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Aviation History
1941
1941 - 0528.PDF
FEBRUARY 27m, 1941. GREECE AND ALBANIA (Continued) ) to/ Uinc) v J •Z which the Italian forces had to pass between the Ionian Sea and the frontier of Yugo-Slavia was 100 miles across; now, since the Italian forces have been driven back by the Greek troops, it is no more than 80 miles across; thus the demand for air co-operation with the Greek forces has not increased, but, if anything, it ought to have decreased during the first four months of the cam- paign. For these reasons the possibility of deploying a large air force for direct assistance to the Greek army did not exist, and has since diminished. (A German move southward from Rumania will, however, modify this position instantly.) Nevertheless, the small British air force allocated to assist the Greek army has carried out important co- operative work in the bombing of road bridges, trans- port, troops, and ports, and has proved of material help to the Greek air force. But the employment of bomber forces against Italy has had a different aspect since the beginning of the Italo-Greek war, and it is impossible to confine the consideration of British air assistance in this campaign to that of the direct help rendered to the Greek army. Viewed from the larger strategy of the war as a whole, the Italian attack upon Greece enabled British air forces to engage upon a wide air offensive against Italy, which gave indirect asistance to Greece, perhaps more vital ^fc its effect than the more direct assistance of the army co-operative units. This indirect ?id was the outcome of the ability of the British air forces in the Middle East to move a portion of their strength on to Greek soil for operation against the Italian mainland. Southern Italy was thus brought into range of British shore-based air- craft for the first time since the Italian declaration of war against Britain on June 10, 1940, one of the calamities which her ultimatum to Greece had been designed to prevent. It was thus possible to attack the long peninsula of the Italian mainland at both ends by shore-based aircraft operating from Britain and from Greece, and that en- abled Britain to threaten every port of importance in metropolitan Italy. In rddition Britain possessed the elusive mobile air strength of the Fleet Air Arm operat- ing from carriers based in the Mediterranean. The action of the Fleet Air Arm Swordfish torpedo-planes against the Italian fleet in Taranto harbour is one of the classic episodes of the war in the air. How great a part it played in the freeing-up of the Mediterranean has not yet been officially stated, but it is perhaps sig- nificant that since that operation (and others) the British Western Mediterranean fleet appears to have become
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