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Aviation History
1941
1941 - 0466.PDF
156 FEBRUARY 2OTH, 1941. ATTACK AGAINST BRITAIN (Continued) range of fighters if they are to be capable of employ- ment upon other than extremely short-range defence (in which category I include the sweeps of limited range which have been made over Flanders in recent weeks). To be acceptable any solution must not seriously in- validate the immediate readiness of fighters for their primary duty of carrying out the most efficient dynamic defence of areas attacked by aircraft. Several methods to increase aircraft duration have been proposed, notably the Mayo composite method, the Pemberton-Billing slip-wing and towed fighter methods, and the Cobham refuelling-in-flight method. For the type of work I have indicated there are objec- tions of one kind or another to all these methods when they are applied to fighters. Let me say at once that I do not seek controversy. Each of the methods I have mentioned has a doughty champion of its worth behind it, and each has merit. But I doubt if any one of the methods entirely satisfies the condition which I have defined. The composite method increases the range only while the twins are Siamese. In that condition the speed is necessarily considerably reduced, and that one cannot afford without losing the advantage of the fighter type of aircraft. Part the portions of the composite, and the range of the fighter returns to what it was on the ground plus the fuel which would have been used if the fighter had had to get to the point of the parting of the ways by itself. With the short distances between British bases and Continental bases in German hands, the advantage of the composite method is necessarily cur- tailed ," the fault is not the fault of the composite system, but that the circumstances are unsuitable for its employ- ment; the idea was not conceived for the present emergency. The towed fighter is intended to provide a means of increasing patrol duration and to place fighters in the most advantageous position to attack bombers; it is a defensive rather than an offensive proposition in the existing condition of the war in Western Europe. The refuelling-in-the-air method does not appear to apply to the short-range fighter, for it does not over- come the inherent difficulty, which is to find room for the extra fuel; the object of refuelling-in-the-air is to overcome the handicap of a low power/weight ratio ; in the short-range fighter the power/weight ratio is high. For the object in view the slip-wing fighter has no greater advantage to offer than the composite aircraft, for its purpose has been described as the prolongation of patrol at the expense of speed until the moment the fighter is detached to go into action. . Fighter Range Obviously, some other means of increasing the fuel capacity of high-speed fighters is required if they are to be employed to attack in daylight targets bej'ond an operational range of a hundred miles (or thereabouts) from their base aerodromes. It is certain that before this war is over it will be necessary for British high- speed fighters to possess a more extensive radius of operation. Otherwise, with the bases at our command it will be exceedingly difficult to carry the air war into the enemy territory in Europe in daylight, and British fighter action will be limited to a narrow zone of territory lying opposite the south-eastern corner of England. Personally, I believe that the solution to this problem must be sought along the entirely rational line of increas- ing the tankage of high-speed fighters. There are several ways of. adding tankage without adding too much resistance, and they are well worth investigation and experiment with a view to incorporating additional duration in our fastest fighters before the long days are upon us. The object is to increase duration, when required, with the minimum loss in speed and without detracting from present performance»of fighters in standard form. It can and ought to be done. I have already dealt with the period of maximum air activity against Britain during the period following the capitulation of France. It remains in this article but to bring the consideration of this phase of the war- up to date from the time of the end of the daylksbt attacks against Britain. From the moment when tS|- German High Command apparently decided that the ^ time was not appropriate (to put it in a generous way) * to commence a general assault upon Britain last autumn; the tactical employment of the Luftwaffe was swung round from direct military objectives to targets which can be best described as falling into a pattern of air blockade. • Two Forms of Blockade As I stated in an earlier article, air blockade cannot achieve its object, as can sea blockade, by the process of withholding. Its object can alone be gained by the>v process of destruction. It seems that the British citizen > generally has been slow to grasp this essential difference between the two forms of blockade. Many of them have asked me what possible object lies behind the German air attacks, which to them appear to represent simply an attempt to destroy without having any pro cess of reasoning behind the process of destruction. Certainly some of the results of German bombing in Britain justify this point of view. But it must be remembered that an isolated incident, or even a number of separate incidents, do not present the full picture of the tactical employment of the Luftwaffe against Britain during the past five months. That complete picture is not available to the public, nor can it become avail- able until after the war, for it is obviously impossible to disclose all the damage done everywhere. This non- disclosure of all the details of bomb raid destruction does not mean that the intention is to minimise it, either to the British public or to the German staff, so that both will believe the damage to be less than it actuafiJL IS. . : Even photographic information of the effect of air. - raids may fail to disclose the actual damage causedf* In some cases an air photograph will emphasise external damage when internal damage to a building may be slight and relatively unimportant. This is important in relation to industrial targets, in which the interior of a building as represented by its contents may be of extreme value to the national effort, while the structure of the building itself is of comparatively slight importance. - r Here, then, is a clear indication of the necessity for any country which undertakes a campaign of air blockade to possess an effective intelligence system within the country so blockaded. Otherwise much oL the value of air blockade damage cannot be accurately known, and an estimate of its percentage of effective- ness must be in the nature of guesswork. It is there- fore in air blockade war more necessary than in any previous form of war to guard against spies and agents of the enemy, and to refrain from disclosing precise details of damage caused by bombing. Personally, I take it as an encouraging sign that
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