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Aviation History
1941
1941 - 2240.PDF
FLIGHT SEPTEMBER 25TH, 1941. AFTER THE WAR A Reply to "Air Vice-Marshal" By MAJOR F. A. de V. ROBERTSON, V.D. IN last week's issue, in his comments on my article" After the War " (published in Flight on August 28th),"Aii Vice- Marshal" attributes to me a "masterpiece of muddled thinking." Attacks on the mental capacity ofan opponent do not carry anyone very far in an argument, so I will pass over that compliment and proceed to discussthe points he raises. I wrote '' at the very least the Army must have first callon a minimum number of squadrons suitable to carry out all the operations required by the Generals." My criticcalls this " a proposition which is itself highly controversial and, in this wider context, strangely irrelevant." It maybe controversial—why not? I stick to my opinion, and everyone else is free to hold his opinion. And I alsowrote: " This Command (i.e., the Fighter Command) most •certainly ought to be in complete charge of all elementsof air defence, the A.A. guns, and the searchlight bat- talions," etc. There are probably some people who wouldconsider this proposition also to be "controversial," but "Air Vice-Marshal" raises no objection to it. In fact hewrote: '' Fighter Command must obviously remain and should include, not only the other components of airdefence, but also," etc. Irrelevant? Well, I do not agree with "Air Vice-Marshal"; I think the point is veryrelevant to a consideration of our organisation after the war. The Bomber "Pool" ~: S He seems to ask what I mean by saying that the BomberCommand must maintain its function "as a pool or reserve." I will try to explain. In the present war theBomber Command has many times attacked special targets for the benefit of both the Navy and the Army. Bombingthe German troops as they advanced towards Dunkerque was one instance, and attacking the German fleet in theHeligoland Bight was another. I think that a body which can reinforce in more than one direction when a specialeffort is needed can justly be described as a reserve ; and we have all heard the term "pool of pilots" which has asimilar implication. "Air Vice-Marshal," quoting my expression "a strong,independent striking force," says that the word " indepen- dent '' is meaningless and misleading. It was applied bythe Air Ministry in 1918 to an Air Force body in France which was not under the command of Lord Haig. I usedthe word in that sense, and thought that the meaning would be clear to all. To my mind, when the BomberCommand is engaged on operations not requested by the Navy or the Army it is acting independently. But why"misleading"? There I fail to understand what "Air Vice-Marshal" means. I will pass over his sneer at my use of th.3 time-honouredword "coasts." Perhaps I may sometimes have been guilty of writing that " the fleet sailed." Old expressionsdie hard. "Air Vice-Marshal" objects to my saying that in thefuture each Overseas Command must be considered in the light of local conditions, and remarks "surely we havelearnt by now that there is nothing local about air power." I think he means that if there is a chain of air bases anypoint can be quickly reinforced. But it has recently been explained to us all that to get aircraft to the Middle East(to say nothing about Allied countries like Greece and Russia) has been a slow and difficult piece of work. It isalso a slow business to transport the ground impedimenta of a squadron. Now, I cannot guess what position willbe held after this war by France and Italy in Africa or by Japan elsewhere, so I cannot suggest what degree ofstrength we ought to slation permanently in the Middle East or in the Far East. I do not in the least differ from " Air Vice-Marshal " when, he says: " Overseas Commandsmust never be allowed to sink back to the ludicrous level of 1939," and there was nothing in my article which sug-gested that I held such a view. But I stick to it that these points must be considered in the light of local conditions. The main point of difference between '' Air Vice-Mar-shal " and myself is that he considers that a strong R.A.F. bomber force will be the best way to prevent Germanyfrom re-arming, and that I doubt it. I do not wish to be offensive in any way, but I really do consider that hehas misunderstood what I wrote ; and after reading my article over again very carefully, I do not think there isany reason why it should be misunderstood. Most cer- tainly I did not overlook (as he says that I did) the neces-sity of preventing the resurgence of the Luftwaffe. I wrote: "If the Eight Points stand, then Europe must beknocked into shape and kept in shape by the combined forces of the British Empire and the United States ofAmerica for a considerable time to come. . . . During the period of policing we shall probably have to keep an Armyin occupation of some parts of the Continent. ..." I suggested no time limit. I made it clear that the Armymust have an adequate Air Component, and that behind that there must be a reserve of bombers. "Air Vice-Marshal" writes: "We cannot keep a greatArmy of occupation permanently in Europe." I consider that very probably we may have to keep an adequate Armythere until we feel safe. It would be expensive, but it is cheaper to prevent a war than to have to win one. Mysuggestion that a small, very well equipped, regular Army would serve Britain's needs was qualified by the precedingwords, " But, in general," which I think indicated with sufficient clearness that the opinion applied to the timeafter the danger was past. And even after it has passed, though pacifists and exponents of disarmament may callme illogical, I stick to it that the Navy and the Fighter Command must be kept at a level of high power. That does not mean that I " envisage post-war conditionsin which we have still powerful potential enemies in Europe." My critic has himself accepted my contentionthat the Fighter Command and the Navy must remain. It does mean that I believe in paying insurance premia. The Lesson of Munich I admitted in my article that the threatening existenceof the Luftwaffe had much to do with causing the humilia- tion of Munich at a time when other Powers were weak.So far as Britain is concerned, my belief is that it was the unpreparedness of the Fighter Command (including A.A.guns, etc.) rather than of the Bomber Command which had the greater influence. In fact I more than doubtwhether the possession of a strong bomber force at that time would have made any difference. I explained whyI believed that the Luftwaffe inspired more terror than British bombers would do, namely, because the latter wouldnot make deliberate attacks on civilians. "Air Vice-Mar- shal " may think that he answered that argument ade-quately. He said that, though we aim at military targets, we cannot help killing some civilians by accident, and heevidently implied that this would deter an aggressor. I am not persuaded that a man of the Hitler type would bedeterred by such a consideration. I doubt if such a man would even be deterred by the thought of deliberate attackson his civilian nationals. However, on the effectiveness of an independent (I stickto the word) bomber force I do not think that any amount of arguing would bring '' Air Vice-Marshal'' and myse«into agreement; so we had better agree to differ. I affi sure that he will survive it.
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