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Aviation History
1929
1929 - 0033.PDF
JANUARY 3, 1929 THE WAR IN THE AIR* WHILE it was undoubtedly a great misfortune, as well as a tragedy, that Sir Walter Raleigh should have died after producing the first volume of "The War in the Air," so breaking the continuity of the work, the student of history may congratulate himself that so good a successor as Mr. Jones should have been found. His task must have been difficult, not only because he had to succeed one who had made an excellent start, but also because in many ways it must be harder to describe actual operations than to write an introductory volume. His publication had to be, not a history of the war, but one of a certain arm which took part in that war. The author had to steer a patli between giving so little of the general operations that the doings of the air services would be unintelligible to anyone who had not taken part in them, and giving so much of the general history that the book would cease to be a specialist work. Mr. Jones has steered that course with excellent judgment, and has given neither too much nor too little of the general fighting. Again, the history of the war in the air is largely a record of technical development, but obviously the work would have had but a limited value if its scope had been confined too much to the design rooms at Kingston, Filton and elsewhere. Again, Mr. Jones is very judicious. He explains, quite plainly enough for the general reader, yet not in such elementary style as to irritate flying men, why it was that the Fokker at one time achieved a mastery in the air, and how it was that the F.E. (which he wrongly explains as meaning " Farman Experimental " instead of " Fighting Experimental ") 2b and the D.H.2 ultimately mastered it. The public ;it the time knew but little of these technicalities and of the war between the brains of designers. To the public an aeroplane was just as aeroplane. Mr. Jones has explained that there was a good deal more in it than that. The development of tactics and strategy in the use of air- craft is also traced with just the right amount of emphasis. Tactics in the air date from a Flying Corps order of January 14, 1916, which enjoined formation flying. Its success was immediate, and on February 7 of that year one of our recon- naissance machines escorted by three B.E.2c's flew for 53 mins. over the lines, and returned, still in formation, with 14 enemy machines hanging round the flanks and rear. Still, one rather wonders why the Germans did not show more enterprise. It is interesting to note that formation flying was originally ordered as an expedient " Until the Royal Flying • Tht War in the Air. Vol. 2. By H. A. (ones. (The Clarendon Pr«s.17s fid.) Corps are in possession of a machine as good as or better than the German Fokker." Air strategy dates from about the same, time, and meant the practical application of the principle that attack is the best defence. It sounds simple, but the Air Staff does not yet dare to carry this principle to its logical conclusion and dispense with squadrons of fighters from the Air Defences of Great Britain. Presumably, army reconnaissance aeroplanes will always need a certain amount of protection, but in other respects the principle means that all air energies must be concentrated on damaging the enemy's aerodromes, forces, and lines of communication. For a long time the Germans adopted the defensive principle, and used their aircraft to try to defend points behind their own lines, with results disastrous to themselves. It was Boelcke who changed that, and von Richthofen carried on his work. This volume does not deal only with the Royal Flying Corps. It gives equal attention to the Royal Naval Air Service, and recounts much work by that body which is not generally known. Seaplanes, airships, and kite balloon receive their due share of attention, as well as land-planes The volume covers the years 1915 and 1916, and deals with the air work at Gallipoli, the fighting in Flanders from Neuve Chapelle to the end of the Somme battles, and then the work over the North Sea including the famous battle of Jutland. The account of Jutland is particularly interesting, though one rather marvels at the restraint with which the neglect of aircraft by the navy is recorded. The aircraft carrier Campania did not accompany the Grand Fleet from Scapa Flow because, for some extraordinary reason, she did not receive her orders to sail and did not realise until two and a half hours afterwards that the Grand Fieet had sailed. She tried to catch up, but was so far behind that Jellicoe ordered her to return to Scapa. It is a curious story. But still more inexplicable is the well-known fact that, though the carrier Engadine was with the battle cruisers under Beatty, she was only ordered to send up one seaplane (a Short piloted by Flight-Lieut. F. J. Rutland) during the battle. Mr. Jones remarks that the battle's " interest to the student of air power lies, not in what aircraft did, but in what opportunities of perhaps vital importance were open for their use." It is certainly maddening to read of our admirals groping blindly for the Germans and not using the eyes which were available for them ; while on the morning of June 1, the Zeppelins were able to keep von Scheer informed of where the British were. Consequently the High Seas Fleet was sunk off Scapa Flow instead of off Tutland. F. A. DE V. R. A Russian " Pusher " : This motor sledge, with driver ' s seat forward and an enclosed cabin for the passen- gers, is fitted with a Bristol "Lucifer" engine. mm m m m m m m £ S s m m IS
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