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Aviation History
1941
1941 - 0531.PDF
FEBRUARY 27TH, T94T. 179 i GREECE AND ALBANIA (Continued, a more potent force in the Middle Sea ; and it was after that disaster to the Italian navy that the German dive- bombers were moved down to Sicily. Here it is important to note that air action has achieved more against the Italian fleet than sea action. There are two reasons for this : (1), the superior speed of aircraft over ships enables aircraft to bring ships to action when surface vessels are unable to do so because of their speed limitation; (2), aircraft are not deterred by a minefield as are ships, nor by submarines. Thus, whgn considering the vulnerability of warships to attack fr<Dm the air, the fate of the Italian naval units at Taranto must be included in the calculation; the fact that torpedoes were used from aircraft operated by the Royal Navy does not affect the issue. :: Naval Objectives ':-'" It is evident from a consideration of the targets which were mostly attacked from the air—in Southern Italy and Sicily—that the objectives were mainly naval in character, and designed to break the objectives which Italy must have had in view when her ultimatum to Greece was delivered. British determination to control the waters of the central zone of the Mediterranean Sea was greater than the Italian. In the north of Italy occa- sional air attacks were made f-om Britain against isolated targets, including the neighbourhood of Venice, at Porto Marghera, Trieste and Fiume. Ancona, an important port on the Adriatic, has not been touched, nor have its two important feeder railway junctions at Piacenza and Bologna. Brindisi, farther south, has been attacked, as has Naples, principal port of the Tyrrhenian Sea, several times. It is thus' possible to see part of the strategy which lay behind the tactical employment of bomber aircraft: used against Italy since the opening of the Italo-Greek campaign, made possible raids by shore-based aircraft against Southern Italy. Primarily it has been aimed ^t the denying to the Italians of the seaway communica- tions outside the immediate and local neighbourhood of , metropolitan Italy, and the destruction of Italian naval power. To these attacks Italy has been unable to make any selective retaliation. The way was paved for the •^greater freedom for naval co-operation in' the Western Desert offensive. Indeed, some of the air attacks made against Italy appear to have formed a part of that offen- sive. And, in turn, the Italian failures against Greece and Egypt have turned a large part of the German forces to the Near East, so that a new phase of the cam- paign in the Eastern Mediterranean has been (shall we say) precipitated by the method of warfare waged by the combined British forces in that vast, and classic, theatre of war. In spite of her reverses, it must not be thought that Italy is tottering to a definite collapse. It is known that the results of the application of sea power are not quickly gained. Pressure by sea is a slow process. While Italy has been strangled, she has not been killed as an enemy, yet. While we have been busy amputat- ing the extremities, we have paid too little attention to the trunk and heart. Metropolitan Italy was suscept- ible to severe internal punishment by air attack from Britain and Greece ever since she entered into hostilities with Greece, but British bombers have not been tactic- ally employed to that end. Instead they have been put to a dual use. One of these uses is to play a definite Part in increasing the pressure which can be brought to bear upon our enemies through sea power; the other is to line up in the actions required by the combined forces in land warfare. After all, you have to cut your suit to fit your cloth. The most had to be made of the air forces which were at Britain's disposal for use in and about the Mediter- ranean. And to that end Britain's bombers were em- ployed in co-operating with the Greek army in Albania and the Imperial army in the Western Desert. In both, local air supremacy was attained by brilliant fighter action clearing the way for the bombers. The bombers and torpedo aircraft which could be spared from those duties were deflected to seek out targets planned to assist the supremacy of the Allies' sea power, and they, too, have achieved local supremacy. Presumably the one reason why virile and numerous air attacks were not made against the metropolitan area of Italy as a general target was lack of aircraft at that time to do everything at once. But the time will come when that can be done, and then the additional weight of independent air power, applied as our independent sea power has been applied against Italy, will extend the tactical employment of our bombers in the Mediterranean to hasten the defeat of Italy by direct action against her metropolitan terri- tory. To do that, however, it is imperative that the bases which are available in Greece shall be secured and manned for the purpose. If they were to be captured by German forces driving through Bulgaria and Yugo- slavia the whole position of Italy would be altered overnight. The capture of Cyrenaica or even of Tripolitania as well would not compensate for the loss of aerodromes on Greek soil. ' And if we were to be driven from Greece for any reason we should have lost the opportunity, the golden opportunity, we possessed in the winter months of 1940-1941 to attack all metro- politan Italy from the airi That, combined with the pressure in Albania and the Desert, would have been too much for her. We ought to have concentrated our air strength more on metropolitan Italy, We ought to have done everything we could to make a German drive through Bulgaria and perhaps Yugo-Slavia this early spring useless; but we have not done so. Sauce for the Goose Remember what Mr. Churchill said some time ago, and he repeated it in his recent broadcast, that even if Hitjer stood at the gates of India it would profit liim nothing if Germany were pulverised at home. Surely the same thing applied to Italy? Is the process which is sound for the senior partner not also sound for the junior? The lesson we ought to learn from the tactical em- ployment of aircraft in Greece is that we do need, and need badly, a mobile Bomber Command which can be despatched to any theatre of war to take, indepen- dent action in that theatre as a strategic air force, so that at no time shall all our air forces have to be de- ployed to serve only the ends of the immediate military or naval situations. If the navy needs control of the Coastal Command, and the army needs the Army Co- operation Command, then the air force certainly needs more than just one Bomber Command stationed at home. It needs a Bomber Command wherever the opportunity arises to employ aircraft in the major strategy of this, the greatest war of all time. Next week: The Middle East Defensive.)
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