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Aviation History
1931
1931 - 0315.PDF
FLIGHT, APRIL 3, 1931 •prolonged leakage, at any rate, if it were so pronounced as 10 be observed." The Report then discusses the conclusions of Dr. Eckener, S madron Leader Booth. Capt. Meager, and Squadron Leader Wann, which all practically agree in attributing the crash to loss of gas. It is pointed out that Squadron Leader Booth had given a written statement of his opinion before Dr. Eckener gave his evidence, and only slightly modified his opinion after hearing Dr. Eckener. The theory is also rejected that the officer on watch was afraid to raise his elevators for fear of forcing the tail of the ship on to the ground. The elevators are known to have been hard up at the moment of the crash. The Report then proceeds to its conclusions. Conclusion as to Cause The conclusion reached as to the cause of the disaster is as follows : — The Three Phases "The clearest way in which to explain the theory of the accident which the Court adopts is to regard the final move- ments of R 101 as consisting of three phases. In the first phase she drops her nose and descends, at a noticeably steep angle, for half a minute or thereabouts before, by use of up-elevator, she is brought back to an approximately hori- zontal position. The second phase then begins and continues for a short time, during which, in spite of her utmost efforts, she does not succeed in g?tting her nose appreciably up, but continues horizontal until she suddenly passes into a third phase, when she dives again and strikes the ground almost at once at an angle of at least 15 degrees. In seeking the explanation of these successive movements, it is best first to direct attention to the second phase. Not- withstanding that the vessel had lost much height during the first phase, if she had b-'en in a normal condition, there seems no reason why she should not have pointed her nose up again and regained altitude. From the fact that she failed to do so, it may be argued most conclusively that she was by then crippled beyond recovery, and the inference is that, though momentarily on an even keel, she was descending rapidly to earth. The action of Chief Coxswain Hunt in leaving the control room to -warn the crew indicates that, in spite of his great experience, his assistance there was no longer of any use, and that those in charge knew there was nothing they could do which would prevent the ship from stranding. And the explanation of this would be provided if she had lost sufficient gas in the fore part of the ship. All that remained was to minimise the impact, and accordingly orders were given to stop the engines and release ballast. If this was the course of events, the ship would proceed to put her nose down agiin, enter upon her second dive and crash. Now, working back to the first phase, the question is, what was the course of events which brought the ship down from, say, 1,200 ft., into this first long dive ? Inasmuch as the reasoning above set out suggests, and, indeed, practically requires, that at the end of the first dive the vessel had lost a quantity of gas forward, it is natural to assume that this loss of gas had begun before the first phase was entered upon, though it became greater as the vessel descended. If the fore part of the cover had become torn and wind entered the envelope, serious damage to gasbags would be most likely to occur with startling suddenness. The reconstruction of the first phase would, therefore, be somewhat as follows :—Assume that the vessel had become somewhat heavy and was being buffeted in the wind so that her nose was sometimes above and sometimes below the line of horizontal flight. If she had been raised by a buffet, the elevator would be put down by the coxswain who had just come on duty to check and counteract this movement. The coxswain, not yet having got the " feel " of the ship thoroughly, might put his elevator rather more down than was necessary, or keep it down longer than was exactly right. The vessel's nose would drop. If when her nose is inclined downwards she gets a strong buffet or wind above her nose it will push her nose further down. If she was already heavy from loss of gas—especially if a rent had occurred in a gas- bag which involved progressively rapid deflation—the descent is emphasised. The ship is now on her downward track in the first phase. The coxswain will begin to put his elevator up, and in order to get the ship out of her first dive has to put it up harder. None the less, she does not come out of her first dive as rapidly as she should, because she is losing more gas all the time. The slowness of her recovery would give sufficient warning of the crisis. This gives the explanation of the course of events which is most consistent writh the evidence, and at certain points is the only explanation which readily presents itself in accordance with the facts. At other points it is no doubt possible to assume certain variations in the data. For example, the final dive might have been assisted by another buffet of wind, and the exact relation between the angle of the elevator and the amount of gas lost can never be ascertained by any process of reconstruction. How the vessel began to lose gas can never be definitely ascertained. The weather was exceptionally bad ; the gasbags were hard up against padded projections, some of which may have begun to wear the fabric ; the bumpiness of the wind and the pitching of the ship would intensify the strain ; and earlier flights had indicated the possibility of leakage through chafing, or, if the vessel rolled through an unusually large angle, through intermittent opening of the gas valves. But it seems very probable that the more serious and sudden loss of gas which followed was connected with a specific misfortune such as the ripping of the fore part of the envelope. Something of this sort had happened on a previous occasion, and no amount of care could secure that it would never happen again. If a rip had begun in the fore part of the envelope it would tend to develop into a larger tear, which would both check the speed of the R 101 through the air and expose the gasbags to additional strain. This seems the most probable explanation of a further loss of gas in increasing quantity and suddenness. But whatever the precise circumstances may have been, the explanation that the disaster was caused by a substantial loss of gas in very bumpy weather holds the field. This is the unanimous view of all the three members of the Court of Inquiry." ^ "FIERY" PERFORMANCE: Mr. Staniland demonstrating, in no uncertain manner, the terrific performance of the Fairey Firefly II at Hanworth before the Japanese Prince and Princess Takamatsu. (FLIGHT Photo> 291 E 2
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