FlightGlobal.com
Home
Premium
Archive
Video
Images
Forum
Atlas
Blogs
Jobs
Shop
RSS
Email Newsletters
You are in:
Home
Aviation History
1941
1941 - 1978.PDF
122 F LtG HT AUGUST 28TH, 1941. AFTER THE WAR ON BOARD H.M.S. PRINCE OF WALES (Left to right) : Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfred Freeman, Vice Chief of Air Staff (G.B.) ; Gen. Arnold, Chief of Staff for Army Air Corps (U.S.) ; Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Staff (U.S.) ; Admiral of the FleetSir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord (G.B.) ; Admiral King, Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet (U.S.) ; Gen. Marshall, Chief of Staff U.S. Army ; Gen. Sir John Dill, Chief of Imperial General Staff (G.B.) ; Admiral Turner, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (U.S.). his democracy. If the United States now confirms the policy of the President, that country stands committed to the policy of p.utting and keeping Europe in order. No Territorial Aggrandisement Mr. Churchill is no less responsible for the eight points, and one notices that the policy set forth in them agrees closely with that advised by some of the best political thinkers in this country—among them we may mention Mr. F. A. Voight, editor of The Nineteenth Century and After. He has advocated, for example, considerate treatment of Italy, provided that she ceases to menace the peace of other countries, and Clause I of the statement shows that Britain has no desire for the permanent annexation of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. Ethiopia must, of course, remain free and independent. That is provided for in Clauses II and III. There is every reason why Britain and Italy should be good friends, and only the insensate ambitions of Mus- solini have interrupted that friendship. It is to our own interest that reasonable desires on the part of Italy should be satisfied ; but she must give up talking about Mare Nostrum and invoking the memories of the old Roman Empire. Likewise she must not maintain a navy or an air force which is obviously intended to drive British interests out of the Mediterranean. It has been proved that Italian ships and aircraft are incapable of bringing about that result, but friendship and threats cannot exist side by side, and so the threats must be eliminated. Those same threats did not concern Britain only ; Albania and Greece likewise suffered from them, to say nothing of France—and Italian aircraft played a part in the civil war in Spain. All Mediterranean Powers must be free from the fear of interference by Italy and, once the rule of Musso- lini has come to an end, there seems not the slightest reason why the countries bordering that sea should not again live in amity. Hitler may be the embodiment of the spirit of Prussia (Austrian though he is) but Mussolini is anything but the expression of Italian national feeling. Britain is not intending to force Italy to abolish Fascism, any more than she intends to interfere with the internal government of Germany or Russia; Clause III makes that clear. But there is a great difference between the two Dictators in that the one succeeds a string of aggressors who have in turn been enthusiastically followed by the German (or at least the Prussian) people, while the other has forced aggression on a people who by nature prefer to live at peace with their neighbours. To Live in Freedom from Fear Clauses VI and VIII envisage the destruction of the Nazi tyranny, the disarming of aggressor nations for as long as may be necessary, and the banishment of fear from the lives of all men. That means first and foremost the disappearance of the Luftwaffe as a threatening force. One may wonder now, and perhaps the question will be answered some day when all records are made public, would the tragedy of Munich have come upon the gallant Czechoslovak people, would the humiliation of Munich have been tolerated by France and Britain, if it had not been for the striking power of the Luftwaffe and the inability of any other Power to resist it at that time? We know now how weak was France in aircraft, how ill-equipped were our own anti-aircraft batteries and searchlight battalions, and that during the emergency outmoded Gauntlets ctood ready on Biggin Hill aerodrome. Events proved that Gladiators could deal with Fiat CR42 biplanes, but the idea of Gauntlets matching themselves against Me 109s and trying to catch He Ills is enough to make one's blood run cold. But, let us not forget, if the Air Ministry can be blamed for not having superseded the Gauntlets by that time, it was the mismanagement of the War Office which was responsible for the deplorable unreadiness of the A.A. defence units. So long as we divide responsibility for anti- aircraft defence between two Ministries we shall always run the risk of a Munich crisis catching us in no sort of shape to resist aggression. For surprise aggression against an unprepared country there is no doubt that an Air Force is the most dangerous
Sign up to
Flight Digital Magazine
Flight Print Magazine
Airline Business Magazine
E-newsletters
RSS
Events
