FlightGlobal.com
Home
Premium
Archive
Video
Images
Forum
Atlas
Blogs
Jobs
Shop
RSS
Email Newsletters
You are in:
Home
Aviation History
1933
1933 - 0746.PDF
FLIGHT, OCTOBER 12, 1933 Navy which contrived to get loose on the high seas in 1914 also did an immensity of damage before they were run to earth and destroyed, but how long could an Emden have lived in the Indian Ocean if aircraft had been used to search for her? Such a search would seem particularly a task for airships, but in any case it was search from the air which was needed. The particular type of aircraft to be em ployed does not concern us for the moment. Of almost equal importance to us in war is the pro tection of our cities from air attack. Nationally we might survive the destruction of parts of London for a longer time than we could survive the cutting off of our sea-borne supplies of food, but our path to victory might be considerably lengthened if the docks, stations, factories, and other important build ings in London were to be effectively bombed. We all know that complete immunity from air bombing cannot be guaranteed in any case, but if the Commander-in-Chief of Air Defence of Great Britain has enough squadrons at his command, we have every reason to hope that the operation of raiding London can speedily be made so expensive to the enemy that the attempt will be abandoned. For that, numbers, as well as highest efficiency, are neces sary. Intensive attacks by wave after wave of hostile bombers may be expected in the early stages, and to meet them there must be an ample supply of fighter squadrons. At present the Fighting Area comprises only 13 such squadrons. Even if those 13 were to suffer no casualties, the same units could not be kept continuously on duty. Reliefs would be necessary, and for that we have as yet made next to no provision. We should likewise need ample supplies and reserves of searchlights, anti-aircraft guns, and other equipment, while it would be neces sary that the Observer Corps should be at full strength, well trained, and equipped with all the latest devices for detection and the rapid passing on of reports. At the same time we should need to counter-attack with our own bombers, striking at the enemy squadrons on their own aerodromes, and blowing up what aircraft factories we could reach. For that purpose a large force of day-bombers and night-bombers would be necessary, again with plentiful reserves. In 1923 it was laid down that 52 squadrons was the minimum force required for the Air Defence of Great Britain at that time. So soon as that force had been raised, it was intended to review the situation afresh, and in all probability to sanction another programme of expansion. Yet 10 years have passed, and the squadrons of Air Defence of Great Britain now only number 42! We are short by 10 squadrons of what was thought to be a modest minimum 10 years ago. We are clearly short by a very much greater number of what we ought to have now. In no branch of our defence is the shortage of aircraft worse than in the Army. In this country the Army has only five squadrons devoted to its use. These five are all of the class known as army co operation, intended primarily for reconnaissance and close contact with ground troops, though capable of a certain amount of bombing and machine gunning. They can carry out a short and a medium reconnais sance, but are not expected to undertake a long reconnaissance. They are not equipped for heavy bombing. Though they are capable of doing a certain amount of fighting, they would hardly expect to be able to survive for very long if assailed by any considerable force of enemy fighters. If they should so survive, it would mean that the fighters which attacked them were not so good at their job as fighters certainly ought to be. Therefore the Army should have its own protective fighters (for in war there would not be the slightest chance of borrowing fighters from Air Defence of Great Britain) and also its own long-range bombers. Even so, the supply of five squadrons as the eyes of the Army is ludicrously inadequate. The number should be multiplied many times. At present our Army is incapable of engaging in any first-class war, for the simple reason that it would soon be literally blind. Our weakness in the air is due to two reasons, (1) finance, and (2) the desire to set a good example. Economy is a very desirable asset, but it is always taking a grave risk and is utterly false when one economises on insurance premia. If the state of international politics is very calm, such a risk may temporarily be justifiable, but who can say that that condition is now fulfilled? Russia may not be desirous of attacking us today or tomorrow, but the Soviet leaders never cease preaching to their ignorant masses that Great Britain is the great enemy of their system, the greatest upholder of the capitalistic system. Russia continues to acquire by building and otherwise unknown numbers of warlike aircraft, with, incidentally, India, probably believed to be more disaffected than she really is, offering a tempting bait. There are only three more army co operation squadrons in India and four day-bomber squadrons as well—just enough to deal with Frontier disturbances. If Russia marched through Afghanistan against the Indian Frontier, these seven squadrons would be but a flea-bite. Again, fighters and long-range machines would be required. As for our good example, .we have truly piped to the nations at Geneva, and they have not danced; we have mourned to them, and they have not lamented. Even when they talk of disarmament, they claim that Great Britain's present weakness is her normal state of armament equipment, and that if they disarm by a certain proportion, Great Britain must apply the same proportion to her own already shrunken Air Force. Our effort has been great and it has been sincere, but it has failed. We should now recognise that fact, and set about putting our defence house in order. The Conservative party is the largest in the country, and the most influential. It is also the most homogeneous. This section of the community has now unanimously approved of the principle of strengthening our defences. There is no doubt that the resolution passed at Birmingham can and should be translated into action at Westminster. At all points, and particularly in the air, the country's desire is to see Great Britain as a strong man armed, keeping his house. 1016
Sign up to
Flight Digital Magazine
Flight Print Magazine
Airline Business Magazine
E-newsletters
RSS
Events
