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Aviation History
1941
1941 - 0277.PDF
JANUARY 30TH, 1941. Air Strategy—XXXVIII 95 "NORWAY'' • The Second Article on the Lessons of the Tactical Employment of Fighters and Bombers in the Present War By CAPFAIN NORMAN MACMILLAN, M.C., A.F.C. t I ^ HE main thought which must derive from a con- I sideration of German strategy in the Norwegian campaign is that the German conquest of Europe had long been planned, and that those in Britain who had popularly been called scaremongers before Munich (and after) were actually the persons with correct views on the true meaning of Nazi ambitions. When I was in Norway shortly before and shortly afaer the accession of Hitler to the Chancellorship in '^Germany, it appeared to me that Norway was divided internally in politics. Political feeling was evideHT even between members of staffs of Government establish- ments. It is always difficult for a foreigner to under- - stand the domestic politics of another nation, but it seemed to me that the political division in Norway was like a see-saw with a Liberal standing on one end of the plank and a Socialist on the other. The gulf between the two was not wide but it was deep. ; There is a saying '' Norway has houses and cottages but no castles." Rich people are few. Everyone shares in taxation. Among themselves the Norwegians have a reputation for stubbornness, and they love litigation.* The^tfonditions were thus fertile for Nazi agents, and full use was made of this cruel, underhand form of race war. The story of the implementing of German merchant vessels in Norwegian waters and then of their employ- ment to carry German arms and troops to the Western fjords and ports need not be recounted here. At the zero hour these vessels dropped their pretence of peaceful trading and became military transports, which disgorged troops who seized the ports where they lay. Suffice to say that the initial success of the German attack on Norway was brought about by the undermining of the internal political structure by Nazi agents' propaganda, so that the Nazi standard was raised by Norwegians themselves, and by the pre-zero hour invasion of Nor- wegian ports by German troop transports disguised as ^^merchantmen. Thereafter it took the Germans two months to capture the whole of Norway. Tactical Employment Here we are primarily interested in the tactical employ- ment of the aircraft used in this campaign. The Ger- mans were well aware of the naval and military resources - of Norway. Probably there were few secrets anyway. Norway could entertain no aggressive intentions against any country. Her forces were small, and there was little to hide. ^s1 The semi-offiefal German Handbuch der Luftfahrt for 1938 gave the strength of the Norwegian Air' Service as follows: — Army air force: 86 first line aircraft, Naval air force : 92 first line aircraft, Reserve about 22 aircraft, a total of about 200 aircraft. * [It used to be said that one could tell the three Scandinavian nationalitiesby their ways of lighting cigars. The Swede would give the other man a light first, and then light his own cigar. The Dane would light his own first andthen the other man's. The Norwegian would lieht his own cigar, and then throw the match away!—ED.] The same authority gave the military organisation of these aircraft as follows:— Army Air Force: 4 Reconnaissance Squadrons, 4 Fighter Squadrons, 1 Bomber Squadron. Naval Air Force: 4 Reconnaissance Squadrons, 4 Fighter Squadrons, 2 Light Bomber Squadrons. This small air force was responsible for the air defence of a country r,ioo miles in length and containing a population of just under 3,000,000 people. Norway was confronted by a nation between 80,000,000 and 90,000,000 strong, and possessing the largest air force in the world. Seizing the Aerodromes With these facts before us it is easy to understand the German tactical emplovtne'nt of aircraft in the Nor- wegian campaign. Their first duty was to seize all usable aerodromes (landing grounds in the extreme north were under ice and snow when the German in- vasion began) and simultaneously destroy or capture all Norwegian aircraft. The second duty of the German air force was to pro- vide a means of rapid communication and swift rein- forcement in a country where railway communications were few and slow and other communications uncertain so early in the year (April). Thus the German air force was used to dominate Norway where usable aerodromes existed; that meant most of the key ports an/fthe coastal railway terminals with the exception of Bergen and Narvik. The Norwegian railway system divides Norway into three, and this peculiarity was fully exploited by German strategy. The southern part is the peninsula enclosed by Bergen, Stavanger, Christiansand, Oslo and the railway between Bergen and Oslo. The central part is the area lying immediately to the north and stretching as far as Trondhjem and the railway which runs thence into Sweden. Oslo and Trondhjem are interconnected by a railway line which forms a loop through the Gudbrands and Oster valleys. The northern part is the area north of Trondhjem wttich is not traversed by a north-south railway line, but which has a short lateral line connect- ing Narvik with the Swedish iron ore mines. With the ports of Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger and Larvik all in the hands of the Germans from the first moment of the attack, and the area they enclosed dominated from the aerodromes at Oslo and Stavanger, the southern peninsula was quickly cut off, and most of the Nor- wegian air force was destroyed or captured at the start. Troops began to fight for the possession of the Oslo- Bergen railway. Meanwhile, and now unimpeded, German air trans- ports landed reinforcements of troops by air at Oslo,
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