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Aviation History
1931
1931 - 0310.PDF
FLIGHT, APRIL 3, 1931 without risk, on the weather forecast which had been given to them, and if they thought it safe to start, naturally no one else would feel any qualms. Truly we have learnt wisdom after the event (a notoriously easy task) and we know now that R101 ought not to have started for India when she did. The trial flights had been cut short. The airship had had no full speed trials since the extra bay had been inserted. She had, it is true, ridden out a tremendous gale at the head of the tower, but she had not met really bad weather in flight. It was not unreasonable to conclude that the greater test included the lesser, and that a ship which could stand up to a gust of 80 m.p.h. at the tower would not be worried by a wind of 50 m.p.h. in free air. But, as Squadron Leader Booth expressed it, a psychological effect was produced by the imminence of the Imperial Conference. It seems almost certain that Lord Thomson's eagerness to make the flight weighed more with the experts than his repeated instructions that the experts must not be influenced by that desire. The experts thought that there was no reason whyithe journey should not be undertaken ; though, had there been no Imperial Conference loom- ing ahead, they would probably have insisted on further trial flights. A fatal loss of gas after six hours' flying was evidently the last thing which they anticipated ; and when we look back, as the Report urges us to do, to the conditions before the start, we must agree that this did not seem at all a probable contingency. The Court naturally cannot reconstruct the exact history of the loss of gas, or discover precisely the cause for it. It came out in evidence that R101 normally lost much more gas than was the case with the " Graf Zeppelin." On the other hand, her normal loss of gas was considerably less than that of R100, which had safely flown to Canada and back, and had survived much worse atmospheric conditions than were actually met on the last flight of R101. The cause for the unusually great loss of gas during the two Hendon flights was believed to have been removed, and the belief was certainly justifiable. For some reason, at which we can only guess, R101 lost gas on her last flight to an unprecedented degree, and this proved to be her undoing. The Report puts forward more than one hypothesis, which may, either inde- pendently or in conjunction, have caused the disaster. The outer cover may have ripped (as it had done once before when the ship was at the tower) and the wind, getting inside, may have buffeted the gas bags and caused them to rip. Flapping fabric of the outer cover may have caused the valves to " chatter " and let out gas. The unusual rolling of the ship may also have affected the valves. These are all speculations. All that we can assert with confidence is that too much gas was lost, and that the circumstances of the gale and the change of watch prevented the officers in charge from realising this in time to take steps which might have saved the airship. The report very carefully refrains from making any recommendation as to future airship policy. That, is a question for the Cabinet. We cannot help wondering whether the present Cabinet, harassed as it is said to be by Budget troubles and a trade depression, is actually in that calm and judicial frame of mind which fits it to take such a momentous decision. The temptation to get rid of a source of expenditure at a moment when the public is depressed by a tragedy and when practically no airship experts survive in Great Britain to bring forward arguments on the other side, may well prove very strong. Certainly, at the moment, the Cabinet would not be likely to incur any widespread unpopularity if it decided to cease further airship experiments in Great Britain. That, however, is not the spirit in which questions of such importance ought to be decided. It would, no doubt, be possible to design an airship in which the loss of gas would be no greater than it is in the " Graf Zeppelin." There is nothing in this report which would condemn an airship in which the gas was well protected. But the disaster has had one definite effect—namely, that everyone is agreed that the use of hydrogen involves too much risk. Scott was firmly convinced that safety would be assured if petrol were dispensed with, but he certainly thought of a ship in the air, not of a ship hitting the ground. .Now, everyone, including the Americans and the Germans, has come to the conclusion that we must use helium or not go up in airships. At the present price of helium, it seems impossible that a commercial airship inflated with that gas could pay its way. The cost of helium may, of course, be reduced to the point where the transatlantic traffic would make a helium airship a commercial possibility, but we cannot be sure that that will come about. For the present, at any rate, the commercial airship appears to be ruled out. There remains the question of the naval airship. For patrolling the trade routes of the Empire—the Pacific and the Indian oceans—where no hostile aeroplane can get within attacking range, the airship offers great advantages. At present these oceans have to be patrolled by cruisers, and cruisers cost a great deal more, in capital expense and in mainte- nance, that even helium airships. The airship has a great advantage in length of vision and in speed of travel over the surface ship. For discovering raiders, like the Emden or the Wolf, airships would seem to be an invaluable economy. The Zeppelins did great service for the German Navy during the war, and our Admiralty was most reluctant to give up its demand for airships in 1919, when the economy campaign obliged their lordships to make a choice between airships and aeroplanes. They could not dispense with the latter, but they would have liked to have both. From the national and Imperial point of view, it is of minor importance whether airships are a ccmrern of the Admiralty or of the Air Ministry. The great point is that if they can do good service, the experiments ought not to be given up because of this disaster. We trust that the Cabinet will not overlook this aspect of the case when it comes to discuss future airship policy. mam 286
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