FlightGlobal.com
Home
Premium
Archive
Video
Images
Forum
Atlas
Blogs
Jobs
Shop
RSS
Email Newsletters
You are in:
Home
Aviation History
1940
1940 - 2165.PDF
AUGUST I, 1940 Air Strategy XIII AIR BLOCKADE-II An Ever-tightening Air Blockade Can End the War Sooner By CAPT. NORMAN MACMILLAN, M.C., A.F.C. NOT only Germany but many of the countries shenow dominates are strategically open to airblockade, while, from the air, the sea strangle- hold which has been placed about Italy can be more tightly drawn and knotted at the top end. Under the policy which ruled during the earlier months of the war, air blockade was impossible. Bombs were dropped on isolated naval and air targets—places like Kiel and Sylt. But the bombing of the manifold targets that must necessarily enter into a plan for air blockade was taboo. Until the invasion of Norway altered the whole picture, Britain's war in the air (in spite of the object lesson in Poland) was repressed by the inhibitory political outlook upon the employment of the bomber. The tragically brief campaign in Norway changed all that. The latent power of the R.A.F. was then allowed to have more scope. The farcical leaflet raids faded into a memory of a new form of operational training in navigation. The way was opened for the application of air blockade. Tentatively it was applied by an occa- sional raid ; recently it has been intensified. More, much more, must be done. As the R.A.F. and the Dominion air forces grow in numbers it should, eventually, become possible to cut Germany's communications with the out- side, world and to isolate her troops in the countries which they have occupied. To do this entails the building up of a vast air force, able to dominate the whole of Europe. And there is no reason why such a force should not be created in spite of the wastages of war, and in spite of the present numerical superiority of the Luftwaffe. And, however much it costs, it will be the cheapest contri- bution to the winning of this war. '..::'.•:-.-•;- -..•.":-;••••- - - Sea and Air Blockade Let us look into some details of the manner in which air blockade can be designed to reduce the power of Germany. It must be acknowledged that air blockade is less forthright than sea blockade. But its effects upon the population are more immediate. Sea blockade means the prevention of the entry and egress of sea-borne supplies. While the oceans are wide, the sea approaches to landfall are not wide; sea supremacy must first be secured, thereafter unceasing vigilance upon the waters maintains the blockade. Plans for sea blockade, once set in motion, are more stable than are plans for air blockade. Intelligence re- ports of the movements of ships from ports ought to be more readily obtainable than reports of the internal movements of supplies within the frontiers of a State with whom one is at war. At sea it is enough to seize the ship. By air it is essential to destroy the internal distribution—or, at least, seriously to derange it—so that the regular life of the separate communities which comprise the State is broken up, and the various parts are thrown back on the attempt to become self-supporting. Sea blockade is impartial. It strikes by withholding. Those who apply it do not visit their victims. Air blockade is direct. Its blows kill and maim a propor- tion of its victims. Sea blockade affects the whole nation blockaded. Air blockade might be so applied as to affect certain sections of a nation, sections which might be selected on account of their geographical situation, or by reason of their employment, for either particular areas or particular industries can be attacked from the air. Air blockade might be employed in such a way as to cause internal disruption in a country by the excitement of some of the human passions. Envy, for example, than which there is none more latently widespread. Air attacks might well be used to arouse envy of more safely placed citizens among groups of persons singled out for especially devastated attacks. One has already seen the symptoms here in Britain over the evacuation of children overseas. To arouse envy is a good card for an enemy to play. So it is necessary for a Government to see that when it is played it does not succeed. War and revolu- tion stalk hand in hand. And it is no less than a German revolution that Britain has pledged herself to secure by the overthrow of the Nazis by force of arms. Skilful use of Britain's air arm might achieve this end earlier than clumsy handling of it. Indeed, such an end might well be made the main strategical conception of the employment of the R.A.F. Detailed Knowledge Necessary How is an effective air blockade to be devised? To begin with, it is necessary to know a great deal about the internal economy, industry and distributive systems of the nation to be blockaded. While many of the in- ternal activities of a nation are affected by war, the changes are notably more apparent in the administrative sphere than in the operational. The mere formation of a central Ministry does not alter the situation of a factory, the routing of a railroad, the position of a warehouse. The purpose of most War Ministries is to apply national and regional planning in place of purely commercial planning, which latter follows the law of supply and demand, and is subservient to it. War Ministries refuse to acknowledge this law, and employ artificial means to evade it; for example, control of prices, rationing of foods, prohibitions of sales of restricted articles, requisitioning. But none of these artificial wartime devices do much to change the fundamental bases of industry and com- merce. Thus, a knowledge of the pre-war industrial and commercial organisation of a nation provides a sufficient basic pattern upon which to draw up a scheme for air blockade. Before war begins, such knowledge is readily to hand in many forms. The ban upon disclosure of vital infor- mation which is the immediate consequence of war is, to the air strategist, simply a closing of the door after the horse has gone. In times of peace every nation is proud to advertise its goods. Great national newspapers run special supple- ments describing cross-sections of the nation's industry. Two years ago The Times issued a special Iron and Steel Number, which, with its map, diagrams, photographs and articles, offered the Intelligence Departments of the world a marvellous amount of information for twopence. Such a publication would never be permitted to-day. Yet
Sign up to
Flight Digital Magazine
Flight Print Magazine
Airline Business Magazine
E-newsletters
RSS
Events
