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Aviation History
1938
1938 - 1401.PDF
MAY 19, 1938. FLIGHT. 493 CORRESPONDENCE The Editor does not hold himself responsible for the views expressed by correspondents. The names and addresses of the writers, not necessarily for publication, must in all cases accompany letters. . DUMPED ^ 4 " Wasting " 1,000 Gallons—and Why A REPORT of the full-load separation trials of the MayoComposite Seaplane stated that of the 1,200 gallons of petrol with which Mercury was filled, a thousand gallons were dumped after a short flying trial in order that the seaplane could land lightly loaded. Can anybody explain to me why it was necessary to waste a thousand gallons of fuel, quite apart from the obvious danger involved, on a test which could surely have been carried out just as well with tanks full of water? This kind of thing is well calculated to produce in the minds of the lay public the impression that all the old cheerful extravagant disregard of public funds still characterises the administration of our fight- ing services. IGNORAMUS. London, N.W.8. 1 - [The answer to this very natural query is that, in the first place, the tank in Mercury runs through almost from wing tip to wing tip, and is separated into compartments by bulkheads in which there arc flap valves. These valves permit fuel to run from the tips to the centre but not vice versa. Some of the inner valves could probably have been sealed, but one of the tests to be made was to check the proper functioning of the valves and whole fuel system. Thus it would have been impracticable to use anything but petrol. Secondly, it was part of the official tests to see that the jettisoning of fuel could be carried out fa) without fumes forming in the cabin, and (b) without fuel getting near the engines where it could be set alight. There is a special pro- cess by which proximity of fuel to an object can be made to colour the object, and in this test it was found that nowhere had the fuel come close enough to any part of the aircraft to cause the slightest risk of fire.—ED.] . * , BUYING ABROAD Could Holland Supply Us With Military Aircraft ? WE in England are led to understand that there is aserious shortage of military-type aircraft; in fact, so urgent has the position become that we have sent a mission to the United States to investigate the possibility of America being able to supply us with suitable machines. Can any reason be given by the authorities to explain why it was considered necessary to go so far afield? Just across the Channel is a neutral country called Holland, in which there are being built, near Rotterdam, the very machines that we require. I refer to the firm of Koolhoven, who are not only offering for sale some very fine aircraft, but who are fitting engines of British design. Two examples may be cited: The F.K.51 military trainer, with Armstrong Siddeley IX Cheetah engine; the F.K.52 two-seater fighter with Bristol Mercury engine. I contend that here are two types that have the initial advantage of being fitted with engines well known to the Royal THE LATEST AERONCA: Known as the "50," this new type is fitted either with the Menasco or the Con- tinental engine — both new units. As in the case of the standard model, the occupants are seated side-by-side and, no doubt to provide the "big ship" atmos- phere, wheel control is specified. The cruising speed is given as 90 m.p.h. and the landing speed as 30 m.p.h. Air Force and for which spare parts can easily be obtained, and that are well up on performance. There are several other types made by the same firm, but these have engines of American origin. But, in spite of this, they are advertised as being capable of modification so that " any other engine of, approximately, the same weight and power" could be used. Why not, then, let our friends in Holland begin to get busy on a substantial British contract ? Perhaps someone can en- lighten us. JOHN V. HEWES. Ashstead. Surrey. < RENFREW REFLECTIONS Another Worry for the Internal Airline Operator THE relationship existing between British internal air-routeoperators and the airport owners, upon whose good will the former are entirely dependent in respect of the operation of their services, has been brought prominently forward in the last few weeks through the action taken by the Corporation of Renfrew resulting from their disagreement with the Air Ministry. An aspect of this matter which merits immediate recognition and demands early action by the Air Ministry appears to have been overlooked, namely, that the aircraft operator, in addition to the numerous handicaps with which he has to contend at the present moment, has been vividly reminded that all his efforts and the money he is expending may be thrown away in the not unlikely event of the airport authorities in the main centres to which he runs his services deciding that they are no longer content to bear the financial burden involved in continuing to provide an airport. Up to the present time, the local authorities, with the encouragement of the Air Ministry, have committed themselves to an annual expenditure which varies according to the locality, and they are now getting tired of the procrastination and delay in forming a definite policy in respect of the develop- ment of British internal civil aviation. There is nothing to prevent any of them, at the shortest notice, actually putting into effect what Renfrew threatened to do, namely, disposing of their airport, which is a liability, and changing it into an asset by selling the site for building or other purposes. They could, if so disposed, just close down and allow the land to revert to agriculture, and still be better off. The operator is obviously most unfairly situated, as it is he who spends his money on advertising the services and on build- ing up the traffic, yet he is liable to lose everything in the event of the airport authorities doing what they are perfectly entitled to do, namely, cry "Enough! We are closing down." The authorities at Renfrew were right in refusing to accept the compromise of a two years' recognition offered by the Air Ministry. After considerable bartering with the Ministry, it was extended to three years, and no doubt they accepted this offer bearing in mind the inconvenience and losses that the operator would sustain had they proceeded with their original intention of closing down.
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