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Aviation History
1941
1941 - 2345.PDF
anc. AIRCRAFT ENGINEER FIRST AERONAUTICAL WLEKLY IN THE WORLD •• FOUNDED WO9 Editor C. M. POULSEN Managing Editor G. GEOFFREY SMITH Chief Photographei JOHN YOXALL Editorial, Advertising and Publishing Offices: DORSET HOUSE, STAMFORD STREET, LONDON, SE.I Telegrams : Truditur, Sedist, London, Telephone : Waterloo 3333 (35 lines). 26 B, RENFIEL D ST., GLASGOW, C.2. Telegrams : Iliffe, Glasgow Telephone: Central 4857. 8-10, CORPORATION ST., COVENTRY. Telegrams: Autocar, Coventry. Telephone: Coventry 5210. GUILDHALL BUILDINGS, NAVIGATION ST., BIRMINGHAM, 2. Telegrams: AutopresS, Birmingham* Telephone: Midlind 29 7 1 (5 lines). 260, DEANSGATE. MANCHESTER,. 3 Telegrams: Iliffe, Manchester. Te/ephsne: Blackfriars 4412. SUBSCRIPTION RATES: Home and Abroad : Year, £3 10. 6 months. Registered at the G.P.O. as a Newspaper. £1 10 6. 3 months, 15s. 3d. No. 1711. Vol. XL OCTOBER 9th, 1941. Thursdays, One Shilling The Outlooks Fleet Air Arm SuccessesT HE recent announcement by a senior naval officer that the Fleet Air Arm, in the two years of war, has sunk or damaged forty enemy warships, besides dealing in the same way with 440,000 tons of enemy shipping and shooting down 200 enemy aircraft, makes one open one's eyes. Everybody has read of many F.A.A. successes, usually at very small cost, but few can have realised the extent of the help which this Arm has given to our war effort. The success with which the T.S.R. Swordfish and Albacores have been used may raise the question whether in the future it will be necessary to make such efforts to produce fast warships for the Royal Navy. The Italian Navy concentrated on speed, but it was of little avail when the T.S.R. machines could slow up a fleet until the British warships, with their heavier hitting power, could catch up. Speed is immensely costly, and if in future designs we could spend less pains and money on it, trusting to the aircraft to make up the difference, the naval Estimates of the future would be less of a burden on the taxpayer, while our position on the seas might not be compromised. Still, it would be foil ' to trust too much to aircraft, for their operations are often dependent on weather. In the history of weapons of war, the success of the Fleet Air Arm is of great interest. The Navy has always regarded the torpedo as the primary weapon of the F.A.A. Before the war, the Air Ministry seemed to be far from convinced of the utility of this weapon, and seemed inclined to pin its faith to the bomb. Since the outbreak of war the torpedo-carrying Beauforts of the Coastal Command have done good work, very good work, and we may now consider the point established. We may contrast the enemy's tactics with our own. Such successes as his aircraft have scored against the Royal Navy have all (we believe) been with the bomb, and mostly by dive-bombing. They have mostly been scored in narrow waters, when the British Fleet has deliberately taken a risk for a good purpose. They have all been scored by an air force acting alone, and have never been that skilful combination of sea power and air power which has distinguished the British operations. The Enemy's Only ShortageT HE Prime Minister surprised the public when, in his speech last week, he said, " The enemy's only- shortage is in the air. That is a very serious shortage, but for the rest he still retains the initiative." We are so accustomed to thinking of the Luftwaffe as illimitable in numbers that it comes almost as a shock (a very welcome shock) to picture Goring as actually short of aircraft and crews, and rather hard put to it to fulfil all his obligations. It is certainly obvious that all through the past summer the Luftwaffe has not been able to maintain an offensive of any importance against Great Britain, as Hitler and Goring would doubtless have wished to do if they had had the power. The bomber crews left in France have shown distinct signs that they would have been all the better for a few more weeks at an operational train- ing unit—perhaps the hit-and-run night raids on East Anglia and other coastal parts of Great Britain have been meant to serve the purpose of operational training. Then we may consider other directions in which Hitlei may wish to advance. The Valley of the Nile may be
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