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Aviation History
1923
1923 - 0130.PDF
Thus, in the matter of choice of routes and machines, it will be obvious that the company must decide purely on a commercial basis, although closely allied with the problem is the potential military value to the country of the route chosen and, to a smaller extent, of the machines decided upon. It can easily be imagined that one route might be of great military •> value, but might be so unpromising from a com- mercial point of view that it could not be contemplated by a company whose first duty was to make the service pay. There is then the question of types of machines. The argument is often advanced that commercial aircraft could, in time of war, quickly be converted into troop transports, bombers, etc. Pei son ally, we are somewhat doubtful on this point. To us it appears iather that we have come to the parting of the ways, and that the military and commercial types will, in the future, tend to become more and more specialised, and that, therefore, the question of the possibility of conversion becomes less and Jess impor- tant. Rather do we think that the development of the truly commercial aeroplane should be quite unhampered by any other considerations than to make it safe, reliable and economical. Again, on the question of personnel, we are of the opinion that—without any direct thought to their usefulness in time of war—the pilots, navigators and ground staff would gain such experience in their everyday life as would be of the utmost value to the country in time of need. The pilots and navigators would be skilled in their metier as such, and any specialised knowledge which might be required of them for war emergencies could be acquired in a very short course of instruction. A possible exception to this would be seaplane personnel, and we confess that we are not without misgivings as to the way in which considerations of the seaplane have been omitted in the report. After many years of neglect, the seaplane is at last to be given an opportunity to develop, and a service is being started this spring between Southampton and France and the Channel Islands. Now, it is at any rate conceivable that the new company may decide that, as little or no data on seaplane services are available, it will not speculate on a relatively uncertain seaplane undertaking, when there is a lot of information available relating to aeroplane services. Thus the seaplane may be left out entirely, which would be a catastrophe in view of the value which a trained seaplane personnel would have in a case of national^ emergency. The problems in seaplane work are quite different from those of land machines, and the training of personnel is considerably more difficult. Yet under the new scheme the country has no guarantee that seaplanes will not be dropped entirely. In the placing of orders for machines, the new com- pany may be regarded as a customer, unbiassed and buying in the open market. On the face of it, therefore, it may be assumed that the orders will go to the firm which produces the best machine. At the same time, looking upon the matter purely from a business point of view, as the new company must and will do, does it not appear probable that the decision will go to an existing type of which reliable information is available, rather than to a possibly more promising type as yet in its experimental stage ? And certainly for the sake of economy the number of different types will be reduced to a minimum so as to reduce MARCH 8, 1923 the number of spares, etc. Once a type has been standardised it will not easily be discarded for a new, unless the latter shows startling improvements, and as a very large proportion of the expenses of running a service is connected with matters outside the machines used, there is, we think, considerable danger of stagnation in design. It is even possible to visualise the establishment by the company of its own aircraft factory, a state of affairs which would leave the entire aircraft industry out of the running, and entirely vitiate the purpose for which the million sterling subsidy was granted. This is a possibility which has not, we think, been given the consideration which it deserves. The company is to be given a virtual monopoly of air transport. We do not' want to see that turned also into a monopoly of construction. At least, provision should be made against such a situation arising. Probably the fairest commencement would be by the asking for designs to certain specifications, drawn up by, or on behalf of, the company, every aircraft firm in the industry receiving the specifica- tions and being asked to supply designs. The drafting of the specification and the judging of the designs would be no easy task, but with all its possibilities of things going wrong could, it appears to us, be made fairer to the industry in general. • * • In connection with the R.A.F. Reserve sThaia°f scheme, details of which were published Schools? m our issue of February 15, 1923, it was announced that four civilian flying schools would be established, one at Edgware, one . at Bristol, one at Coventry, arid one at Glasgow. That is all to the good, but what of the sea ? Surely it is at least as important to have a school where pupils may learn to pilot seaplanes. The whole training of seaplane personnel is far more difficult than the training of the corresponding land personnel. Yet the Air Ministry appears to have overlooked entirely the question of a civilian seaplane school. Even if the Air Ministry has not the foresight and knowledge (there are precious few officials with seaplane knowledge now serving in the Air Ministry, and most of those who do possess it are in departments , where their knowledge is of no use) to appreciate : the vital importance to the nation of developing the seaplane, surely in its own interest it might be expected not to give the Navy a peg on which to hang its hat, by affording the advocates of a Naval Air Service one more opportunity of complaining that nothing is being done with seaplanes and marine aircraft and personnel in general. We know perfectly well that the reply to this argument will be that the Air Ministry is limited by the Treasury. Certainly it is, but we do submit that it would have been far better to have established but three land flying schools and one seaplane school. The cost would then have been no greater, and the interests of the nation (and incidentally those of the Air Ministry itself) would have been better served. There is still time to xeconsider the situation, and we strongly urge that some such arrangement be made. The Air Ministry killed airships, and may be now regretting it. To the ordinary observer it appears very much as if the Air Ministry was doing its level best to kill seaplanes, and we are quite certain that it will—if it lives long enough for the Navy to come along and take over seaplane work— regret it more even than it regretted airships. 130
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