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Aviation History
1924
1924 - 0058.PDF
attitude towards aviation as a real factor in strategy, whether with land or sea forces, was most anxious to see that from thenceforward every opening for the employment of aircraft should be utilised in the movements of the Grand Fleet. Not that this " repentance " was in any way broadcasted to the world. On the contrary, it was kept a profound official secret, so far as it was possible, having regard to the requisition of R.A.F. co-operation. Where the cat was observable emerging from the bag was in the sudden anxiety of a number of backers of the Admiralty to create, in various ways, an atmosphere of the Air Arm being of no use whatever to the Navy, except in an entirely disassociated form from the Air Force. All the Air Force was fit for was to fool around with the Army. The Navy Air Section must be entirely distinct and independent of any co-operation with any other section of Imperial Defence, no matter how its functions might be duplicated and its work overlap the efforts of the R.A.F. to give the best results in the Air for the national interests. No stone has been left unturned since the Armistice to carry on this campaign for a separate Air Force for the Navy, but, fortunately, wiser counsels have prevailed with those who have had the last say on Imperial questions, and each time when a new source of attack has been advanced, the result has always been the same—an emphatic refusal to allow anything but a separate and single Air Force. That most of the attacks by the champions for the Navy were of the crudest description was hardly their fault. The arguments in support of their contentions were so few and weak, that the more they were advanced, the greater was the ex posure of the futility of carrying the discussion further. That the Admiralty's dignity, however, should be considered, was a different matter, and from that point of view sympathy could well be expressed and an endeavour made to meet points in detail which would minimise the inevitable decision that the Admiralty must make up its mind to accept a work ing arrangement with the Air Ministry, in place of the separate Air Arm which it was anxious to create for itself. Hence the appointment of Committees by the Government to enquire into the whole position, with the result that the old conclusions were again arrived at and even emphasised as being the only solution to the problem of Imperial Defence in the Air. The appointment, therefore, of a Sub-Committee of the " Committee of Imperial Defence " to examine into and make recommendations upon the question of " National and Imperial Defence," especially as to methods of co-operation and correlation between the Navy, Army and Air Force was an inspiration worthy of the Prime Minister as a constructive contribution to the solution of the various obstructive tactics which have been, in the past, so systematically placed in the way for a smooth working organisation Even at this late hour, there are indications of renewed activity on behalf of the Admiralty in the " Notices of Motion " which have been tabled for the new Session in Parliament on February 12. It may be these are mere phantoms, but the putting down of the questions is indicative of the existence still of the unscotched efforts of partisans who are able only to visualise Imperial questions from their own individual standpoint. JANUARY 31, In the Report issued at the end of last week, as the result of the many meetings of this Sub-Committee, the main portions of which are published this week elsewhere in FLIGHT, testify to the thoroughness with which the members of that Committee approached their work, and the care which has been so scru pulously taken to weigh'all arguments for and against the various views which have been so diligently advanced. What emerges, to our mind, is that the Report presents the whole matters in dispute in such form that it should be easy for all concerned to smooth • out all their differences, without loss of prestige or dignity to one or the other, and evolve a really harmonious working arrangement that will once and for all settle all the petty difficulties which have been raised as to methods of procedure and details of routine, which after all, are but grooves which have grown up by custom, and with so new a revelation as to the power lurking in the utilisation of the Third Element, should be open to variation in the broadest sense of the worcfc That the path has been shorn of its worst snags by the diplomatic treatment in the report of the queries dealt with may be gathered from some of the conclusions which are there set out. In this connec tion they say :— (a) While the Committee do not put forward any suggestion to change the existing division of respon sibility between the three Services as described in the Report, they recommend that the responsibilities of the Navy and the Air Force in regard to the pro tection of communications in the narrow seas should form the subject of further investigation. The Committee further recommend that experiment in respect of the problems of air attack and defence at sea should be given due weight in Admiralty and Air Ministry programmes, in order to secure on the basis of practical experience the fullest measure of unity of professional opinion. (b) The principal need, as regards co-operation and correlation, is closer co-ordination (dealt with in Part III of the Report). (c) The principle that in all belligerent operations in which more than one Service is concerned one of the three Services should be selected as a " pre dominant partner " to co-ordinate the other Services should be examined by the Committee of Chiefs of Staffs. In the final Report of the Sub-Committee, the General Problem is clearly set out, and it is stated :— " They do not think that the present system can remain altogether unchanged ; neither do they think it possible to sever completely the Air organisation which does work for the Fleet from the Air organisa tion which is responsible for Home Defence against air attack and for co-operating with the Army in other theatres of operation. A course somewhere between these two extremes is the one we recom mend " In conclusion, based upon the evidence and facts obtained, the thirteen Recommendations (now re published in FLIGHT) are of a constructive character, and should help materially to create a new feeling of mutual help, subject to there being " the will to work together." We sincerely trust the outcome of this Report may be as beneficial as the extremely long investi gations and careful conclusions justify. 58
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