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Aviation History
1940
1940 - 2298.PDF
/ 126 OTF AUGUST 15, 1940 AIR BLOCKADE (CONTINUED) of heartening the home Italians, endeavouring to deflect our strength from the defence of Egypt, and striking a blow at British prestige among the native races. What- ever happens in Somaliland cannot affect the sea blockade which the British Navy maintains. Nor can that desert country of 68,000 square miles, whose chief products are cattle, sheep, goats, hides, skins and gum, do much to help our enemies. But the Somalis are a Mohammedan people; that is important. The Hitlerite repression of religion shoul' be spread far and wide among the followers of Mahomet. Here is the best description of Somaliland I have read. It was written by (then) Squadron Leader J. L. Vachell, M.C., who gave a lecture before the R.U.S.I. dealing with a flight from Aden to Addis Abbaba at the time of the coronation of Haile Selassie. Squadron Leader Vachell was then in command of No. 8 Squadron at Aden. " Somaliland," he wrote, " generally is a barren waste covered in most parts by thorn bushes ten to twelve feet high, and dotted with ant-heaps. The country is entirely featureless, and even the watercourses are dry except in the rains. . . . About half-way between Hargeisa and Jig Jiga, somewhere near the frontier, which is very indefinite, the country changes abruptly from the scrub-covered plain to rolling grass land, somewhat reminiscent of Salisbury Plain." The population of Somaliland is about 350,000. And the best defence of that barren country, albeit an indirect one, is a resolute scheme for the tightening of the blockade about Italy by air attacks on objectives on Italian soil. Spirit of the Army Before I pass on to what I have to say about the process of applying blockade still more severely, I want to say one thing which has proved to be the most heartening matter I have come across for weeks. It is that those specimens of Britain's new army I have come in contact with while moving about the country during the past few days have not failed to impress me with their guts; I know that they have an indomitable spirit which is the same as the spirit of the men who came through Mons and the first battle of Ypres in 1914 in those dark days when the Germans first tried, then without success, to reach the Channel Ports. I knew those men who survived Mons and that first battle of Ypres. I lived among them and fought with them. And the spirit they possessed, their capacity to laugh at the Germans, is alive again among the fellows who came back from Dunkirk. The British Expeditionary Force in Belgium was not defeated. The Germans never broke through it. They broke through the Belgians on one side and the French on the other side, but never through the British Army. And the Germans know it. It must be a disturbing thought to Hitler that his massed tanks and armoured vehicles, his sidecars and infantry by the hundred thou- sand, could not break through the British front, and far from breaking the spirit of the troops who returned to this country, have simply made them laugh at Jerry. Although we have had to withdraw our troops from the Continent, I believe we have left the German troops who met the B.E.F. with the feeling that the British have a sense of superiority over the Germans, and that is more than half the battle of the spirit which, with adequate material support, triumphs in the end. The same spirit prevails in the R.A.F. and in the Navy. And until that spirit is broken—which will never happen—the "Jerry," who was in the last war the " Hun," cannot win. And so while we have Jerry with the knowledge that the British soldier considers himself superior to the German soldier, let us use every resource we possess to smash down the spirit of the German by getting at him from every angle, and above all by getting at him where he thinks he is safe—in the area of Eastern Germany. A Missed Opportunity We missed a golden opportunity to operate from French soil, partly because of the political policy of the period and partly because our squadrons in the R.A.F. were not sufficiently mobile. The aeroplanes themselves were mobile, but all the things that pertained to their operation—the ground crews, the maintenance organisa- tion, the supply side of the job—were too slow and had to pass through the same channels of movement as the Army units. Now we must make up for that failure to seize the opportunity presented. And that can be done only by increasing the range of the aircraft we are using and those we are going to use in the near future. If it has not already been done steps should at once be taken to secure additional range, without sacrifice of bomb load, by means of assisted take-off. In time of war, economy is thrown to the winds. There is no need, therefore, to. consider money. The most expensive way may prove to be the cheapest in the end if it will finish the war sooner. ' The simplest way to provide assisted take-off is to use gravity. It has been customary for long-range flights to use special runways for the purpose. Why should not military aircraft use special runways for their purpose? The labour can be found. The cost of con- struction need not be considered. The fact that machines might have to take off singly would not matter. For bombers it would have to be a night job anyway. It would be undesirable to send bombers hundreds of miles across German occupied territory by day. The losses might be too great, prove the operation uneconomical, and unnecessarily trying to the personnel engaged. Night Bombing It the tasks are made more dangerous, the crews will have to be given more rest; for the running of risks consciously produces a sense of strain, which causes fatigue to develop quicker. Reduce the strain caused by risk, and fatigue is less marked, and moreover is of a kind from which the individual recovers more rapidly. Indeed, I think that the continuous running of known risks can, after a time, produce in some individuals a result not so very different from that produced by sudden shock. And the best way to cut out the risk factor in the operations of bombers is obviously to make the bombing operations principally night operations. For proof of that one need only examine carefully the com- parative losses suffered by German aircraft which have operated when British day fighters could get at them and the losses suffered by German aircraft which have operated at night. And the mere fact that night bombing interferes with the sleep of people in the areas under attack is of itself a good war weapon, for lack of sleep quickly undermines the constitution and com- placency of most individuals. So, as the job must be principally a night job, the aircraft would take off singly anyhow. I know, of course, that my suggestion of a special
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