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Aviation History
1941
1941 - 1824.PDF
86 FLIGHT AUGUST 14TH, 1941. them, Mr. Beacham, before the Royal AeronauticalSociety, and the world, the British official world at any rate, "was rot amused." In fact, officialdom did itsbest to damn the invention. Commenting on the discus- sion of the paper. Flight of April 19th, 1928, said: — ' We nave no personal interest ill the variable-pitch aiiscrew, and to us it matters not at all whether it be adopted or not, excepting in so far as it may affect the progress of flying, service as well as commercial. But we do think that, in this instance, a certain amount of unfairness—not intentional, we are convinced—-was allowed to creep ia. To our way of thinking, Dr. Hele- Shaw and Mr. Beacham stated the case for their variable; pitch airscrew quite moderately and soberly, certainly making no exuberant claims for it."After surveying the position, and pointing out the advantages of constant speed, we concluded :— "We do not, personally, share the pessimism that wasso treely expressed at the lecture. We believe the variable- pitch propeller to be well worth developing. Moreover, asit would appear that the hydraulic mechanism need not be either very heavy or very complicated, there wouldseem to be a good deal to be said for the automatically operated type." In after years Dr. Hele-Shaw often used to say it was Flight's support (we were permitted to see the idea iong before the lecture was read) which gave him courage to continue the fight. Be that as it may, we are glad, on this occasion, to pay tribute to his memory, and to those co-workers of his who are still, happily, with us and, in the case of Mr. Milner, continuing the develop- ment to the benefit of British flying. The R.A.F. and RussiaI N last week's debate in the House of Commons there was a discussion as to whether German ' was or was not fighting on two fronts, which Mr. Eden summed up by saying that she was fighting on two fronts in the air and on the sea. On land, of course, she is able to concentrate all her energies in the East. Her armies are fighting outside the range of British bombers, and the help which we are able to give to our ally has to be confined to intensified bombing of German factories and supply centres. Before starting her invasion of Russia, the Germans undoubtedly piled up such reserves of materials as they thought adequate, with a margin, and so long as these reserves lasted they were independent of the output of factories, and consequently it has to be admitted that our efforts in the air could give no immediate help to the Russian armies, beyond holding in the West a fighter force which the enemy would be glad to use in the East—and that is a notable service. It is certain that the Germans did not expect such a lengthy resistance by the Russians, and it may be that their margin of reserves is nearly exhausted. If so, they will have to draw once more on factory output, now more than ever suffering from the'R.A.F.'s attentions. The Bomber Command's effort has been wonderfully magnified. In July of this year its machines dropped by day roughly four times, and by night three times, the weight of bombs which it was able to unload on German territory in July last year. All the same, we must regret that the Germans are fighting outside the range of our bombers. Attacks on factories produce slow results; they are part of a long- term policy. The battles now being foughf cannot be affected by them as they would be by attacks by British bombers on the actual German armies. This consideration gives little encouragement to those who believe that in strategic bombing lies the way to final victory. All the evidence is against that theory. The attacks on production must be maintained, of course, but so far in this war air power has proved itself chiefly potent when used to help land power or sea power. The Luftwaffe in France, the Red Air Fleet in the present campaign, and the R.A.F. in the Middle East, are all examples of the success of such tactics. It is to be hoped that the Air Ministry will take note of these examples and profit by the lesson. The Douhet theory of staking all on a bombing campaign is not likely to survive the present war. WELLINGTON MK. II . me iUio-™nc i.ierlin X engines fitteu iu u»c Vniters Wellington have put up tne bomber's speed to255 m.p.h. As in the Mk. I version, power-operated gun turrets are fitted in the nose and tail.
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