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Aviation History
1922
1922 - 0193.PDF
MARCH 30, 192a to maintain the integrity of their country. The Air Minister told them that for this specific purpose he had three units. No one had ever seen what an air attack would be like. We were going to have air attacks in 1919, and as he was partly responsible for preparing them, he knew that the facts and figures given by General Groves were perfectly accurate. Nobody ever attempted to bomb a place with more than fifty aeroplanes during the War, but it would be quite easy, and no doubt would be done if ever they went to war, to bombard with 300 aeroplanes, which would carry, not the little bombs that were carried by the thirty-six aeroplanes that raided London, but bombs at least ten times that weight and at least four or five time the effective power per weight of projectile dropped. It was hopeless to attempt to protect yourself against raids with 300 aeroplanes. It took 32,000 men to protect London against the raids of thirty-six machines, and then they only made it more difficult for them. He urged that in order to meet the new kind of danger in future we must have the most highly skilled staff and men, and we must have the power of expansion. We had a very much larger proportion of skilled pilots than any other country, and he believed that in technical training we were as great as, if not greater than, any other country. But in power of expansion we were ridiculously short, as compared with other nations. We should, therefore, so encourage civil aviation as to have a reserve by which in an emergency our machines could be greatly increased. Lieut.-Colonel Moore-Brabazon said that for over a hundred years the Navy had been the spoiled darling of the nation. But it was for one reason only, and that was that they could defend us. But a vast change had taken place. If the Channel were dried up, could the Navy defend us ? Some thing tantamount to that had occurred when the air became an avenue of attack. Consequently the Navy could no longer be responsible for the defence of the country. He had heard it said that the Navy alone could protect the commerce of the country on the high seas. During the War the Navy was unable to do that without the assistance of air power. In these circumstances, was it not logical to put a Service which could not do a thing under a Service which could ? Surely, people realised now that the Navy today was obsolescent. The poor Air Force was attacked from every side, but that force did know that they were a power for economy. We had a certain amount of money to spend on defence, and we must use it to the best advantage. From the point of view of defence, the Air Force must take first -place. And yet, while £130,000,000 was allotted to the Army and Navy, only £10,000,000 was allotted to our first line of defence. Sir W. Joynson-Hicks said the next war would be a war in which women and children would be bound to suffer as much as men, and would probably break out without the possibility of our knowing twenty-four hours beforehand. We were as vulnerable from the air as France was, and it was ridiculous to say we were prepared for the future with half a dozen Service squadrons at our disposal. He asked whether any arrangement had been made with regard to the new kingdom of Egypt for our hold upon Egypt as an air centre. He was one of those who believed that the air was destined in the future very largely to supersede both the Navy and the Army. Knowing all that the Air Service did •during the War, knowing what those of them who believed in the Air had prophesied, he wanted the House to approach the question from the point of view that the Air in the next few years was going to be the paramount Service, and was not going to be looked upon merely as an auxiliary. The question would be, how much money it was desirable to transfer from the Navy and the Army to the Service which would gradually take the place of these two great ' Services. Field-Marshal Sir H. Wilson said soldiers and sailors were as fully alive to the coming powers of the air as anybody in the Air Force. It was because they wanted to have all the power possible from the air that they disliked an independent Air Force, and not because they disparaged the air. That it was absolutely essential to guarantee a supply of air machines, and even of personnel, as between the Navy and the Army was certain ; but he challenged the contention that because they did that they must go another step, and have an Air Force independent of the Navy or the Army. So far as he knew, we were the only country that had decided to have an independent Air Force. What was happening now was that in order to become autonomous the Air Force was duplicating practi cally every service in the Army and the Navy, at a time when we were very hard up. He did not quite understand the decision—that the Air should take over anti-air defence at home. Here we were IfUgg] duplicating a complete little service ; for it was quite certain that in any future theatre of operations there would have to be anti-aircraft. We were spending very little money on, and getting very little from, civil aviation. If a big war came, the Air Force would require an enormous expan sion. He therefore pleaded strongly for a big sum of money to be devoted to civil aviation, on which we should have to depend for such expansion. Lord H. Cecil said that no discipline and management of the Air Force was possible unless that Force was indepen dent, and he hoped that the Government would not fritter away their wise decision to maintain a separate Air Force by, under the name of co-operation, conceding any control of discipline, promotion, or training either to the Navy or to the Army. As to home defence, there was no advantage in having only three squadrons. Either they must compete with Continental nations, or they must make no attempt whatever. The arguments used filled him with the con viction that the whole thing was impossible. An air struggle between two European Great Powers could only result in the total destruction of both. Colonel Wedgwood said the debate was highly valuable. What we had to do now was to instil into the minds of the Admirality and War Office some conception of the power and capacity of the new arm. Most people must now see that the Navy was not our first line of defence, but rather the Air Force. A discussion then followed upon an amendment put forward by Lieut.-Col. W. Guinness to the following effect : " In the opinion of this House, to enable the best use to be made of the Air Service, all defence forces should be represented on and their activities co-ordinated by the Committee- of Imperial Defence, which should meet regularly and fre quently ; and that a Minister, who is not departmentally responsible for any of the fighting Services should be appointed as permanent Vice-Chairman of the Committee, to take the Chair in the absence of the Prime Minister." Mr. Churchill ultimately replied to the whole discussion by saying- the question of first importance raised by the debate was, " Ought there to be a separate Air Service ? " But, surely, for the time being, at any rate, there was in existence a separate Air Service established by Act of Parlia ment. It was born in the convulsions of the Great War. The only question now was whether we should go back on our experiences derived from the War and repeal the Act setting up the Air Ministry. The developments which were in progress in the War were, owing to our having run short of Germans, never reached. Had- it been continued another year, or a year and a-half, people would have seen an entirely new consideration brought into the whole struggle. Military science as it was at the close of the struggle must be our starting point for the future. A separate Air Force existed by Act of Parliament, and extraordinarily strong arguments would have to be adduced by those who wished to make a change. We must be sure that in the great developments which were taking place we had leadership in all forms of aerial war from a defensive point of view. The greatest form of defence would undoubtedly be offence. Did the House think the Air Service would get its chance if it were separated into two parts—one handed over to the Navy and the other to the Army The whole prejudices of the higher officers of the Army and Navy must lead them to depreciate the possibilities of this new and subversive element. As to the relations of the Air Force and the Navy, he felt that it was the business of the Air Force to cater for the Navy, just as it catered for the Colonial Office. They knew how easily the relations of the Army with the Air Force in France were adjusted in the course of the War. But the Navy was more specialised in some ways, and it would be a great mistake for the Air Ministry not to put the Admiralty at their ease in this matter. A Committee had been set up to examine the question, and he believed that they would be able to come to an agreement. The point was not the division of the responsibility as if it were booty to be shared, but the harmonious association of the three Services in the discharge of a common duty. There was no final solution of a harmonious kind of these difficulties except in a Ministry of Defence. But they could not possibly achieve that at the present time. The practical steps which it was open to them to take were being taken. The creation of the brain of a common service was to be the subject of an enquiry by a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. A system of training which would unite officers of middle rank in the three Services ought not to be delayed, and the sub-committee was being set up with directions to formulate such a scheme. He thought that was all it was wise and practicable for them to do this year. The amendment was then withdrawn.
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