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Aviation History
1941
1941 - 0736.PDF
240 MARCH 27TH, 1941. BALKAN BLOCKADE (Continued) the whole length of her eastern and northern frontiers— a difficult undertaking, especially in the northern plains after the Danubian floods have dried up. Yugoslavia disposes of an air force of about 500 first-line aircraft with an equal or perhaps slightly greater number in reserve. Her air strength is thus about two-and-a-half times that of Holland, whose air strength was destroyed in four days. Can Germany, if she is forced to do so, repeat in Yugoslavia what she succeeded in doing in Norway, Holland and Belgium? I think the answer is that she might succeed in doing it in the strategic part of the country which she undoubtedly covets and for the same reason—that Allied assistance is difficult to provide because of geographic and strategic considera- tions. Air-Power Will Decide To the Allies the possession of the trunk railway sys- tem of Yugoslavia does not offer the same advantages as it offers to Germany. To the Allies, Yugoslavia might become important after the fall of Italy, and thus it is important to keep Germany out of Yugoslavia while the major war is being waged by the Allies against the forces of Italy. But if that is not possible it will not matter greatly in the long run. For already the major strategy of the war is clear: it is certain that the outcome of the war will be decided primarily by the air weapon and the application of air power. And though this is not to say that the air weapon will neces- sarily administer the coup de grace, it does mean that without the air weapon in preponderant strength no victory, conclusive and final, can be wrested by either side from the other. And preponderant strength means not numbers alone but quality as well; it means not latent strength but strength put forth and wielded with effect. In this war aircraft are (and are likely to remain) the cbmmon denominator, especially in relation to the blows already rained and yet to come upon the major terri- tories of the belligerents in the United Kingdom and in Germany. In other respects the contest between Ger- many and the Allies is being waged upon different lines. Germany is carrying her war effort along internal lines of communicatign, transporting her troops and their supplies by railway, road, river, canal and transport air- craft. The Allies are waging their war against Germany by means of sea-borne ship transport; ships.bring in the supplies from overseas to the advanced bases in the United Kingdom and from overseas and the United Kingdom carry supplies to the other advanced bases in the Mediterranean and North-East Africa. Partial Blockade Not Enough Because there is this vital difference in the method of waging the war outside the realm of the air, Germany applies all the ingenuity and energy she can spare to the task of breaking down the ship-borne supply routes of the Allies upon the seas.- And against this German war operation of paramount importance Britain has devoted a large part of her energies to defensive measures with the object of preventing Germany from attaining success with her attack upon the Allies' principal lines of communication. In war it is necessary to do much more than adopt defensive measures designed to prevent the enemy from achieving success with his strategy. So it should be a major part of British policy to smash at the German opposite number to our overseas communications. That is not the submarine. It is the German transport system throughout Germany and occupied Europe. Certainly we have dealt some shrewd blows at German rolling stock in railway marshalling yards. We have dealt some major blows at oil refineries, synthetic oil plants and oil storage tanks. We have laid mines in German inland waterways—rivers and canals—and we have attacked motor transport factories in Germany and Italy. But far more attention appears to have been paid to attacks against ports and docks whence German snipping (both naval and commercial) issues. In other words, we appear still to be more on the— defensive than the offensive in regard to returning German attacks against our transportation lines of com- munication. Admittedly we have largely cut German overseas shipping and have maintained a useful sea blockade by that means; but this is only a partial block- ade, and while the present German hold is maintained over Europe, and while there is no war zone in eastern Europe (I do not mean south-eastern) it cannot be other- wise. This partial blockade is not enough. It must be supplemented by a definite attack against the German communication system; an attack which is as continu- ously maintained as is the German submarine attack against Allied and neutral shipping. That is the real counter to the German air and submarine attack upon our lines of communication. In the main it can be carried out only by air, by direct bomb attacks, by the dropping of paratroops, by the laying of mines and by the unremitting smashing of railway lines, rolling stock, roads, road transport, oil supplies, factories making transport requirements, and by forcing Germany to divert her transport from direct war work to other tasks. Retaliatory Attacks ' - How is direct German war work to be diverted other tasks? One way is undoubtedly to begin a series of retaliatory attacks against cities in Germany without regard to the nature of the target attacked but with the object of creating the greatest possible destruction in the briefest possible time. To achieve their object these attacks must be made on a greater scale than the German attacks against British cities, and they should be con- centrated all round the main transport arteries of road and railway within the urban areas. The Baltic ports, which have been almost immune from attack, ought to be hammered so that supplies from Scandinavia and the Baltic are depleted. The trans- portation system of south-eastern Europe should be attacked wherever it is used by Germany. If the Yugo- slav railway system is used by Germany it ought to be attacked without delay. The transportation systems of Rumania and Bulgaria ought to be damaged. But, I suppose, as with other theatres of war, we shall have to wait until the German military machine has been placed into position, for its assault before we strike back, as we did in Norway, Holland and Belgium, on disadvan- tageous terms. But surely we could make it clear that the use of the strategic Yugoslav railway system by Germany will be tantamount to an act of war which the Allies would be forced to resist by means of air attack against the communication system? Otherwise we permit Germany to ignore the rules of war by her sub- marine attacks against our shipping and at the same time permit her equal freedom of piratical methods on shore to further her own communications. We must offset the German undersea war against our communications by an overhead war against German communications— and to do so we need a more direct air war policy.
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