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Aviation History
1941
1941 - 0637.PDF
MARCH 13TH, 1941. Air Strategy—XLIV 211 THE MIDDLE EAST^OFFENSIVE Lessons of the Tactical Employment of Fighters and Bombers in the Present War—VII By CAPTAIN NORMAN MACMILLAN, M.C., A.F.C. IN no other area and to no other air force in tjlepresent war have the changes from peace to mobili-sation, from mobilisation to war, and from defensive4 war to offensive war been so smooth as in the area of the Middle East, and to the Imperial air forces within that widespread area. Such conditions are ideal con- iilons for the competent organiser, and the results obtained and those still being obtained within the north- eastern sector of the African continent leave no doubts about the complete competence of the organisers of the British offensive there. The Western Desert offensive was hailed as the per- fect example of the supreme co-operation of the three Services in a combined action. The circumstances of terrain and of the disposition of the enemy forces made that strategic employment of Britain's and the Empire's power possible. Nor is it to be wondered at if for a period of years the details of such a campaign have been regarded with exceeding care by Britain's most skilful strategists in the Army. For if one man more than any other has called for the employment of all the skill of which British arms are—and have been for cen- turies—so manifestly capable within the arid tracts which lie about the peripheries of the wilder portions of the earth's surface, that man is Benito Mussolini. In- habiting those tracts, he jibed at the British because they let him remain there in peace. In a way his personal debt is greater than Hitler's, for he has jeered at Britain's supposed decadence with all the untravelled foreigner's misunderstanding of British tolerance, and he has done it outside Europe. Subsidiary Campaigns The Imperial offensive in the Middle East is still in progress, and it is possible to examine only that part which has been completed. The attacks against Soma- liland, Abyssinia and Eritrea must be looked upon as campaigns still in the making, and it is difficult to observe useful lessons from a campaign before it has been finished. In any case, these three campaigns are undoubtedly subsidiary to the main offensive, which was made against the Italian forces in the Western Desert. The latter forces were within (or should have been within) the power of reinforcement from the Euro- pean continent. Indeed, it is, perhaps, yet too soon to say that they will not be so reinforced in Tripoli; but the garrisons of the farther east portions of the Italian possessions in Africa cannot be reinforced unless the British land forces are first defeated and the British naval forces in the Mediterranean subsequently out- manoeuvred. Thus the present operations in Somaliland, Abyssinia and Eritrea are in a measure mopping-up operations following upon the true victory in the area between Sidi Barrani and Benghazi. The importance of this operation is indicated by the manner in which it has drawn Hitler's armed forces south-eastward into the Balkans. Thus, if Hitler had to thank his partner Mussolini for his help in keeping a large force immobilised in the Mediterranean prior to the fall of France, we have, perhaps, to show also a measure of gratitude that Mussolini enabled us to pave the way to action. Suppose Mussolini had not declared war on France and Britain on June 10th, 1940. What might not have happened? We could have had no victories in Africa Jo hearten the applauders of the Allied cause. We * should have had no right of entry into any south Euro- pean tetritory. We should have had to wait until Hitler was at the eastern end of the Mediterranean before a shot could have been fired there. And if that had come about it would have been a far more dangerous moment (to us) for Mussolini to declare war against us, for we should not then have been able to devote all we had in the Middle East and a good deal of what we had in the United Kingdom to^flie primary purpose of smash- ing up the Italian armies. Mussolini has been a good general for us; he has helped us quite a lot. There is no doubt that we have won what we have by a quality of audaciousness. Whose was the driving brain behind the audacity has not been disclosed. It may have been no one man, but a happy combination of men at home and overseas who could plan and carry out the necessary moves to meet the ends they served. Calendary Strategy Perhaps it was the past fixity of Hitlerian strategy which made it-possible to plan in this way. Hitler has always made his big strokes in the spring, his lesser strokes in the autumn. His winters have been quiescent. Probably that was because everywhere that Hitler struck was territory wherein winter was unsuitable for military operations—Austria, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Memel, Poland, Norway, Holland, and so on ... who could attack there with hope of success when the Continental, or northern, winter had a grip on the land? The Balkans faced Hitler with the same problem. (I've seen the Danube in the winter and I know what it can be like.) So the winter of 1940-1941 was, territorially, tlje^sSme kind of winter for Hitler. Mussolini ought to have been wise enough with such a partner to avoid the attempt to browbeat Greece which led to his debacle in Albania at the very time of year when the winter was setting in in that inhospitable land of mountain and snow where the Grecian and Albanian frontiers meet. Just as Hitler has been adroit at selecting the best calendar moment for a major stroke, so Mussolini blundered over Greece. History again has not recorded it, but the Italian ultimatum to Greece might have been intended as the Italian answer to our growing strengtfr'in the Middle East; for it is impossible to believe that the Italians could not have known that we were sending men and materials to reinforce our Middle East command. If the Italians had got the bases they demanded of Greece it would have .made things easier for Graziani, more difficult for us. So, while Hitler was preparing fir his winter hibernation, Mussolini plunged. That plunge, remember, delayed General Waveil's campaign. The reason for the delay has always been given by us as solely the necessity to replace the aircraft which had to be released from the Middle Ea^t-to assist Greece. That explanation is good enough in wartime, but I doubt if it will stand the test of time ; there is probably more behind the postponement of our Desert offensive than that, for clearly we did not send very great numbers of aircraft to Greece. Now for some of the lessons to be drawn from the campaign in the Western Desert. I believe that it is necessary to admit from the beginning that the factors which made Mussolini take the action he did against
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