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Aviation History
1941
1941 - 0278.PDF
96 JANUARY 30TH, 1941. AIR STRATEGY (Continued) while ships brought more and more troops and supplies up the Oslo fjord. Thus was the main German base in Norway swiftly established. The British and Norwegian navies had cut the sea communications betwen Bergen and Trondhjem, while Norwegian troops guarded the railway and road communications between Oslo and Trondhjem. But for aircraft, the German force landed at Trondhjem from German vessels at zero hour would have been cut off. The third duty of the German air force was then to reinforce the garrison at Trondhjem to enable it to hold out until it was possible for the troops in the Southern area to force a communication by land through the ii linking valleys. Aircraft were landed on frozen lakes and on temporary landing grounds as well as on the aerodrome at Trondhjem, and from them troops and supplies were disemplaned to reinforce the original force which had seized the town and its surroundings. The fourth duty of the German air force was to assist the mechanised troops who were forcing a way up the Gudbrands and Oster valleys. Fighters, bombers and dive bombers were employed for this purpose. The relatively small German force which had seized Narvik at zero hour had been completely cut off by the British Navy, and its supporting ships of the German Navy in Narvik fjord had been destroyed. Again the one means of communication between the main German force and the beleaguered garrison at Narvik was by air. But at Narvik no aerodrome was available, and supplies and reinforcements in men had to be dropped by parachute. Chain of Aerodromes This tactical employment of aircraft was rendered comparatively easy because the Germans had a con- tinuous chain of aerodromes from the provinces of Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg and Pome- rania through Denmark and Norway to Trondhjem, and had seized the oil supplies in the two Scandinavian coun- tries they had overrun. To operate aircraft over the route Copenhagen, Aalborg, Oslo, Trondhjem was nothing more than the Luft Hansa had done for years in all parts of Europe, except that the commercial line had used Gothenburg instead of Aalborg and had not found it worth while to proceed beyond Oslo. Perhaps it was not for nothing that Erhard Milch* was appointed Secretary of State for Air under Goring when the Air Ministry was formed in Berlin in February, 1933, for Milch had been handling the operation of air lines in Europe for ten years or so^Jbefore that. Anyhow, whether Milch was responsible fer it or not, the German military transport air line which ran in Norway during the campaign did its job well, although it must be admitted that on the whole it had not many more diffi- culties to contend with than would a civil air line, and it had no limitations in personnel and aircraft. From Oslo to Trondhjem is 250 miles, and from Trondhjem to Narvik is 400. Even without the air base at Trondhjem the Narvik garrison need not have been cut off, but it would have been more difficult for supplies and reinforcements to reach them regularly by air, and it would have been really difficult to give them air support. After the occupation of the Southern peninsula, Trondhjem became the key to the situation in the two northern areas of Norway. And it is noteworthy that its garrison, although cut off on all sides by land and sea from support of any kind, maintained constant touch Aerodromes and seaplane stations in Scandinavia. Thefirst task of the Luftwaffe was to seize the Norwegian aerodromes. with its main forces and with its outpost in Narvik by means of aircraft. The tactical employment of aircraft by the German air force in these circumstances provides a most valuable lesson, for by means of aircraft two beleaguered garrisons were maintained, while the nearer ; "was utilised as a base for the farther one. I am not aware of any similar circumstance in war, and it woul<|[ appear that aircraft alone could make such a situation V possible. Favourable Geography Undoubtedly the geographical situation favoured the German commanders. Narvik wras beyond the reach of Allied aircraft operating from any Allied base. Trondhjem lay at almost the limit of bomber operation from any Allied base ; it was beyond the limit of fighter operation. The one counter air action which could be taken against the German military air transport line between Germany and Narvik was th^ bombing of inter- mediate aerodromes, including Trondhjem. It has been proved in the present war that the bombing of aerodromes need not stop air operations for long periods, for the craters made in landing grounds and runways can be rapidly filled and the surface made good enough for taking off and landing. It is necessary to damage or destroy the aircraft to cause a serious interruption in air operations. With the tremendous preponderance of aircraft possessed by Germany for the Norwegian campaign, even the damage or destruction
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