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Aviation History
1941
1941 - 0279.PDF
JANUARY 30TH, 1941. AIR STRATEGY (Continued) i of aircraft on the scale which was possible in view of . the distance of the Norwegian aerodromes (except -: Stavanger) from British bases could not greatly affect the efficiency of the German air communications. The lesson which appears to be indicated here is that the bomber is not a good weapon to employ against a y line of air communications. In such circumstances its: value as a weapon may be thrown away. The bomber should be directed against main bases, base stores, ports of embarkation and disembarkation—in fact, all points of concentration of effort, including troop concentrations even in the front line. The next duty of the German air force in Norway was to employ their bombers against just those very targets which it was impossible for the Allies to attack •".. on the German side. Allied troops had landed in the fjords between Bergen and Trondhjem, and the forward f imes had moved up the valleys to intercept the German advance on Trondhjem along the Gudbrands valley. The Allied force arrived in the Gudbrands valley in time to intercept the German forces, but there they found themselves attacked by enemy aircraft without having any air defence except their ground equipment. The German bombing forces simultaneously con- centrated upon the Allied base ports in the fjords, destroyed the towns and smashed up the jetties. It was at this period that a British Gladiator squadron landed on a frozen lake in the attempt to hold up the German bombers. The squadron's aircraft were bombed out of action within 48 hours. The Allied forces in Central Norway had to be withdrawn the way they had come, because German bombing pressure was too heavy. British and German Tactics In this we see the converse of the British bombing of line of communication aerodromes in German hands - in the two Scandinavian countries. The German bomb- ing was directed against Allied concentrations, including their sole concentration of aircraft. Admittedly the odds were unequal, but it would appear that the method of the tactical employment of air power was at fault on the Allied side. The Allies had the opportunity to bomb the German "jJLorces when they were concentrating in Baltic ports . prior to the attack on Norway. This opportunity was missed, but for what reason it was missed it may not be possible to learn until after the war, when it becomes possible for a full history of the momentous events of this war to be written by both sides. Once the force had dispersed throughout Denmark and Norway it became an impossible proposition for the Allies to carry i - out effective air attacks from the far-distant bases they possessed. It would also appear that the failure to attempt the recapture of Trondhjem by direct instead of indirect methods was the Allies' principal strategic misconception of the whole campaign—that is, after their initial failure to stop the surprise seizure of all the key ports. That initial failure was a flop for the intelligence depart- ments, unless there is more in the story than appears on the surface ; again we shall have to wait until the war ends. The withdrawal of the Allied force from, Central Norw'ay marked the beginning of the last jrtlase of this campaign. The way into Narvik had been kept open by Allied naval ships, most of them British. Narvik was the all-year-round port of shipment of Swedish iron ore. Whoever possessed Narvik possessed at least part of the iron ore supply of Sweden, unless, of course, German ? had occupied Sweden. A British expedi- tionary force went to Narvik. All three Services were under naval control. Narvik was captured. The shore- based aircraft did good work, but there was still a failure to provide the bombing punch which was needed to deal with-^the enemy. Concentrated Targets And while that effort within the Arctic Circle drew to its early close, the great struggle on the Western front had begun. The German squadrons had been faced about, their blows fell first and hardest on Holland. The German air force again struck at the heart of con- centrations of troops and people and cities, while in the Far North the little expeditionary force of the Allies struck at a shadow by comparison. The importance of Narvik had gone. But still the Germans reinforced the German troops by air, and dropped supplies. In the face of what must have been an unfathomable situa—' tion the Allied expeditionary force withdrew from Narvik, and the brief Norwegian campaign was ended. The lesson to be learned from that campaign is not only that air superiority, in numbers, in striking range, and in lines of communication, must be matched or bettered, but that when bombers are tactically employed they must be directed against concentrated targets. Once the targets are dispersed the whole air effort is dispersed, too. Moreover; air lines of communication, once established, need fighters, not bombers, to break them efficiently ; air victory is won by destroying air- craft at any point, from the destruction of the raw materials of which they are made to the finished article in flight, and that includes their fuel and their oil also. (Next week: Low Countries and France.) THE CANADIAN WAR EFFORT CANADA'S High Commissioner, Mr. Vincent Massey, when^ he spoke at a luncheon given by the National Defence Public Interest Committee on January 22, gave a stirringaccount of what Canada was now doing for the prosecution of the wax, and of the close relationship which exists betweenthe Dominion and the Mother Country. Though agriculture was still the foundation of the country, the value of the pro-ducts from factories had now been made to exceed farm products, such was the magnitude of the industrial effort. Inihe military field the Army was the largest of the three forces, but the Navy, though not large, had increased its personnelby eight times and its number of ships by ten times since the outbreak of war. The Empire Air Training Plan was well ahead of schedule, for instead of 33 training schools due to beoperating last month there were 48. All the buildings and aerodromes due for completion in 1941 had been finished lastyear. • The great diversity of the Canadian manufacturing plantwas shown in the products being made or about to be made. These included atrframes, 3.7 in. anti-aircraft guns, 25-pounders, anfi-tank guns, 4 in. and 6 in. naval guns, machine guns, tanks, trucks, rifles, explosives, shells, naval craft, andoptical and other precision instruments. To accelerate pro- duction eight Government-owned factories had been sf:t up forthe production of aircraft. Canada, said Mr. Massey, is now "full out" in her war programme.
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