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Aviation History
1940
1940 - 1190.PDF
372 APRIL 25, 1940 and muddling start. One should also note the rapid in-crease in assistance to the Allies from the United States which may be expected to maintain from now on, evenwhile building up the rate of delivery under our produc- tion programme as required to meet our own Air Forceexpansion needs. But, compared to England and Ger- many, our production is still small. Relative Proportions The method used to obtain the curves shown in Fig.2 is the following: A start is made' in January, 1936, with an estimated air strength for each country. Then, thestrength for each succeeding year is estimated by increas- ing for that year each country's air force by the amountobtained by integrating the curves of Fig. 1 and then reducing by an amount estimated to take care of obsoles-cence and wastage due to crashes or other causes of loss. It has been found that in this country the yearly depre-ciation of the air force is approximately 22 per cent, in normal times, probably somewhat less during a period ofrapid expansion. In determining depletion for European countries during the period 1936 to date, varying rates ofdepreciation were used, depending on particular circum- stances which were found to maintain as regards rate ofobsoleting equipment, rate of training and probable result- ant crashes, both in training and service. The figuresaverage from about 25 per cent, per year in 1936 to 45 per cent, per year by January, 1940. This, it .should benoted, is a "monthly rate of depreciation of from two per cent, to about four per cent. At the present time, March,1940, with relatively minor air activity, it is not believed that the depletion is more than five per cent, per month,judging from the published losses of the various belliger- ents, coupled with the other factors cited above. It should be noted that the curves of Fig. 2 cover totalplanes of all types, including first-line; reserve, co-operation and training.' However, the proportion each class of planebears to the total approximates these percentages: First line, 30 per cent.; reserve, 20 per cent.; co-operation, 20per cent.; training, 30 per cent. But Germany, an aggres- sor, emphasises bombers; England, a defender, pursuits.During certain periods of expansion, trainers must be em- phasised. Also, the proportions of first-line to reserve areaffected by availability of pilots. It is believed, however, that the percentages given will not vary for any countryby more than 15 p?r cent, of the values shown. The curves for total air power have been extended be-yond the present time, showing a tendency to flatten out as the -estimated capacity of the country involved isapproached. Effect of "Total" War - Shown in dotted lines on Fig. 2 are the effects on the total air power strength of the Allies and Germany which will maintain in the event of a " total' * war in the air taking place. These curves have been derived by assum- ing continuing rate of production as given in Fig. 1 (as it is impossible to guess even the approximate falling off of production that might result from bombed aircraft fac- tories), but assuming destruction of planes in service at the rate of 25 per cent, of total strength per month. In the event of a " total'' war there may be reluctance on the part of Germany to dig too deeply into her oil, iron, and aluminium reserves. The curves portray (assuming that the "total " war starts this spring) that the air strength of the Allies will exceed that of Germany during the last half of 1941, although towards the end of 1940 there will be a dangerous disparity between the two air forces in favour of Germany. Strangely enough, in the event a "total" war does not start this spring, the relative strengths of the belligerents in the air will become equal only a couple of months earlier in 1941! Quality Comment on this admittedly important subject will be restricted to the statement that, in the writer's belief, quality of equipment is, and will remain, substantially equal, but credit is given to the highly developed and effec- tive power-controlled gun turrets with which many British bombing planes are equipped. It is not believed, however, that superiority in performance of equipment will so pre- dominate on either side as to make this the determining factor. No one who has inspected German equipment and German research laboratories, and is aware of German general engineering and scientific ability, can believe the quality of her products from the performance standpoint is likely to be greatly exceeded. Similarly, one cannot feel that the Allies will traiL in quality after viewing such notable English aircraft equipment as the Spitfire and the Hurricane. It seems likely, therefore, that the eventual outcome of the war will be largely affected by the relative strength in the air that each side can muster. I feel that Germany's past supremacy and present small superiority in the air will be overcome by the Allies. The curves shown should approximate the situation. Assuming substantially equal land forces and land defences, and continuing Allied supremacy on the sea, and economic superiority for the Allies in access to world markets and in financial means of exchange, then, once air equality is attained, the out- come will not remain long in doubt. This time should arrive late in 1941 or early in 1942, and with it Allied victory. The world has had to relearn a lesson the hard way: policy must always be backed by strength. This holds whether international affairs fall into the scheme of power politics or collective security. Collective security, in the form of the League of Nations, was tried after the last war. It proved insecure and failed since collective strength was not behind it. Realising the determining importance of air power, Germany secretly started her air rearming. She built up an efficient industry and then openly extended her air force and by threat of its use acquired much of what she wanted. If the world has learned the lesson sufficiently well, then after this war we may possibly hope to look forward to a more effective collective security. When backed by overwhelming air power, some future federation, or union, or league will possess a means of keeping the peace far superior to any yet devised. Then the aeroplane will assume a new dual role in civilisation: the most rapid means of transportation, for bringing people closer together, and the guardian of peace for enforcing and ensuring success of the next form of collective security. U.S.A. Accident Statistics AIR transport in the United States has set a new recordin safe operation. Between March 26, 1939, and March 26, 1940, the airlines have operated without onefatality. This is remarkable considering the volume of trans- port which has been flown, 814,906,250 passenger-miles and87.325.145 aeroplane-miles. The passengers carried totalled 2,028,817. .. Of course, by picking the period, one can get the mostfavourable accident rate, but the achievement cannot be dis- missed so easily, even though other periods of American airtransport have had their share of accidents. It is a mag- nificent record. An analysis of accidents in private flying from January toJane, 1939, shows that, of the 978 accidents, 62 per cent, were due to pilot error; 13, engine tailure; 7, structural causes;7, weather; and n per cent, doubtful and miscellaneous. Miles flown per accident were 74,297, with 95 fatal accidents, involving the deaths of 77 pilots and 77 passengers. Totalfatalities, including third party, were 161. Miles flown per fatality, 451,320, was the best figure so far recorded, thefigures for the three preceding years all being about 422,000. The Me 112 and He 112 F "E*REQUENT references have been made in Flight to the pos--T sibilities of using the Messeischmitt Me no as a bomber. Our French contemporary, Les Ailes, has recently mentioneda machine designated the Me 112. This is said to be developed from the Me no and may be the machine (now called tneJaguar) illustrated on April 4 and n. It is also stated that the new version of the Heinkel Hepsingle-seater fighter is known as the He 112 F. This n™0^" differs considerably from the original model and is fitted \via Daimler-Benz D.B.601 engine. The designation HL iI2^ nmay apply only to the machine in its speed-record forn:- * HE 112 has been reported over the Western front.
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