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Aviation History
1940
1940 - 2436.PDF
170 Air Strategy—XVII AUGUST 29, 1940 APPLICATION of AIR BLOCKADE The. German and the British Objects : Importance of Intelligence Reports By CAPTAIN NORMAN MACMILLAN, M.C., A.F.C. AIR blockade may be applied in accordance with /~\ two theories : Either it may be intended to deprive the enemy of the greatest number of commodities, or it may be designed to eliminate a selected number of commodities. In both cases its success must be gauged by the results obtained. Up to the moment of writing, it would appear that the German method of applying air blockade follows the first theory, while the British method follows the second. The first method demands a numerically superior air force, which Germany (at the moment) possesses. But its effectiveness is dissipated by the inevitably wide- spread nature of the attacks which must be launched to give it effect. It is, basically, an unscientific employ- ment of brute force; or if one cares to be polite to the German High Command, a scientific employment of brute force. ' I leave the reader to decide for himself in which category he would place the aeronautical ebul- lition of the German High Command. (I have my own opinion. The German never did know the meaning of the word finesse). The second method strikes with art at the planned war economy of the enemy. In its results (assuming that the attacks launched are effective) it is far more deadly, for it affects the military capacity of the enemy and weakens it at source. In the use of the word blockade in what I have just written the reader must appreciate that I do not refer to the bombing of aerodromes or any other objective of a purely military character. I refer to the bombing of industrial plants, industrial stores, food factories and storehouses, communications, and centres of the pro- duction of basic raw materials. I do not refer to the bombing of civilian housing areas, for that is not block- ade but open warfare in its worst form, for which the German is world renowned not alone in this war but in former wars in which the Teuton has engaged. Studying the Targets The art of employing air blockade requires the advance study of specific targets. To those entrusted with the duty of giving effect to a Cabinet requirement for the application of air blockade against a specific product, the strategical study of the terrain of the enemy may disclose a widely scattered array of targets. They may be sited at intervals throughout a series of zones, each becoming more distant from the operating base; yet each one of those targets will have to be attacked if the product in question is to be effectively eliminated. So it may prove that those entrusted with the duty of drawing up the plans for air blockade of that particu- lar product may have to report back to the Cabinet that a complete blockade is impossible because it is tactically impossible to reach certain targets which lie in the more distant zones. In this case it is clear that it will be possible to apply partial blockade only. And the report will estimate the percentage of effectiveness which air blockade, under the circumstances, can operate. Pending the production of aircraft with a greater operational range of action, it will be necessary to attack the targets which apply to that particular product in the zones which can be reached ; and simultaneously to attack the lines of communication between these zones and those which lie beyond operational range, to pre- vent the free circulation of the product from the unmolested centres of production. " : It is evident that intelligence reports are of the utmost importance, for it is vital to know all the targets con- cerned in the elimination of a given product; otherwise the blockade will be reduced in its effectiveness. Thus the kind of intelligence which an air commander requires is different from that needed by a naval or a military. commander. And it is for this reason that even the humblest employee of almost every firm in the country must guard his words, for in these days of air war it is not the " man in the street " that counts, but the man in the works. The application of air blockade is certain to send the enemy in search of alternative sources of supply and production. It is highly important that the earliest possible information be obtained about such moves so that they can be frustrated either by advance or by higher-price buying, or other means of peaceful depriva- tion ; or by suitable naval, air or military action, or combined action. •. . ; Difficult Tasks ^Z,-^ ^^:j ':i With Germany in possession of vast tracts of Europe, and with all France under her domination, it is obvious that there must be great difficulty in applying a complete blockade, even by the combined efforts of Britain's sea and air forces. On the other hand, as Germany is now responsible for the control of the lands she has over- run, it is absolutely imperative for her to maintain her huge armed forces at their maximum strength until she has succeeded in all the plans which have been laid for her by Hitler, or until the attempted execution of those plans breaks down, as those of Hitler's forerunners broke down in 1918. For that armed force, Germany needs an entirely dif- ferent kind of planned economy for nearly the whole of Europe. Almost the whole of that unhappy Continent must be placed under the same yoke as that which Ger- many has borne for seven years ; but, whereas Germany bore it without the stress of war, the Europe which is in bondage to-day has not that advantage ; nor has Germany now. And as Britain's air force continually grows in strength and its power to reach out over Europe extends ever farther afield, from the United Kingdom and from the Middle East, Germany will find it increas- ingly difficult to maintain the delicate equipoise of supply and demand under the strain of partial sea and air blockade. Then Italy will begin to drain her partner of steel and coal, oil and manufactured weapons, for Italy will feel the draught first. So it is that Hitler has thrown the Luftwaffe at Eng- land as he has. By day its strength has been concen-r trated against the south-eastern portion of England.: Why? Not alone to threaten that part of England, in which the heart of the Empire lies, but partly because that part of England is the very pivot of the striking strength of the Royal Air Force. Take a map of Europe. Place one point of a pair of compasses upon most parts of Germany, and upon Northern Italy on those very towns and cities which have been visited by the R.A.F. in their partial blockade of Germany and
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