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Aviation History
1921
1921 - 0772.PDF
v the cheapest possible form of effective insurance against attack from the air. To do this he would devote all the funds that can be spared to the strengthening of the military air force by machines , and pilots. He would devote the money to securing an extra five or six squadrons, and would raise these by the aid of some sort of Auxiliary Air Force, a citizen force like the Territorials, but not neces- sarily on the Territorial basis altogether. The Service would then lead, and trade would follow the flag. •...-. • • • We do not profess to be able to under- stand Sir Hugh Treitchard's attitude of Attitude ? mind. He thinks the present subsidy to civil aviation might possibly provide him, as a reserve, with a limit number of ioo machines and ioo pilots, and prefers his five or six partially trained auxiliary squadrons to these. On the face of it, we do not think this indicates clear thinking at all. We take it he is thinking that his five or six squadrons would be complete with their ground organisation, which would be lacking in the case of the ioo civilian pilots. But why should it ? We have suggested in these pages more than once that if the civilian element is to supply a reserve against emergency it should be organised on the lines of the Royal Naval Reserve. If it were, we can see more than the five or six squadrons eventuating out of even that number of machines and pilots, with all the ground staffs and other personnel attached to civil air transport. The whole thing seems so extra- ordinary to us that we are perforce compelled to look behind the scenes for the influence which has led the Chief of the Air Staff to go back on opinions previously expressed and to show himself as the champion of Service aviation and the enemy—for Jiis speech shows that this is hardly too strong a term—of the civilian side. Our argument has always been that both sides of aviation are of equal necessity to the prosperity and safety of the realm and the Empire. In that view we are supported by all who have taken the trouble to think more than superficially about the subject, or who have approached it from any but the narrow sectional standpoint of the Service. At the very present moment our representatives are at Washington engaged upon the discussion of ways and means for limiting armaments, yet this is the time chosen by the Chief of the Air Service to administer a snub to civil aviation and to plead for the extension of our 'military resources. Worse still, if his views met with general acceptance, they would have the effect of robbing the military side of its most valuable auxiliary. It passes understanding. • ~ «. «. «. - . . Speaking at Amiens recently, the Chief of the General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson, suggested that it was for those who and govern the world to ponder whether, Aircraft, if they wanted to limit the horrors of war, it would not be better to limit aeroplanes rather than submarines. He had been speaking of the bombing of defenceless towns from the air, which, he said, seemed to be on the whole a development of a movement for killing women and children. Soldiers did not like it; they would prefer to fight matters out themselves. This sounds rather like a lead to the Washington Conference, coming from so distinguished and _. : ' - ;-. • ~ ' v NOVEMBER 24, 1921 influential an authority, a lead which we hope may produce at least some useful discussion even if it should result in nothing tangible. The subject is a very difficult one. For reasons which are obvious, we do not desire to see1 any restrictions placed in the way of the legitimate development of aerial transport. But unless something of the sort is done, we do not quite see how the desired end is to be attained with any absolute safety from abuse by any Power minded to take advantage. Unquestionably aviation will develop. More efficient machines than we have ever known, and more of them, will be built. Their radius of action and their weight-carrying capacity will be increased out of knowledge, and while it is true that the ideal commercial machine is not the best adapted for war, conversely, any machine is better . than none when it comes to aggressive action against a country which is ill- prepared to resist attack from the air. Apparently, the British delegates to Washington are not inclined to go very far in the limitation of aircraft and their use in war. It is pointed out that, while the submarine may be the engine of assassination at sea, it does not exert any great moral pressure on an enemy. On the ground that its murders are useless and fail of effect, our delegates are all for forbidding its use by belligerents. The case of aircraft they argue, is different, because the bombing of an enemy's cities may exercise such a powerful moral and material effect on his population that his Government may be brought to admit defeat or at least to'make a peace less advantageous to himself than would be the case were the issues of war left to the armies in the field. Unquestionably the argument is a very strong one, but the question is whether the material end justifies the immorality of the means. Our own view is that it does not. and we should be extremely pleased if any effective means could be devised of ensuring that aircraft attack on open towns and cities should not be carried out. It must be clear, however, that we do not desire to achieve this end by limiting development of commercial aircraft either as to construction or as to numbers. That is the last thing in the world to be countenanced. Is it, however, any use. to pass international laws forbidding this form of warfare ? Poison gas was expressly excluded by the Laws oi Nations, yet we know what happened in the War. The sinking of peaceful merchantmen again was excluded from the legitimate operations of war, but the Germans carried it to lengths which set the whole civilised world against them and their fiendishness. Would a law against the bombing and gassing of open towns be of any more avail ? We are inclined to think it might with the example of Germany before us. It was her utter disregard of all the laws and usages of civilised war that caused the whole of the civilised peoples to take up arms against her, culminating in the declaration of war by the United States. Is it probable that an aggressively-inclined Power, with that example to read, would run the risks that in the end brought unparalleled ruin and disaster upon Germany ? We do not think so, and we incline to the belief that if the Washington Conference agrees that there shall be no more war made on civilian populations, its decrees will be observed, not always because treaties and solemn bonds are not invariably regarded as mere scraps of paper, but because of the dire consequences that must inevitably befall any Power which outraged its undertaking. 772
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