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Aviation History
1933
1933 - 0394.PDF
FLIGHT, AUGUST 24, 1933 place it may be noted that the great French Marshal does not say, as so many thoughtless British writers have hastily said, that " getting your shell in first " is the whole secret of air warfare. He alludes else where to the possibility of surprise, but he has nothing to say about " striking at nerve centres " and terrifying the enemy population into demanding peace at any price. He speaks of bombarding the " enemy bases." The best protection for one's own- population, he suggests, is the fear of reprisals in the enemy's mind. Bombarding the enemy's bases is most certainly the best means of curtailing his power for harm. If by bases is meant aerodromes, it is a doubtful point if that can be effectively carried out in time of war. A war-time aerodrome is very easily evacuated. Repair parks, stores depots and aircraft factories would all be admirable targets for bombs, and to destroy a number of these might have a considerable effect on the enemy's righting power. When factories in enemy territory are attacked, how ever, attention cannot be concentrated on aircraft factories alone, and one's power of crippling the enemy by such tactics must depend on the numbers and efficiency of one's own bomber force. As for the menace of reprisals, that is only another way of putting the old Roman saying Si vis pacem, para helium. Of course no fear of reprisals will deter any belligerent from bombing military objec tives (e.g., factories) on the other side. Both sides will pursue these tactics in any case as a matter of course, according to their respective abilities. To refrain from attacking the enemy's factories will not prevent him from attacking one's own factories. The question of reprisals only applies to attacks on the civil populations, and it is very interesting to note that in Marechal Petain's opinion the best protection for one's own civilians is the possession of a strong bomber force. With all due deference, we heartily agree. The Marshal continues: "It is true that direct defensive action, that is, fighters, ground armaments, and passive defences, should not be neglected. . . . The most potent direct defence resides ... in the fighter squadrons." The fear of reprisals will save the civil population from deliberate attack if inter national agreement has proved a vain defence— though we are not at all convinced that such agree ment will be vain, and we remember that in the great war there was no deliberate attack on civilians by either side. But some civilians must inevitably be killed by bombs aimed at military objectives. In the great war the victims, wounded as well as killed, of the German bombs dropped on British soil numbered under 5,000 in four years of war. That did nothing to cripple the fighting power of this country, and, though every life (soldier or civilian) lost is a tragedy, still more of those tragedies are caused when the fighting men are kept short of muni tions of war. What Marechal Petain calls our active defence must be directed to saving our factories and other military objectives from the attacks of hostile bombers. Everyone knows that it is impossible to prevent all hostile bombers from reaching their objectives. Our hope of success lies in taking such toll of the raiders and making the raiding so costly 842 to the enemy that he will soon desist from the policy of raiding. Marechal Petain admits that by 1918 the British defence had become so effective that it virtually deterred the enemy from attempting to fly over British soil, and they then turned their attention to the Paris district, which offered a " most tempt ing target " and which had hitherto suffered from only three air raids. Paris then had to pay the price of inexperience in anti-aircraft defence. The Paris defences, and ultimately the whole of the French defences, were thereupon based on the experience so dearly acquired by London under Gen. Ashmore. Marechal Petain writes that " the chief weight of the British defences lay in their ground armament and organisation." The rapid passing on of in formation was, he says, the mainspring of the whole organisation. Later on he repeats that the informa tion service is the base of all defensive organisations. Information and fighters are the two points which he stresses as of most importance. We have our selves often pointed out that the scheme of defence worked out by Air Defence of Great Britain depends above everything on the Corps of Observers. These observers are civilian volunteers, enrolled as special constables, and when one comes to think of it, never before has such a vital task of national security been entrusted to a civilian volunteer organisation. On all the Air Exercises the work of the observers has been praised by the High Command, but we believe that the organisation is far from complete. Another of Marechal Petain's remarks is " there is not the least chance of any country being in a state of ever- ready anti-aircraft defence during times of peace." It would seem to be incumbent on Great Britain to be as near complete readiness as can possibly be contrived. There are many stations round the coasts which belong to the Crown, and we should like to feel that all of them were able to share with the Corps of Observers the task of reporting hostile air raids. We admit drawbacks when bodies not directly under the Air Ministry are expected to work for the Royal Air Force, and on principle we should not like to see that practice extended; but unless our voluntary organisation can be kept in a complete and continuous state of high efficiency, it seems that we are running a considerable risk. Marechal Petain holds that in Gen. Ashmore's book the efficacy of aerial bombardment and the importance of the danger are systematically under estimated, while the capacity of the defence » assuredly exaggerated. He writes: " Even if we admit that the defence may have grown four times more effective, who could estimate the coefficient by which it is necessary to multiply the offensive power of modern aviation—and a fortiori that ot the future? " Does the Marshal mean thai the bombers have outstripped the fighters? In that case it behoves us to increase our bombing force withou delay, so as to rely more on what he calls " ineurec defence." We believe, however, that the defence has outstripped the accuracy of the bombing, an certainly future raids will have to fly very high. n that case, military targets will be harder than eve to destroy, and, as we pointed out above, ° " direct defence " must have as its object the \ tection of military objectives.
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