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Aviation History
1922
1922 - 0441.PDF
AUGUST 3, 1922 AIR FORCE AND THE A DISCUSSION of some moment took place in the House of Lords on July 27, in response to a question to the Under- Secretary of State for Air by the Marquess of Londonderry. The Marquess asked whether the Government realised the anxiety of the nation with regard to the alleged deficiencies of the Air Service in all its branches, especially with regard to its naval and home defence sides, and whether he was in a position to make a statement. It was imperative, he said, that there should be real co-ordination between the three arms of the Service. He had recently noticed that a journalistic war was being waged against the Air Ministry. He did not know how far it had disturbed the Air Minister. The criticism as usual, in his opinion, was intended to injure the Govern ment rather than benefit the Air Service. He hoped the Government would be able to tell their lordships of the relative importance of the three arms of the Service. The arguments in favour of a separate Air Force appeared to him over whelming, and he did not want the Air Force unduly developed at the expense of the Navy or Army, or vice versa. But he wanted the money that would be necessary to allocate to the Services apportioned with a close regard to the actual services which each arm could render. There was the question of civil aviation, and its bearing on the fighting Service—how far civil aviation could be the reservoir in time of war for the Air Service. How much would it cost to raise a large reserve through the instrumentality of civil aviation ? Would it be less costly than providing regular squadrons ? Lord Montagu of Beaulieu thought the. Air Ministry had been unjustly attacked by some of its critics for not doing certain things for which it had not the money. He had never seen any reason to change his opinion that an indepen dent Air Ministry and Air Service were vital to the country. As time went on he thought there was more reason for main taining that separate Air Service, A terrible attack from the air would be the first sign of war in the future, and the Navy and the Army would not be able to ward it off. It was absolutely vital that we should have an independent Air Force, continue the Air Ministry, and regard it more and more as our first line of defence. Air Service training was a thing quite apart from any other form of training. The idea that they could take a naval officer or a military officer for a time and then return him to his Service was a fallacy. They must get the air officer young and keep him as long as they could. He supported the request made by the noble mar quess. He considered that the Air Ministry had done extremely well, considering the limited means at its disposal. Lord Sydenham said there might have been exaggerations in the Press, but he thought the anxiety which the public had felt on this subject had been fully justified. The present position was dangerous and deplorable. Though it was probable there would be no great war for several years, only dreamers believed wars were at an end. The Navy would be incomplete and handicapped if it were not provided with an adequate Air Force thoroughly trained at sea. It must be an integral part of the Navy. The Admiralty ought to be responsible for the strength and efficiency of its own air branch. Viscount Long said he became convinced in the early stages of the Conferences in 1919-1920 that the proposal to set up an Air Ministry with absolute control of the Air Force of either the Army or Navy, or both, was doomed to failure. If they were to secure both efficiency and economy they must have an Air Force which was part of the naval system under the control of the Navy and run by them. They needed a review of the whole situation, naval, military, and air. He hoped the Government would not commit themselves im mediately to the final adoption of the plan now working. We must have an Air Ministry, for which there was plenty of work. It must have charge of the selection of types of flying machine, the purchase of materials and construction. But the Navy must be responsible for its own Air Force, have full control over it, and its cost should be a part of the Navy Estimates. . Lord Gorell, Under-Secretary of State for Air, said the Marquess of Londonderry had stated that the Air Ministry had been suffering under a journalistic war. He would not go quite so far as that. There had been a very great deal of attention paid to the whole question of air power lately, and that was a very hopeful sign. Some of the criticism had been of great assistance. The great bulk of it had been very uninformed. There was no doubt that in certain quarters, there had been deliberate misrepresentation. He was asked only the previous day by a friend of his why it was that certain journals seemed to have been inspired by personal animus in their attacks on the Air Ministry. He gave then the reason BBS) NAVY IN THE LORDS he would give their lordships, that there were certain journals controlled by Lord Rothermere, who was, for a short time, in charge of the Air at the Hotel Cecil, and whilst there was in daily contact with our present Air Marshal—who was certainly distinguished for saying frankly and straightforwardly what he thought. It might be presumed that that straightforward ness and frankness might have ruffled Lord Rothermere, and that he was not now able to forget and take a wider than the personal view. In October last year he went very fully into the cost of a separate Ministry. He attempted then to show that so far as cost could be estimated at all, a separate Air Ministry was less costly than two Services would be, and no answer had been given to the figures he gave. The first question of the noble marquess he could answer quite definitely. There was, undoubtedly, now a great potential menace from the air. If there should be unhappily in the future an outbreak of a great war, we could confidently rely upon the air playing a very much greater part than it did in the last war. It was probable that the raiding would be continuous on docks, factories, food depots, and on mobilisation places, and that called, undoubtedly, for a revision of our ideas. It was fairly obvious that it would be the endeavour of every belli gerent Power to put out the maximum of air effort in the very first days of the war, There was a considerable divergence of view as to whether the menace from the air was greater than that from the sea. It must to some extent be hypothetical. Except for the fact that the German Fleet was at the bottom of the sea the old menace remained, and one could go no farther in any claims in regard to the air than to say that to the old menace had been added this great and almost unknown new menace. Nothing that land or sea forces could do could prevent this menace from the air. All he could say about the allocation of funds was that the question had been before the Committee of Imperial Defence for a long time, and they were carefully considering the matter. They had seen and heard in the Press comparisons between the air power of this country and the air power of France. Did anyone who had had experience of the past war regard the air power of France as a menace to this country ? He absolutely refused to believe the word " menace " in that connection. Our strength and that of the French would, if necessary, maintain peace and establish it. Having dealt with the distribution of our air squadrons, he said as regards ground organisation during the war, it took 86 men on the ground to keep one machine in commission in the air. That number had been considerably reduced, but it must always be large. As to the cost of squadrons, the total estimated expenditure on the Royal Air Force, including India, for 1922-23, was £15,177,500, for 32 squadrons, which was roughly £474,300 each. If they added 20 squadrons at home to these, the total cost would be £17,227,000 for 52 squadrons, and the cost per squadron would be roughly £331,300. If the number was increased to 100 squadrons, the total cost would be £24,000,000, or £240,000 per squadron. So that the larger the organisation was, the less relatively the overhead charges were. After defending the policy of the Ministry in regard to buildings, he dealt with the relations of the Air Force and the Navy. There were in co-operation with the Navy, employed on reconnaissance, spotting, torpedo-carrying, and bombing, 62 machines, and in training, etc., 21, a total of 83. In addition, there were reserve machines to cover replacement 46, and reserve in store 229, giving a total of 275, making a grand total of 35S machines. As to the Army, there had been definitely allotted 28 machines, and there were 45 units upon which the Army could call for co-operation, while an addition of 18 units were available in urgent circumstances, and 20 for training, making a total of nr. In addition, there were 60 held as a first reserve, and 6 more were available for assistance in field training. These figures could be varied according to the requirements of the Army and Navy. The Army and the Navy had the fullest operational control over the units allotted to them. It was an entire travesty of the facts to say that naval and military commanders had no responsibility for them. The Geddes Committee recommended that the aircraft available for co-operation with the Navy should be cut down from 6J squadrons to 2. The Navy at present had 5 § squadrons, which was a " cut " of one. The Committee recommended in regard to the Army that the air craft should be " cut " from three squadrons to one. The Army had 2-| squadrons, a " cut " of a half. There were more squadrons allocated for co-operation with the Navy than there were for independent work—pre ference had been given for the requirements of the Navy. 441
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