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Aviation History
1940
1940 - 2229.PDF
AUGUST 8, 1940 133 EXPANDING US. PRODUCTION Analytical Survey 0] the Task : 3,000 Aircraft per Month in Four Years By BRUCE FOSTER, B.C.E., D.I.C., A.P.R.Ae.S. CID BEAVERBROOK'S broadcast statement that planshad been approved for the immediate expansion ofthe American aircraft industry up to a capacity of 3,000 pei month is extremely important, and if such a flow of aeroplanes were available now, a decision would be reached in the war in a very short time. The words as used by Lord Beaverbrook, "to put into immediate production aeroplanes for our account up to a total output of 3,000 per month," may convey a wrong impression to some. Though we are receiving aeroplanes from America now and will continue to receive them at an ever-increasing rate, it will be some time—a long time—before the ships are pouring out Consolidateds, Douglases, Lockheeds, Grummans, Curtisses and Martins on to our wharves at the rate of 100 every day (with no let-up on Sundays). Suppose there are 50 aircraft aboard each ship; that means two ships every day, rain or shine, rough weather or calm. One does not doubt the ability of the U.S. air- craft industry to reach such a rate, for her automotive factories have always shown production ability of a high order. But the factor with which we are vitally con- cerned—and of it Lord Beaverbrook gave us no indication at all—is the time required to work up to this 3,000 rate. Probably the production people in U.S.A. had not then worked out their estimates. As a preliminary to the time estimate it is the purpose of this article to give some idea of the magnitude of the task lying before the United States in the expansion of its present facilities on the enormous scale which will be needed. Some estimates of the time required will be discussed also. The Present Facilities There are 39 airframe factories in U.S.A., and for the purpose of making estimates all calculations will be based on these factories and their related figures. Not because they are more important than the engine, airscrew and accessory factories, but because they are the easiest part of the industry at which to apply the yardstick to measure production. The words "airframe factory" have been applied in this article to those factories in which airframes are made and fitted with engines, airscrews and all the accessories such as instruments, hydraulic systems and landing wheels which are made in other factories. The table lists the 13 largest of these factories, whose total factory personnel (office, engineering and production) at April, 1940, exceeded 1,000. The term "factory personnel" as used in this article needs definition. It has been used to include the three classes of labour reproduction, office and engineering. Pro- duction people are those engaged in the factory proper ; office people include the accounting, advertising, sales, managerial and executive staffs; while engineering covers design, research, stress analysis, drafting and testing. Investigating the relative proportions of labour in 14 American factories with total personnel ranging from under 100 to over 15,000 and covering a total of nearly 40,000 people, it is found that the average proportions are these: production, 74; office, 16; engineering, 1.0 per cent. DATA Airtaune factory Bell Boeing Brewster~urtis3 Douglas LockheedMartin North AmericanRepublic ON LARGE U.S. AIRFRAME FACTORIES Employees at April, 1940 1,150 6,100 1,500 6,000 15,700 6,400 10,824 5,0251,650 Employees at April, 1939 1,000 3,000 _ 3,500 6,350 5,6007,458 2,490245 Floor area 1000s of sq.ft. 210 765 188665 1,307 6681,200 720200 Backlog 1000s of dollars 7,500 — _S)7,287 65,00041,500 51,00015,000 Though exact figures for Consolidated, Grumman, Vought-Sikorsky and Vultee are not available, they would also quality for this list Adding to these the figures for the remaining 26 factories* and making reasonable approximations to fill a few gaps for which the information could not be obtained, it is found that the employees for the 39 factories totalled 79,000 at April, 1940, and about 42,000 at April, 1939. This is an 88 per cent, expansion in one year, itself a very creditable increase, but, as will be shown, nothing like the order of increase required. Total floor space, including office as well as factory proper, approximated closely to 10 million sq. ft. at April, 1940. (On the subject of floor space it may be of value to note that T. P. Wright subdivides factory space into work- shop space, 83 ; office space, 17 per cent.) How Much Expansion ? Consider the Lockheed factory, whose personnel for 1939 may be averaged at 6,000. A Lockheed official state- ment showed that for the calendar year of 1939 they made 356 military or commercial aeroplanes, of which 290 were reconnaissance bombers (presumably Hudsons), 12 were light patrol, and 54 were commercial transports. This total is a rate of 30 per month, a small figure when we are talking of thousands per month, yet no one would accuse the Lockheed Company of being inefficient or of being a negligible figure in the aircraft world. Of this production, 250 Hudsons went to Britain and their manufacture and delivery took twelve months. Even if unlimited credit is arranged, aircraft cannot be obtained just by giving the order, and the above example illustrates this forcibly. Apropos of finance, one wonders what significance should be attached to the comment of Mr. Morgenthau, Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, that there appeared to be no doubt about the ability of Britain to pay. Does it mean that the transaction is on a credit basis and that America will no longer insist on the "cash- and-carry '' clause ? Total airframe factory personnel in U.S.A. may bo averaged for 1939 at 60,000, and this labour force was able to turn out 5,856 aeroplanes of all types during the year, a monthly rate of 488. Of the 5,856, 2,141 were military and heavy commercial, while 3,715 were classed as other commercial aeroplanes. The figure of 488 agrees with a statement by Mr. T. P. Wright, vice-president of engineering for the Curtiss- Wright Corporation in Aviation for July, placing current production rate at 500 per month at May, 1940. So the expansion as far as personnel is concerned must be at least a 6-fold one to attain to the 3,000 rate. It is obvious that an enormous task lies ahead for Ameri- can industry. The expansion may be more than a 6-fold one since the 488 aircraft of mixed types are not equivalent to 488 military aeroplanes. In fact, the bulk of the 3,715 commercial aircraft are described as being in the " light 'plane class." But greater efficiency will result when bigger production batches are the order of the day, as they would be if production were greatly increased. With- out more refined data a very close estimate is not possible, but to put the expansion at 8-fold is a not unreasonable figure. This implies an airframe factory personnel of 480,000. Engine and airscrew factory personnel may be obtained by recourse to a ratio given by T. P. Wright, which chow3 that this figure is in the proportion of 21 to 79 when com- pared to airframe personnel. It should, therefore, be about 128,000, giving a total of 608,000 for airframe, engine and airscrew manufacture. * The other 26 factories are: Aeronautical Corporation,Barkley-Grow, Beech, Bellanca, Cessna, Culver, Curtiss- Wright, Fairchild, Fleetwings, Harlow, Howard, Kellett Auto-giro, Luscombe, Mononcoupe, Northrop, Piper, Porterfield, Rearwin, Ryan, Spartan, Stearman, Stinson, Taylorcraft,Timm, Vega, and Waco.
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