forces of the Protectorate, the general direction of affairsbeing vested in myself by virtue of my dual functions as Governor and Commander-in-Chief. Tt was hoped that theunexpected attack, together with the moral effect created by the new Arm, would lead to the general disruption of theDervish forces, which could then be hunted down and dealt with in detail by the Protectorate mounted troops." Details are then given of the scheme of operations andthe preparation of the aerodromes. A report was dis- seminated that the latter work was the commencement ofthe oil-boring operations and this ruse, helped by the fact that no R.A.F. badges were worn, proved successful inpreventing anv suspicion being raised. When the main body of,the "Z" Unit, R.A.F., landedat Berbera from the '"' Ark Royal " it brought the R.A.F. strength up to 32 officers and 164 other ranks R.A.F. and4 officers and 25 other ranks R.A.F. Med.S. The details of the operations carried out were :" On January 21 six machines left Eil Dur Elan for the attack on Medishe, but, owing to clouds and the difficultiespresented by the intervening country, which was unknown and unmapped, only one machine found the position. Fourmachines located and bombed the Dervish fort and stock at Jidali, and one was forced to proceed to Las Khorai andland with engine trouble. The machine that found Medishe inflicted great damage. Subsequent reports of captives anddeserters, present at the time, show that Amir Hassan, the Mullah's uncle and one of the best known oi the Dervishleaders and ten riflemen were killed by the explosion of the first bomb. The Mullah himself, standing by Amir, narrowlyescaped death, his clothing being singed. It is said by Dervishes that he saw in the approaching aeroplanes a divinemanifestation ; by others that he was informed by a Turk in the haromt that they were Turkish aeroplanes on theirway to him from Stamboul to convey the Sultan's greetings. None at Medishe apparently knew that the European Warwas ended. However that may be, it is known that on the approach of the aeroplanes (the whole flight passed withinsight of Medishe) the Mullah collected his people around him and awaited their coming under the white canopy usedon State occasions. In the subsequent bombing and shooting upon this day the total casualties amongst the Dervishesin the haroun amounted to some twenty killed and twenty wounded. On the two succeeding days the aerial attackson Medishe and Jidali were maintained morning and after- noon, causing further casualties and great panic among theDervishes, who finally fled in all directions utterly demoralised. Machines descended to 800 ft. bombing and to 300 ft. machinegunning. The haroun was set on fire by incendiary bombs and the stock scattered. The results of the aerial bombard-ment had been communicated to the Officer Commanding Troops by wireless and by messages dropped from aeroplanes.Extensive reconnaissances over Medishe and Jidali and Bariat (lat. io°33',long. 47°33') on the 24th failed to reveal the presenceof any large body Of Dervishes or stock, and it was clear that the Mullah's forces were now scattered and in hiding. Orderswere accordingly given for combined operations to begin. Colonel Summers decided that he would advance at onceon Jidali, and, moving via Megedu (Bariat), he arrived with the mounted troops within sight of Jidali fort in the earlymorning of the 27th. It had been arranged between the Officer Commanding Troops and the Officer Commanding" Z" Unit that aeroplanes should bomb Jidali up to 10 o'clock that morning, after which the troops would move forwardand attack the fort if still held. " During the preliminary aerial bombardment of Jidalion the 27th some of the Dervish defenders hastily evacuated the position, fleeing in all directions into the buth ; but thefort remained lightly held, and the Camel Corps was ordered forward at 11 o'clock.By January 28, one week after the commencement of operations, Jidali and Baian had thus fallen into our handsand Medishe had been practically destioytd by the Royal Air Force. But the situation as to the whereabouts of theMullah and the main body of the Dervishes was still veiy obscure. He and his scattered forces had apparently retiredinto the hills to the north., but they had not been located, and no deserters or prisoners had as yet been brought in.Machines left Eil Dur Elan twice daily to reconnoitre the country about Surud and Medishe, and the foothills weiesearched as far as Las Khorai, landings being made there and at Baran and at the headquarters of the Officer Com-manding Troops. A reconnaissance alsowa.s made towards Tale. " That morning, January 31, at 10 o'clock aeroplanespatrolling the country east of Eil Afweina intercepted near Daringahiye (lat. g° 57', long. 47° 34'), bombed and shot upfrom ico ft. a party of horsemen escaping south -with the Mullah's own baggage and faster moving stock. " As soon as. the flight of the Mullah south was knownEil Afweina had been commissioned by Group-Captain ' Gordon as an advanced base for the Royal Air F#rce ; andon February 1 an aerial reconnaissance was carried out to ; Tale, which was located and bombed, valuable photographsbeing taken. These photographs revealed that Tale was a formidable, strongly-iortified position consisting of a main > • vwalled enclosure surmounted by 13 forts, with three covering forts of great height and strength distant about 2co yards.• . . By the aeroplane proceeding on the reconnaissance of February 1 I sent letters in Arabic to the Somali leadersacquainting them with the position and instructing them to :keep a close look-out as the Mullah and his following were in flight and now heading for Tale. On the following dayI was able to communicate by the same means with Captain Gibb, who was with the headquarters of the Tribal Levyat Duhung, in the central No gal, and I instructed him to gain early touch with the Camel Corps. As the friendlies hadby this time been let loose to participate in the round-up of the Dervish fugitives and stock, and as it was impossibleto distinguish between friendlies and Dervishes, Group- Captain Gordon issued orders to his officers to cease bombing.But preparations were made for an aerial bombardment of Tale, and three machines left on the 4th for this objective.In the course of the raid three direct hits with 112-lb. bombs and four with 20-lb. bombs were obtained on the mainposition, and a 2O-Jb. bomb was dropped on the Mullah's own fort without, however, effecting great material damage.The machines then flew low, machine-gunning and setting fire to the Dervish huts inside and outside the fortificationswith incendiary bombs, and part of the haroun was destioycd. The garrison returned the fire strongly from the forts. Good r"photographic work was done, and on the return journey the Camel Corps was located at Hudin, and messages dropped -to the Commanding Officer. From this time onwards, owing to the complete breakdown of the portable wirelesssets with the troops, ' Z ' force undertook the maintenance of communication and the carrying of despatches, whichwas of the greatest assistance." The despatch then continues with details of the movementsof the ground troops in their hunt for the fugitive Mullah, whose power, after declining for six years, was now definitelybroken. Mr. Archer continues :— " For this the credit is primarily due to the Royal AirForce, who were the main instrument of attack and the decisive factor. They exercised an immediate and tremen-dous moral effect over the Dervishes, who in the ordinary course are good fighting men, demoralising them in the firstfew days. There Mas thus no serious opposition, and the . operations assumed, almost from the start, the nature of ahunt. Our casualties among troops were confined to three t native ranks killed and eight wounded ; and one officer ofthe Camel Corps was slightly wounded. Neither the Royal Air Force nor the Royal Navy suffered casualties." Mr. Archer concludes his dispatch -with the following :•—" The good work of the officers of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force will no doubt obtain recognition throughtheir own service channel, but I desire to bring to Your Lordship's notice the conspicuous services rendered to theProtectorate by Group-Captain R. Gordon, C.M.G., D.S.O., at request of Air Ministry, and the valuable work performedby Captain G. G. P. Hewett, Royal Navy, H.M.S. Odin."
Sign up to
Flight Digital Magazine
Flight Print Magazine
Airline Business Magazine
E-newsletters
RSS
Events
