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Aviation History
1941
1941 - 0336.PDF
FEBRUARY 6TH, 1941. THE CHANCES OF INVASION Prospects of Air-borne Troops : Key Position of Fighter. By MAJOR F. A. de V. ROBERTSON, V.D. ers TI HE authorities have been warning us that the dangerof an invasion is not over, and that we must all beon the qui vive to meet it and deal with it, if and when it comes. The Germans have been saying that thewar is to be won by defeating Great Britain and in no other way, and at no other place. That is one way ofcomforting Mussolini, for it implies that British victories in the Middle East and round the Mediterranean will beof no account if Great Britain herself is to be mastered by German arms. The argument is specious, but not entirelyconclusive. One may recall how M. Reynaud wished France to fight on in her colonial Empire after the home-land had been beaten by the German invaders. Marshal Petain's periodic resistance to German pressure is based onthe unspoken threat that, if pushed too hard, the Vichy Government might even yet withdraw to Algeria andTunisia with the remains of its fleet, and there take up a new attitude beyond the reach of a Power which has nomeans of crossing the sea. Our own Prime Minister, too, when the tide of war was not running too favourably forus, threw out a hint that if the need arose the British struggle against dictatorship would be continued in andfrom the British Empire. Further, the Government has given an assurance to the United States that, howeverbadly the United Kingdom might be defeated, the Navy wouid in no circumstances be handed over to the Ger-mans. So that even if Hitler were to lord it at St. James's (perish the thought!) free Britons, no doubt with the fullpower of the United States at their side, would still fight on in the cause of liberty. Hitler's Promise There is a chance that the German talk of an invasionol Britain may be a feint, designed to prevent us from sending more reinforcements to the Mediterranean theatreof war; or, on the other hand, the massing of German troops on the frontiers of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria may beintended to make us think that the real German threat is to the Suez Canal. The enemy will undoubtedly want tokeep us guessing as to his next move. It is, however, significant that a sort of promise to invade Great Britainhas been broadcast to the German people. The propaganda machine in Germany is in such order that the people athome there can be kept ignorant of or informed about any particular thing which the Nazi party wishes them toknow or not to know. Announcements made to the Ger- man people may have more behind them than broadcastswhich are meant maiuly for foreign ears. If Hitler promises something to his own people and fails to make his wordsgood, he will lose some of the prestige which still sur- rounds his name at home. Therefore this promise to in-vade Great Britain may have more substance in it than can be found in some other German declarations. One thing is certain. Germany has not the naval powerto attempt to win command of the seas and then land her troops on this island with comparative ease. If the inva-sion is attempted it will have to be by trying to evade the Royal Navy. It must be difficult for our ships to watchevery area of the seas between our coasts and those of Europe, for the hostile shores of the Continent now extendfrom Norway to the Bay of Biscay. We sorely miss the help of the French Navy; though the fifty Americandestroyers which have been made over to us are a great help. The Coastal Command aircraft, too, are giving in-valuable help in watching all the possible invasion ports. But foggy weather will blind the ships and will still moreeffectually close the eyes of the scouting aircraft. There was a chance that the attempt might be made during thewinter when conditions were right. Right conditions imply low visibility and a calm sea. Presumably the seawould have to be calm on all sides from which the invading ships would have to start. Conditions which were right for. the German transports'would not necessarily meet the whole case. The Luftwaffe^ would have to play its part. Severe bombing attacks o#the British land forces opposite the selected landing places would probably be thought quite necessary, and there isalso the possibility of the use of air-borne troops. If fog lay over this island it might be well out of the question forthe German aircraft to play their allotted part in the invasion. At any rate, most of the whiter has now gonewithout a move by the invading forces They may still make the attempt before February is out, or they maywait for the very different conditions which obtain in the spring. When so many favourable circumstances in dif^ferent parts of Europe have to coincide, and as weather%t. is very unaccountable—especially when the Germans onlyreceive partial weather reports—it becomes obvious that extremely careful organisation would be necessary to seizea moment which was in all respects favourable and launch the attack from its various starting points. Meticulouscare in organisation is one of the strong points of the Ger- man character, though the organisation is apt to becumbrous and slow, and speed in seizing an opportunity is not such a strong national characteristic. The Prime Minister has reminded us that we are still ahalf-armed nation, though we are now infinitely better off than we were on the morrow of the rescue from Dunkerque.Modern war is an affair of machines, and in land fighting that means, not only machine guns and machine-gun-carriers, but tanks of various categories, guns of various calibres, and motor transport. Vast masses of men withrifles do not count now as they did in the last war. Man- power only counts relatively to the numbers of machinesavailable. The British Army has now enough machines at its command to set a problem for any invading force.Invaders cannot overwhelm that Army if they have no arms but machine guns and a limited number of machine-gun-carriers. They would certainly need heavy ordnance and tanks, and these could only be transported by sea. Ifthe vessels which brought them eluded the Royal Navy, the guns and tanks could not be landed until a safe landingplace on shore had been prepared for them. Landing the Aircraft : These considerations point to a surprise coup by air-borne troops who would be ordered to seize and hold suit* «. able stretches of the shore until the heavy armament could <be landed and got into action. The modus operandi might well resemble that used in the invasion of Holland. Firstwould come swarms of aircraft which would drop large numbers of specially trained parachute soldiers at variousselected points. It would be very necessary to attack simultaneously and at a number of widely separated points,so as to confuse the British reserves. The descent of the parachutists would probably be made at dawn. It wouldbe the task ol these men to overpower the Home Guard: on the spot with all speed, and then to prepare, likewisewith all speed, a landing ground for troop-carrying aircraft by removing obstructions. It would not need to he a verysmooth landing ground, for the object of the troop-carriers would be to get the soldiers down in fighting condition,regardless of whether the aircraft would ever be fit to fly again or not. If the machines had retractile under-carriages (which the Ju 52 has not) the landings might be made with wheels up, except where the parachutists hadseized an aerodrome. They would not be likely to seize many. The descent would be made some distance inland,and the troops would assail the defenders of the beaches from the rear. During the fight to secure spots on the beaches for thedisembarkation of the heavy ordnance, the British defenders would be heavily assailed from the air with everyweapon and device which the Luftwaffe could muster. It
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