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Aviation History
1941
1941 - 0378.PDF
134 FEBRUARY 13TH, 1941. THE BRITISH BOMBING CAMPAIGN, Working on a Plan : Evidence of Results WHILE the fighting round the shores of the Mediter-ranean and in East Africa goes merrily on, thewar in Northern Europe has relapsed into a state of bombing and torpedoing. In fact, for some time past, the weather has reduced bombing to a minimum on both sides. This set some people wondering whether it meant that the enemy was plotting some new form of terror and was saving up his resources for it ; while others debated the possibility that the R.A.F. had inflicted so much damage on the Luftwaffe that it was unable to carry on its bombing activities. Flight had no hesitation in attributing the lull to the weather, and our opinion has recently been authoritatively confirmed by the A.O.C.-in-C. of the Bomber Command, Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse. The German raids on Great Britain, deeply as we all resent the harm done to individuals and to property, has held out no promise at all of ending the war in favour of the enemy. Naturally the question arises : Do the raids of the R.A.F. hold out any prospect of producing an Allied victory? Enthusiasts have written and spoken of the work of the Bomber Command as the great example of the Offensive, and as paving the way to a victorious end to the war. At present there is little enough evidence avail- able to support such optimistic views. Sifting the Reports It is certain that our raids are doing damage. The reports which the bomber pilots bring back after a raid are trustworthy. Sometimes pilots who are new to the job are apt to be rather enthusiastic and optimistic about what they have done, but the more experienced men tend rather to be conservative. All the members of the crews engaged on a raid are cross-examined by the intelligence officers, who are themselves very experienced men (often Army officers who served in the last war), and by com- paring all the reports they arrive at a very fairly correct picture of what has really happened. Subsequently photo- graphic reconnaissances are made, and the art of air photography has now been developed to a very high level. Few of the photographs taken would tell much if they were published in the Press. It takes experts to examine them and interpret the story which they relate The pictures are never likely to exaggerate the damage done. On the contrary, the walls of a building may still be standing though the inside has been gutted and the build- ing be quite useless ; but the photographs will rarely reveal a fact like that. The tendency of the expert examiners is to allow none of the pilots' claims which cannot be con- firmed by the evidence of the pictures. Sometimes addi- tional evidence comes from other sources, and this may show that both the claims of the pilots and the results admitted by the experts who read the photographs have been too modest. After a recent raid on Mannheim a reliable intelligence report said that four direct hits had been obtained on the goods station and nine on the main station. The railway track had been destroyed in 15 places and complete repair would take three weeks. A photograph taken after a raid on Bremen showed that the Focke-Wulf factory, other factory buildings, and railway buildings near by, had all been damaged. At Ludwigs- haven, 48 industrial properties were destroyed and seven factories were compelled to stop work entirely after a raid by the R.A.F. There is thus no doubt at all that the raids are doing damage, but raids on factories and generally on produc- tion are slow in producing results. Though the Focke- Wulf factory at Bremen has been damaged, and though periodical raids are made on the. Condor base near Bor- deaux, still the Condors are flying out over the Atlantic and doing no little harm to British shipping. It seems that it is' only in times of great military activity that the results of damage can be seen in the diminished fighting power of one side. The victory of the Fighter Command over the German day bombers last summer produced results, and the all- round mastery of the air established by the R.A.F. in Libya also made a definite recognisable contribution to the success of the Army of the Nile. A similar service was performed by the R.A.F. for the Greek Army in Albania. Perhaps, when the time comes for the British Army and its Allies to join issue with the German Army, we may iearn whether the R.A.F. bombing campaign has made a substantial contribution to a British victory. At present we are really in ignorance of the degree to which German production has been and is being curtailed. Germany is a large country and there are many factories in it, while the R.A.F. Bomber Command is not yet as large as we should like it to be. It is, however, increasing and w<yA still further increase as American production gets into itsj stride. The policy of the Bomber Command in drawing up ffe plans is dictated by the classical military dictum, to strike with the greatest possible force at the right place at the right time. The problem before the staff of the Command is to decide which is the right place and when is the right time. To decide which is the right place entails constant review by scientists, economists and air strategists; in fact, a complete branch of the Ministry of Economic War- fare works in close co-operation with the Bomber Com- mand. There are two obvious weak spots in Germany's war economy: namely, oil and communications. Oil is one of the commodities most difficult for Germany to pro- cure and to import. The number of synthetic oil plants established about the country is a confession that this is one of the very weak spots, and their existence displays an anxiety about the results of the British sea blockade. Naturally, the Bomber Command hits these spots with great frequency. Communications, too, are a constant problem for the German authorities, especially now that their armies are spread about Europe with enormous dis- tances between them. The railways and canals are work- ing to capacity, and when that is the case an interruption can never be made up. The track can be repaired after a time, but the traffic which the line ought to have carried but did not carry in the lost days is a permanent loss. Choosing the Target Each suggested target has to be carefully considered. The Bomber staff has to consider whether that target can be found and identified ; and when it is found can $kt ... be destroyed by bombs ? Some targets are carefully hidden 3p* in forests, some are underground, and so on. The staff must also consider such questions as whether a certain target should be attacked on a moonlight night or whether darkness is preferable. As for the right time for the blow, that is governed by a number of factors. The chief of them is the weather. The C.-in-C. of the Bomber Command has to be concerned first with meteorology, and only secondly with strategy. Many a time have hours been spent in drawing up plans for a raid, and at the last moment all have had to be changed because of a change in weather. It is not only the staff which has wasted its work ; in all probability the armourers on the station from which the raid was to start have expended a great deal of energy in bombing up the machines, and they have then to unload them, and perhaps load another type of bomb suitable for the raid which has been chosen in substitution—or perhaps there will be no raid at all. The programme of the Bomber Command is also apt to be dislocated by calls to attack special targets. The Admiralty may ring up and say that a raider has been located in a certain port, that it calls for a heavier weight of metal than the Coastal Command can provide, and will the Bomber Command please deal with it; or there may be (Concluded on page 139.)
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