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Aviation History
1931
1931 - 1076.PDF
FLIGHT, OCTOBER 9, 1931 the Dardanelles without military co-operation, and the attempt was certainly a failure. So were airships a failure when the Germans used them for military instead of for naval purposes, and sent them to bomb Great Britain. Though they did some damage on occasions, they were ultimately beaten, and it would be folly to neglect the lesson and to use airships again in war in circumstances which exposed them to aeroplane attack. That may be taken as a prin- ciple of future operations in the air. The acceptance of this principle does not, however, rule out the use of airships in other circumstances. The Zeppelins were of very great use to the High Seas fleet, but the North Sea does not give enough scope for the use of an airship, and on the North Sea it could seldom be sure of remaining out of range of hostile aeroplanes. We recall the classic example of L 53. The " Camel " could climb to the height at which that airship operated, so she never came within a " Camel's " range of the British coast. She overlooked the possibility of an aircraft carrier. In this case the carrier was only a specially prepared barge towed by a destroyer, but it conveyed the " Camel " within range of the Zeppelin, and Lieut. •Culley took off from the barge and shot the airship down on August 11, 1918. Aircraft carriers are more highly developed now, and from the experience of the great war we may say that no fleet can entirely forbid the waters of the North Sea to a hostile carrier. There remain the great trade routes of the British Empire across the oceans, and particularly the Pacific and the Indian oceans. We use cruisers to patrol them. When isolated raiders such as the " Emden " got loose in those vast expanses of water it took a great many cruisers to run them to earth. In the case of the " Emden " it has been authori- tatively stated that at one time 29 British cruisers were engaged in looking for her. The cost to the country in maintenance of the cruisers was very high, and they took a long time before they found the raider. In the meantime she had sunk some millions of pounds worth of British shipping. It was a case in which airships would have been invaluable to the British Navy. We have heard a reply given to this argument to the effect that an aircraft carrier would have been just as efficient as airships would have been. Possibly so, but an aircraft carrier costs a great deal more than quite a number of airships built by production methods. In the Indian and the Pacific oceans airships could work in complete safety so far as the aeroplane menace was concerned. They would naturally keep out of the range of hostile shore aerodromes, and it may be taken for granted that hostile carriers would not be at large on those oceans. If they were, it would mean that the British Navy had failed badly in one of its main functions. We should no longer be ruling the seas, and the safety of the British trade routes would no longer be a matter of very much concern. The whole basis of this case must be that trie Navy can forbid the great oceans to hostile fleetsand capital ships. To discuss wars and defence is now regarded in some quarters as a crime against the League of Nations spirit. Expenditure on armaments is con- sidered one of the main causes of the ills which beset the world in 1931. Few men, however, are so fanatical as to suggest that no defence forces are needed, and among reasonable men merit should be accorded to a suggestion which would enable defence to be carried on with less expenditure of money. If savings can be effected by substituting airship patrols for cruiser patrols (not wholly, of course, but in part), the suggestion should deserve careful con- sideration by patriot and pacifist alike. Completely convincing figures are naturally not available, but the following figures are given by Sir Dennistoun Burney in his book The World, the Air and the Future. Despite his experience in building R100, Sir Dennistoun may be no more able than other people to say what would be the cost of naval air- ships when standardised and built by the dozen, but, as a naval officer, he doubtless is quite at home when quoting the cost of cruisers. He puts the matter as follows:—-The cost of patrolling 1,000 square miles of sea with airships would, in running costs, be 25s.; while the running costs of patrolling it with light cruisers would be £77 10s. If capital costs are considered, Sir Dennistoun has worked out that 55 million pounds would have to be spent on light cruisers to give a power of reconnaissance which would be obtained by using airships for a sum of 3J millions; while the saving in annual upkeep by using airships is put down at 11 million pounds. Sir Dennistoun also puts the case in another way, comparing the radius of search of six airships with that of six light cruisers. In southern oceans he allows the cruiser a range of vision of 15 miles from the masthead, and the airship a range of vision of 50 miles at a height of 2,000 feet. The cruising speed of the surface ship he puts at 20 knots, and calls that generous; that of the airship at 50 knots. The six cruisers spread on a line would search 180 miles by 170 miles in 12 daylight hours, while the six air- ships would search 600 by 700 miles, or about 370,000 more square miles per day than the cruiser squadron. Moreover, he assumes the complement of a cruiser to be 700 officers and men, as against 40 on an airship, which gives totals of over 4,000 men and 240 men respectively. The capital cost of a cruiser is put down as about two million pounds. We take no responsibility for these figures our- selves, but even if a very large miscalculation could be found, there is a huge margin of economy on the side of the airship. Sir Dennistoun seems to have allowed a margin of error of 19,400 square miles in the last calculation. About the difference in the cost of manning the two there can be no doubt at all; nor, granted average weather, is the difference in speed and in range of vision a matter of dispute. The question, therefore, arises, can the Navy in these days of economy afford to carry on without airships? THE HAMPSHIRE CLUB'S MYSTERY.—It is nowgenerally known that Mr. J. C. Jewell, a member of the Hampshire Aeroplane Club, has been missing sinceapproximately 6 p.m. on Sunday, September 20, when he was seen leaving Bristol, presumably en route to Hamblein a " Gipsy Moth " G-AAJR. It has, however, been established that an aircraft was seen flying high from Barn- staple down the coast of Cornwall over Bude to St. Ives,and was last seen over Penzance the same evening shortly after 8 p.m. It would greatly assist the club and Mr. Jewell's relationsif the pilot of this machine, assuming it was not Mr. Jewell, was to come forward, thereby establishing the factthat it was not Mr. Jewell. 1006
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