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Aviation History
1941
1941 - 1662.PDF
FLIGHT JULY 24TH, 1941. WHICH ROAD TO VICTORY muster, and then we shall be able to bomb Germany harder than she can bomb Britain, but that by itself will not defeat her or prevent her from sending bombers across the Channel and the North Sea. Her striking power in the air could only be crippled permanently by R.A.F. action if so large a proportion of her aircraft factories, oil stores, and other necessaries were destroyed by British bombs that she could no longer maintain her offensive. Considering the size of Germany and the manner in which she has distributed her factories and flying schools, the task of knocking out over 50 per cent, of them would be gigantic—and if it were accomplished, would even that be enough to ensure an Allied victory? Defence a Necessity- There are other targets besides aircraft factories the destruction of which would be helpful. Before considering them, however, let us deal with another catchword. No- body seriously denies the truth of the maxim '' attack is the best form of defence," yet, like other proverbs, it can be so twisted as to become almost a deathtrap. Sometimes in the past years air authorities have argued on these lines: the fighter is a defensive weapon and the bomber is a weapon of attack ; therefore let us concentrate on bombers and neglect fighters. This policy was reversed just in time to allow our fighters to win the Battle of Britain. If the defence of vital spots is neglected, a country may lose a war before it has a chance of attacking at all. In all land operations (except in Africa and Syria) British armies in this war have been short of fighter support and, largely for that reason, have suffered defeats. The Air Staff now says that nobody can ever have too many fighters. So, whatever our building strategy may be, we must always continue to build up our fighter forces. They may at least blast the enemy out of the air at a vital spot at a critical time, as they did, for all practical purposes, last summer. While bombing German aircraft factories is a Herculean— one might almost say a Sisyphean—task, there are, of course, many other classes of target which can usefully be attacked. Oil has been mentioned. One of the most important is the U-boat bases. Heavy attacks on them can give material help towards defeating the Germans in the Battle of the Atlantic. But in that blockade battle Britain again is on the defensive, and though successful defence is essential it will not win the war. Another class of target is the factories which make tanks and other muni- tions for the German Army. Again we are faced with the question of whether we could hope to destroy so many that the German Army could no longer fight. To produce that effect we should have to destroy not only factories, but also stores depots and immediate reserves. An Army can fight for a considerable time without drawing on fac- tories if its depots are full when the battle begins^ and it may win. concentrate primarily on a formidable number of mechanised divisions. When the Germans enter upon a campaign like the invasion of Russia, they must be prepared to use up and lose a lot of equipment, and before the frontier was crossed the ordnance department must have piled up immediate reserves of material and have filled up the stores depots as well, so that during the campaign (unless it proved of inordinate length) the armies should be independent of output from the factories. To disarm the German Army by bombing would again be a tremendous task. Yet, unless either the German Army or the Luftwaffe can be deprived by bombing of the means of continuing to fight, it is hard to see how the Bomber Command of the R.A.F. can by itself win the war. On the other hand, if Britain builds up a huge Air Force equipped and trained to work with her own Army, prospects of a decision begin to appear. This is not the place to make suggestions as to where the decisive battle might be fought, but it may be pointed out that, the Axis has the longest coastline to defend that any belligerent has ever had, and that it does not command the surface of the seas. There are many possibilities in that situation. Exponents of the bombing policy say that it is more profitable to destroy an aeroplane or a tank in its nest, than to shoot it to pieces in battle—but is that universally true ? That argument leaves out of account the value of the crew, it disregards the tactical object on which the aircraft or tank was engaged at the time, and it forgets the discouraging effect of such a blow on the other troops engaged in the same fight. A tank or an aircraft in battle is worth much more than either is when in its factory or depot. What is of great profit is to cut the lines of communication behind a hostile army, so that munitions and rations cannot reach the fighting men at the moment when they most need them. The Chance of a Smashing Victory To do that is the work of bombers working with an army, not of an independent Air Force. And, where factory bombing may be inconclusive, we may take it as a certainty that a land victory as complete, mutatis mutandis, as Waterloo would mean the end of German aggression, of Prussian domination, and ef all for which Hitler stands. If the British Army with its allies, supported by an over- whelming air arm, can bring the German land forces to battle, then the R.A.F. may well be able to do more to help in achieving our common object than it is reasonable to expect from independent air action. Without doubt the Air Ministry and Air Staff will loyally co-operate in any plan upon which the War Cabinet decides as best calculated to give us victory, but they may grieve if the decision is for final victory by land. Airmen, both inside the R.A.F. and outside it, are sometimes swayed by a sentimental affection for the aeroplane. They have a counterpart in some retired cavalry officers who are breaking their hearts because their own regiments have been mechanised, and who sometimes talk as if they would sooner see the war lost on horseback than won behind an internal combustion engine. Horse and aircraft alike evoke an affection which goes beyond all reason, one being an old-established factor in war and the other among the newest weapons. Air enthusiasts want to see the war won by the Bomber Command. They like to see that Command working independently and not in connection with the Army. They rejoice when they hear it said that a land force must be beaten unless it has air supremacy, but still more do they want to see the Bomber Command win without any help from the Army. Where an opinion is dictated by sentiment and not by cool reason, it does not deserve much consideration. It is unscientific, and warfare is not only an art—it is also applied science.
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