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Aviation History
1941
1941 - 0338.PDF
FEBRUARY 6TH, 1941. THE CHANCES OF INVASION Prospects of Air-borne Troops : Key Position of Fighters By MAJOR F. A. de V. ROBERTSON, V.D. THE authorities have been warning us that the dangerof an invasion is not over, and that we must all beon the qui vive to meet it and deal with it, if and when it comes. The Germans have been saying that the war is to be won by defeating Great Britain and in no other way, and at no other place. That is one way of comforting Mussolini, for it implies that British victories in the Middle East and round the Mediterranean will be of no account if Great Britain herself is to be mastered by Gorman arms. The argument is specious, but not entirely conclusive. One may recall how M. Reynaud wished France to fight on in her colonial Empire after the home- land had been beaten by the German invaders. Marshal Petain's periodic resistance to German pressure is based on the unspoken threat that, if pushed too hard, the Vichy Government might even yet withdraw to Algeria and Tunisia with the remains of its fleet, and there take up a new attitude beyond the reach of a Power which has no means of crossing the sea. Our own Prime Minister, too, when the tide of war was not running too favourably for us, threw out a hint that if the need arose the British struggle against dictatorship would be continued in and from the British Empire. Further, the Government has given an assurance to the United States that, however badly the United Kingdom might be defeated, the Navy would in no circumstances be handed over to the Ger- mans. So that even if Hitler were to lord it at St. James's (perish the thought!) free Britons, no doubt with the full power of the United States at their side, would still fight on in the cause of liberty. Hitler's Promise There is a chance that the German talk of an invasion of Britain may be a feint, designed to prevent us from sending more reinforcements to the Mediterranean theatre of war; or, on the other hand, the massing of German troops on the frontiers of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria may be intended to make us think that the real German threat is to the Suez^ Canal. The enemy will undoubtedly want to keep us guessing as to his next move. It is, however, significant that a sort of promise to invade Great Britain has been broadcast to the German people. The propaganda machine in Germany is in such order that the people at home there can be kept ignorant of or informed about any particular thing which the Nazi party wishes them to know or not to know. Announcements made to the Ger- man people may have more behind them than broadcasts which are meant maiuly for foreign ears. If Hitler promises something to his own people and fails to make his words good, he will lose some of the prestige which still sur- rounds his name at home. Therefore this promise to in- vade Great Britain may have more substance in it than can be found in some other German declarations. One thing is certain. Germany has not the narval power to attempt to win command of the seas and then land her troops on this island with comparative ease. If the inva- sion is attempted it will have to be by trying to evade the Royal Navy. It must be difficult for our ships to watch every area of the seas between our coasts and those of Europe, for the hostile shores of the Continent now extend from Norway to the Bay of Biscay. We sorely miss the help of the French Navy; though the fifty American destroyers which have been made over to us are a great help. The Coastal Command aircraft, too, are giving in- valuable help in watching all the possible invasion ports. But foggy weather will blind the ships and will still more effectually close the eyes of the scouting aircraft. There was a chance that the attempt might be made during the winter when conditions were right. Right conditions imply low visibility and a calm sea. Presumably the sea would have to be calm on all sides from which the invading ships would have .to start. Conditions which were right for, the German transports would not necessarily meet the whole case. The Luftwaffe,. would have to play its part. Severe bombing attacks OH1" the British land forces opposite the selected landing places would probably be thought quite necessary, and there is also the possibility of the use of air-borne troops. If fog lay over this island it might be well out of the question for the German aircraft to play their allotted part in the invasion. At any rate, most of the winter has now gone without a move by the invading forces They may still make the attempt before February is out, or they may wait for the very different conditions which obtain in the spring. When so many favourable circumstances in dif, ferent parts of Europe have to coincide, and as weather%j is very unaccountable—especially when the Germans only receive partial weather reports—it becomes obvious that extremely careful organisation would be necessary to seize a moment which was in all respects favourable and launch the attack from its various starting points. Meticulous care in organisation is one of the strong points of the Ger- man character, though the organisation is apt to be cumbrous and slow, and speed in seizing an opportunity is not such a strong national characteristic. The Prime Minister has reminded us that we are still a half-armed nation, though we are now infinitely better off than we were on the morrow of the rescue from Dunkerque. Modern war is an affair of machines, and in land fighting that means, not only machine guns and machine-gun- carriers, but tanks of various categories, guns of various calibres, and motor transport. Vast masses of men with rifles do not count now as they did in the last war. Man- power only counts relatively to the numbers of machines available. The British Army has now enough machines at its command to set a problem for any invading force. Invaders cannot overwhelm that Army if they have no arms but machine guns and a limited number of machine- gun-carriers. They would certainly need heavy ordnance and tanks, and these could only be transported by sea. If the vessels which brought them eluded the Royal Navy, the guns and tanks could not be landed until a safe landing place on shore had been prepared for them. Landing the Aircraft These considerations point to a surprise coup by air- borne troops who would be ordered to seize and hold suit- able stretches of the shore until the heavy armament could be landed and got into action. The modus operandi might well resemble that used in the invasion of Holland. First would come swarms of aircraft which would drop large numbers of specially trained parachute soldiers at various selected points. It would be very necessary to attack simultaneously and at a number of widely separated points, so as to confuse the British reserves. The descent of the parachutists would probably be made at dawn. It would be the task of these men to overpower the Home Guard on the spot with all speed, and then to prepare, likewise with all speed, a landing ground for troop-carrying aircraft by removing obstructions. It would not need to t>e a very smooth landing ground, for the object of the troop-carriers would be to get the soldiers down in fighting condition, regardless of whether the aircraft would ever be fit to fly, again or not. If the machines had retractile under- carriages (which the Ju 52 has not) the landings might be made with wheels up, except where the parachutists had seized an aerodrome. They would not be likely to seize many. The descent would be made some distance inlands and the troops would assail the defenders of the beaches from the rear. During" the fight to secure spots on the beaches for the disembarkation of the heavy ordnance, the British defenders would be heavily assailed from the air with every weapon and device which the Luftwaffe could muster. It
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