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Aviation History
1941
1941 - 2741.PDF
NOVEMBER 2OTH, 1941. PLIGHT 357 COASTAL COMMAND AND THE FLEET : An Anson flying over British warships. the Admiralty is of the closest. The liaison between the Command and , due to him (which we are not for a moment suggesting) the crews of the reconnaissance aircraft would be exonerated. But was there any delay after the German transports had sailed ? There are many cases in which the crews of aircraft are ordered to keep wireless silence at certain distances. Naval vessels receive similar orders. But exceptions are made when things of outstanding importance are seen. The unexpected appearance of an enemy fleet at sea would be such a major event that airmen would certainly report it— unless they had been previously ordered to keep wireless silence £ven if they saw something important. There might sometimes be special reasons for such orders, but they would certainly not be given to a reconnaissance aircraft which had been sent out to keep an eye on movements in the North Sea. In fact, there is no substance in Admiral Yarnell's charge that the Royal Navy lost 48 hours through the stupidity and lack of naval seffse on the part of Coastal Command airmen. Another assertion of the Admiral's is that the R.A.F., while patrolling the coast of Great Britain, had sighted submarines but had refused to attack, maintaining that it was the Navy's duty. This charge is quite fantastic. Over 300 enemy submarines have been sighted and attacked by R.A.F. aircraft, and, as will be remembered, one Hudson captured a submarine alive. The fact is that a chance of attacking a submarine is the greatest attraction dangled before the eyes of Coastal reconnaissance aircraft. That is the prospect which gives a little glamour to work which is often monotonous and wearing. If the Admiral means that the depth charges of a surface warship are the most efficient weapons for destroying a submarine, and that reports from aircraft are often the chief source of infor- mation which enables warships to get on the track of sub- marines, he is right; but to say that the airmen will ever refrain from attacking because they are not themselves naval men is wildly divorced from the facts- Mistakes Will Happen Another of Admiral Yarnell's allegations is that duringthe pursuit of the Bismarck an R.A.F. machine actually bombed a British cruiser. Official records have been dili-gently searched, and it can be stated with authority that this incident did not take place. Even if it had, thatwould not prove the point which Admiral Yarnell wishes to make, for mistakes of that sort do, unfortunately, some- times occur in war. There is at least one case on recordwhen ships of the Fleet shot dawn a British aircraft. There was another deplorable case over Gravesend when R.A.F.fighters shot down a Coastal Hudson, and Admiral Yarneil was quite right, for once, when he stated that a Britishsubmarine commander once sent a plaintive message that he intended to dock if friendly aircraft would cease fromattacking him. There have been many occasions, both in the last war and in this, when British aircraft have beenfired on from the ground by both British and French troops. None of these cases proves that British organisa-tion is radically wrong. In time of war fingers are apt to itch on triggers. Not Seeing is Often Not Believing The Admiral also states that after the evacuation fromCrete the British soldiers were full of indignation against the Royal Air Force, and that R.A.F. men were kept offthe streets of Alexandria when the evacuated soldiers were being disembarked. Everybody now knows that the Alliedtroops in Crete had no air support worth mentioning, and that the decision to defend the island was taken with fullknowledge by the authorities that there would be no fighter support. The individual soldiers were in no position tojudge the rights and wrongs of the case. Similar complaints were made by soldiers from Dunkerque, who complainedthat they seldom saw a British fighter. Naturally they did not, for the fighters were doing their work out of sightof the beaches ; but that their work made the evacuation possible and prevented the complete annihilation of theB.E.F. is a fact now known to all. Actually, during the fighting in France and the Dunkerque evacuation, betweenMay 10th and June 4th, 1940, the Fighter Command lost in casualties 25 per cent, of all its available first-line pilots.So far as its existing resources went, that Command cannot be accused of having failed in its duty-—though weremain of opinion that the fighter needs of the Army ought to be calculated separately from the needs of the defenceof Great Britain, and that the Army ought not to be dependent on what the Fighter Command can afford tospare. But if Admiral Yarnell would seize on that remark of ours as a concession to his case, we would make it clearthat in our opinion the air defence of the country must most certainly remain in the hands of the Air Ministry,and should in no circumstances be handed over to the War Office.
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