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Aviation History
1940
1940 - 2024.PDF
JULY IS, 1940 Herein lies the explanation of the fact that we have not been able to place the German army of occupation in France in jeopardy. What might we not have done had our air force had the measure of strength possessed by our Navy? It was to preserve that all- important strength ratio that the British Navy took action against the French. So it appears at the moment that we cannot apply the full force of air blockade measures against even one German army of occupation, that in France. And there are six other such armies of occupation in Belgium, Hol- land, Denmark, Norway, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Clearly, then, the main British air effort must be directed towards the most rapid means to gain ascendancy in the air. For, taking the parallel of the sea, ascendancy ot power is a pre-requisite to the successful application of blockade measures. To gain supremacy in the air the R.A.F. must be employed, as frequently as may be possible, to cut down the production and employment of aircraft for the German and Italian air forces by attacking the most vital sources of supply of materials and oil. This must in- clude not only new supplies, where possible at source, and during delivery, but also the storage places for Ger- many's reserves for manufacture. Simultaneously, every effort must be made by Britain to increase the output of aircraft (complete with all equipment) from factories which are safe from air attack. Output The relative success of the British air attacks against German sources of supply for the Luftwaffe, and those of the Luftwaffe against the British sources of supply for the Royal Air Force, will largely determine the length of time necessary for the Royal Air Force to gain the mastery of the air over the enemies of Britain. Bound up with the time factor is the output of aircraft from the two sides, the output of pilots and other members of crews, the output of trained personnel for ground duties both to-day and during the continuation of hostili- ties under the forms of attack which may be devised by both sides to the conflict. In the long run, the time factor ought to be in favour of Britain, for aircraft for the R.A.F. can be built (and are being built) in factories which are far outside the reach of bombers of the enemy. The difference in the sources of supply of Britain and of Germany and Italy must make a difference to the technique of air blockade as practised by one side and the other. British air blockade cannot hope to snatch victory for Britain until the weary process of building up air supremacy has been completed. This process, diffi- cult enough in time of peace, is far more difficult in time of war in a country within striking distance of enemy bombers. The dual need for the output of attack-free factories is certain to play an increasingly vital part in the struggle for air supremacy. It is regrettable, therefore, that the circumstances of the moment demand the deflection of a part of the R.A.F. to the duty of interfering with the supply arrange- ments of German armies of occupation. And, no doubt, too, the R.A.F. is concerned regularly with the recogni- tion, location and attack of concentrations of enemy forces which may be gathering to the attack of the British Isles. Both these duties necessarily detract from action which the R.A.F. might take towards the reduction of the future supremacy of the Luftwaffe by means of air blockade waged against the factories which supply the Luftwaffe and the Regia Aeronautica. Britain urgently needs the creation of a separate force of bombing air- craft charged with the sole duty of attacking the sources of the enemy supply of aircraft. In the meantime, Germany, with her air superiority in numbers (but not in efficiency of aircraft or personnel), can direct her whole energies towards the single purpose of air blockade of Britain, combined with direct attack in support of land forces both air- and sea-borne. For none of the British air units outside Great Britain can attack Germany. And so Germany's air methods against Britain are likely to be directed towards defeating the objects which I have set out above as being those towards which Britain must move relentlessly. Thus Germany will strive with all her might to force a conclusion to hostilities before Britain can achieve the air supremacy which will spell the doom of the Axis Powers. Whatever may result from any attempts which Ger- many may make to invade the British Isles, it is certain that her air forces will be employed on the grand scale to cause the maximum confusion, to slow down the work- ing of the war production effort, to dislocate communi- cations and the transport of supplies. Her air attacks will have the effect of blockade activities by other methods. Instead of the cutting off of outside supplies, as is the time-honoured method of sea war, her air blockade will be directed to cut off internal supplies by a process of disruption. It is that process which Britain must defeat. It is not enough to have squadrons of fighters to shoot down bombers. It is not enough to have squadrons of bombers to bomb factories making aircraft in Germany. We must have also a super-excellence of internal communi- cations in Great Britain so that under all circumstances communications will be maintained. By that successful internal organisation the mobility of the island defences will be secured, the food resources assured and the pro- ductivity of the factories maintained at the highest point. And if Germany's attacks upon Great Britain fail, as assuredly they should fail, there will remain to her only the method of air blockade—waged in the hope that she may be able to weaken us too much before our air strength grows greater than her own. That blockade, unable to affect the air strength derived from factories far overseas, will be flung against us to attempt to starve us by cutting our communications internally at every point possible between the ports and the factories, the factories and the shops, the farms and the home, the markets and the retailers. Internal Communications It will not be blockade in the accepted sense of the word. But its effect may be as pronounced if we are not prepared to meet it at every point and defeat its power. Just as our recent air attacks have been of effect upon the German armies of occupation in France, so would German air attacks have effect upon the British armed forces and the British public if they severed too many of our communication links and kept them cut. That is the real purpose of air blockade. And this war will give an answer to the question which has been uppermost in the minds of many thinking men and women for years. That question is, can the methods of the air rival the methods of the sea in the same time or in less time? The answer at sea has always been superiority in numbers, or technique of seamanship, or courage, or a combination of such assets. Not always with the British Navy has success been gained by numbers. The answer in the air will be written in the same way—numbers, air- manship, courage. At the moment we have the last two. As soon as we add the first the end of another victorious war for Britain will be in sight. Until then we shall have to bear the rigours of air blockade.
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