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Aviation History
1941
1941 - 0099.PDF
JANUARY C/TH, 1941. Air Strategy—XXXV 33 THE FOURTH DIMENSION Begin Now to Defeat the German Spring Offensive By CAPTAIN NORjVlAN MAG'MILLAN, M.C: , A.F.C. WAR is four dimensional. Of the four dimension*that of time is often the most importantT"'fJutduring war it is frequently and unhappily the dimension over which least cofltcaLcaix be, exercised. For example, the leaders of a nation, knowing it to be beaten, seldom give in until the last, probably because they cannot bring themselves to relinquish the reins of power which they have held in their hands. In this matter of the fourth dimension in war the policy of the propa- gandist and that of the militarist are not always in alignment. The propagandist endeavours to shorten the war by undermining the morale of the enemy. The militarist may often, temporarily, desire to lengthen the war to ;_•-Enable him to implement the forces under his command. *^ The militarist may occasionally wish to curtail the war to secure what he believes will be better terms, whereas the propagandist may argue that his. weapon will be blunted by that very act. Of all material weapons, the aeroplane, being the swiftest, ought, by that inherent quality, to be the most efficient weapon to cut down the fourth dimension in war, provided it is wielded with the utmost effect. Were it not for the aeroplane, with its power of comparatively (in relation to the Great War) long-range bombardment, the British Isles would have suffered no material damage and our need to press on with the war would be less urgent. Now, there are many people who affirm, but with perhaps a little less conviction than of yore, that the aeroplane cannot win a war. I believe that this view is still held by those who, even now, have not adjusted their perspective to the focusing viewpoint of actual war, so that features in the picture which the)' have mentally created remain dis- proportioned. Taking Stock Those who hold the view that aeroplanes cannot win •«L war, invariably, in my experience, deny to the aero- plane the right to superiority in numbers which they are filling to accord to the arms of the other Services if ^.Jthey are to be enabled to proceed to a victorious con- clusion of a strenuous campaign. At this stage of the war it is desirable and necessary to take stock of the general position as it now exists. And to do that it is imperative to examine the relationship of the three other dimensions to the fourth—time. ; If the Italian armies are defeated in Northern Africa, so that the hostile forces which the Allies have to face are confined within the Continent of Europe, two of the " four dimensions will have been most sensibly diminished. Such a reduction of the surface area of the land war ,will be of the utmost value to the Allies, for it will enable ';- the forces at their disposal to be more closely concen- trated. But unless other Allies, with great reserves of man power, come to the assistance of the Allies in a belligerent capacity, the numerical superiority of the :"' German war machine in men will persist. And there is but one way to offset that advantage in human ss. bomb- and cannon-fodder—by the employment of the '^V machine. Therein lies the Allies' great advantage. The English- speaking peoples possess a machine-making capacity in excess of even.the present German-controlled Europe. And it is t»-'offset the employment of that machine- making capacity as much as for any other purpose that the Germans are still waging the war against the ship- ping of all nations with unrestricted brutality. War demands more shipping space than peace, Losses must be replaced by a nation which depends upon shipping for all its overseas supplies coming into and.going out of its home base. Every ship which must be built curtails the number of tanks, shells, bombs and aeroplanes which can be built. The sea war waged_J>y" Germany thus serves two purposes. It is a blockade of the civilian population, and it is also both a direct and an indirect blockade of the war effort. It interferes with the military pressure which the Allies can put upon Germany within a given time. It increases the time period during which Germany can maintain excess air pressure on Britain. A Choice of Weapons In such circumstances there must be for Britain a choice of weapons. Either it can-be decided that a smaller total of all weapons in the order of proportional supply will best meet the exigencies of the campaign, or it may- be found essential to give preference to certain classes of weapons. Under such conditions it is understandable how it comes about that Service leaders of each Service, anxious for the success of the particular sphere of the campaign entrusted to their care, emphasise the absolute importance of their own requirements. But the stage is ultimately reached (as happened in the Great War and may again in this) when a decision can no longer be post- poned and the man with the final say must, in his own judgment, give the verdict upon which the future course and perhaps conduct of the war will be, to' a great extent, founded. JSTo such verdict has as yet been passed in judgment upon the preparations for the present war. Three years of the Great War passed before it was then necessary. We are still only in the first half of-the second year of this war, and the crucial, bitter moment when the hour of decision must be faced has not yet been reached. Perhaps it may never come! But if it does come, as come it may, it will be again the same question to which a decisive answer will have to be given: .must the aero- plane be given priority and if so to wftat extent? It is possible that the Spring will see the importance of this question become paramount, and upon the answer will depend the future course of the war. Suppositional Speculations Let us assume, for a moment, certain postulates. This process is necessary in war, for on no other basis is it possible to make preparations for future stages of the campaign. In war certainties are unpredictable. Let us say that by the spring the Italian armies in Albania and the North African Mediterranean coast will have been defeated, so that both areas will have fallen into the hands c^the Allies. Let us go even further and imagine that the Italian army and people will have revolted against Mussolini and the Fascist Party. Let us understand that the German forces will have moved into Northern Italy and will have occupied the country to a
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