FlightGlobal.com
Home
Premium
Archive
Video
Images
Forum
Atlas
Blogs
Jobs
Shop
RSS
Email Newsletters
You are in:
Home
Aviation History
1940
1940 - 1669.PDF
JUNE 6, 1940 RE-SITE THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY Standardise Types and Shift Factories to the Dominions By CAPTAIN NORMAN MACMILLAN, M.C., A.F.C. THE strategy and tactics of conquest are not iden-tical with the strategy and tactics of resistance toconquest. Terminologically, there is as much dif- ference between them as exists between a synonym and an antonym. Hence it follows that the military com- mander who excels in attack is not necessarily the best leader in defence, and vice versa. For years—even before the advent of the third Reich under the Nazi regime—German military leaders dreamed of the redemption of the defeat of 1918 by force of arms. The pace of their thoughts was quickened when Herr Hitler became Chancellor in 1933. When he became President everything was subordinated to but one end—and that end the British and French Empires, are now opposing. For eighty years German militarists have pursued the study of conquest. Time after time they have put their theories to the test. And their latest theory is to use air- craft as the spearhead of a mobile army moving against the immediate foe. Bombs bludgeon down resistance by forcing opposing troops to take cover while armoured and mechanised ground forces advance. Bombs and machine guns fired from aircraft throw the civil popula- tion into rout and confusion, and cause an inextricable mix-up of fleeing civilians and defensive troops. All tac- tical points in the immediate rear of the defenders are shattered by air attack. The essence of the whole opera- tion is speed. The Nazi conception of military strategy will work, and continue to work, so long as the sweep of movement can continue. It will cease to work when the movement of the armed and armoured hordes ceases. •••'••" Allied Resources • Three things can hold up that movement. One is the opposition of superior force in men and machines. Another is a sufficiently powerful natural barrier. And the third is the exhaustion of Germany's resources in men and machines. As things stand, it looks as though a combination of all three is the aim of the long-term strategy of the Allies; and, be it noted, to the Allies alone is such a combination possible. But we need time. We have done little more than scratch at the surface of the resources in men and material of the British Commonwealth. And while the Governments of Holland and Belgium stand fast with the Allies, we can draw upon the resources of their Colonial possessions in addi- tion to those of France. To the Allies is open the latent power of industrial production in the United States. To the Allies is open the great food areas of the Western hemisphere. Thus, the Allied reserve in material, in food and in the creation of machines of war, is almost in- exhaustible. • That Barrier Germany's resources, on the other hand, have been drawn upon to capacity. In men, in machines, the whole nation has been converted into a war mechanism. Her man power is being mown down by bullet, shell and bomb, and she has no reserve—unless, indeed, Italy acts as her reserve of men and machines. There lies Ger- many's one war potential. Her own has passed the peak. The first and third processes are simultaneously work- ing for the benefit of the Allies. Against that process Hitler can balance only the latent strength of Italy. But even that power, added to the power of Germany as it is to-day, is assessable by the Allies; and, given time, it, too, can be bested. ; The other consideration is the natural barrier. Obvi-ously, at the moment, it consists of the North Sea, the English Channel and the Straits of Dover. If Germany cannot cross that barrier she cannot win this war whether Italy enters it upon her side or not. Never did the Prime Minister speak words more true than when he said that the people of this country have only to hold out to win through to the defeat of Nazism. What Next? In one sense this war is only just beginning. What has happened up to date (including the capitulation of the Belgian Army) is, as it were, a prelude to the real struggle. All the indications are that the great air war between Germany and Britain may begin at any moment. There is one proviso—Will Germany, with or without Italy, try to settle with France individually first ? Will her next blow be directed against the Army that defends the Hne of the Somme and the Aisne? Or will she be content to hold that force in check and turn her air squadrons against the British Isles? Or will she enter upon yet a fresh course and march against the Balkans? It may be that Italy would not consent lo enter the war upon the side of Germany unless Ger- many were prepared at once to throw a part of her armies against the Balkans. Whichever course the war may follow from now on it is ever increasingly clear that the most important shortcoming that Britain must make good is the Allied inferiority in aircraft. This inferiority is a numerical one; the quality of the Allied aircraft is superior to the quality of German aircraft. The quality of the British pilots, battling against superior numbers, is far higher than that of their German opponents, good as they may be—indeed, I have reason to believe that the British pilots do not belittle their opponents' skill, Nevertheless, the Royal Air Force has the Luftwaffe whacked except in this important matter of numbers of machines. 'y''•' Our Late Start It is our folly in allowing the German air force to out-build us that we have to thank for some—indeed most—of the difficulties with which the Allies are now faced. And of that folly and how it arose I could say much, and as much again upon the subject of how it was perpetuated—except that this is no time for re- criminations. Nevertheless, I do not see why those who are responsible for the paucity of British aircraft should not be held responsible just as much as others are held responsible for the things that they have done or have left undone. Let us get down to brass tacks. We want to win this war. We must win it. So, if we have made mistakes in the past, we must own up to them, not try to smother them and cover them up as is the way in times of peace. I bet some people in this country wish they could go back five years and begin again. But that is impossible. We have got to begin again now, when the going is so much worse. Never- theless, if we do so and do it rightly this time, we shall win this war no matter how dark the times may be
Sign up to
Flight Digital Magazine
Flight Print Magazine
Airline Business Magazine
E-newsletters
RSS
Events
