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Aviation History
1942
1942 - 0445.PDF
FEBRUARY 26TH, 1942 FLIGHT 175 THE THREE-SERVICES PROBLEM Need for Unity of Command : Should the Army Have its Own Air Arm ? : Basic Functions of the Roy at Air Force By MAJOR F. A. de V. ROBERTSON, V.D. T HE present war is the first one in which Britain has engaged under the system of three fighting Services. That system also obtains in two of the countries opposed to her, Germany and Italy. It does not exist in the cases of two other major combatants,, the United States and Japan. The Royal Air Force certainly .came into existence in the spring of 1918, but as the last war only j£nt on for another seven months there was no time in vwnich to test out the new system. It made comparatively little difference to the final stages of the campaign. The f old squadrons of the Royal Flying Corps continued to work for the Army as they had been doing for the previous three years. The few fighter squadrons of the Royal Naval Air Service which had been lent to the Army just carried on the same work in a different uniform, and perhaps felt that their position had been regularised. The flying-boat squadrons maintained their reconnaissance round the coasts for the benefit of the Royal Navy. The only outward and visible sign that a new Service had come into being was the episode of the Independent Air Force, which indulged in strategic bombing of German production in the Rhine- land towns. Actually its bombers did little damage, and though they caused the withdrawal of some German fighter squadrons to protect those towns, it has been urged that it was a mistake to deprive the Army of so many bombers at the time when the Germans were making their last despairing assault on Gough's Fifth Army. Only later was the principle enunciated that when a critical battle is in progress the strategic use of aircraft ought to be subor dinated to their tactical employment—though some French Generals showed an appreciation of the principle even then. Probably few people at the time could have given any clear reason why the British formed a third Service, except to simplify the problems of supply. The country's air effort had been hampered by the rivalry of the Admiralty and the War Office to get more and better aircraft for the R.N.A.S. and the R.F.C. respectively. It occurred to nobody at the time that the wisest innovation would have been to form a Royal Air Force, but at the same time to leave both the Navy and the Army with their respective air arms. Logic has obliged us to retrace our steps in the case of the Navy, and whether to do the same for the ^rny is now a very lively question.' A Haunting Dread From the very beginning the discussion has been tainted by acrimony, and too often arguments have shown evidence of partisanship rather than of calm consideration of the interests of national defence. At the beginning the Admiralty and War Office could see no reason for having an Air Force at all, and the Air Ministry started on its way haunted by the dread of its own abolition. Long , before September 3rd, 1939, there had ceased to be any substance in that fear, and now there is less cause than ever for entertaining it. Yet the reaction to that appre hension remains in the abhorrence shown by the Air Ministry to the idea that any body or person other than "self should have command over any air squadrons. It is not easy to learn lessons from the early stages of a war in which one side started fully prepared and the othur very much unprepared. Lord Trenchard, in a very lfm,a letter to The Times, recently pointed out that the Luft- wtffe is not under the command of the German Army, and |«at Germany has won her great successes under the sys tem of dual command. He added that in the Libyan cam- Paigns no fault could be found with the co-operation betwe "istai en the British Army and the R.A.F. From these lces he undoubtedly concludes that unity of com mand of an operation is not necessary, and it is common knowledge that he thinks unity of command in the air more desirable. One may, however, question whether that is the right conclusion to draw from the facts which he has adduced. Others have pointed to our various set-backs, in Norway, in France, in Greece, in Crete, and in the Pacific, in all of which shortage of air power or of some particular class of aircraft played a major part, and from these cases have drawn the conclusion that our organisation is all wrong. To such arguments the Air Ministry makes the perfectly valid reply that it would have provided more aircralt during the peace years if successive Governments had not forbidden it to do so. Even so, one rather doubts if it ever gave sufficient consideration to the needs of the Army. Perhaps the War Office itself was to blame in not insisting on contingents of fighters and bombers being allocated to its use in the years of peace. It may fairly be said that the War Office has not been sufficiently air-minded or the Air Ministry sufficiently army-minded. Combined. Training Necessary The German successes on land have been due to the per fect unanimity with which the Luftwaffe and the Army have worked together. Much of the recent Russian suc cesses has been due to the same cause. In both cases there have been years of thorough combined training. Both the Germans and the Russians have realised that the air is one of an army's major weapons, and that victory on land is not possible if an army is not adequately supplied with that weapon. The same, of course, is true of an army not adequately ^provided with tanks or artillery or any other essential weapon. The inability of the British Empire to provide adequate air components for any of its land forces, except in Libya and Syria, has resulted in a* tendency for many people to conclude that the air is the one all-important weapon. That is not a justifiable con clusion from the data. At the same time, it must be admitted that the school of thought which believes success to be possible under dual control receives support from the German record, but it must not be overlooked that long, careful, intensive training in working together v-as mainly responsible for the German successes. But, it may be urged, the R.A.F. had not had that long training with the Army (it certainly has not) and yet the two have worked together satisfactorily in Libya. It is not yet certain that future military historians will fully endorse that theory. The R.A.F. in the recent Libyan battles has deliberately concentrated on attacking the Ger man supplies. This was undoubtedly the best work which it could do, even though it is evident that its best efforts have not prevented Rommel from getting up sufficient supplies to keep on fighting. It does not seem from the reports that our aircraft have intervened to any great extent in the actual fighting. Here we seem to see again the results of past years. Special types of aircraft are needed for giving tactical help in a battle. Everyone has heard of the use made of dive-bombers by the Germans. Now there is need of a new class, which has been given the inelegant title^ of "tank-buster." The Germans had the classes of aircraft which they considered necessary all ready and trained before they went to war. It may be the case (we hope it is) that the American Army Air Forces are also well provided in that respect, because an "Attack"' section has long been part of their forces, and has doubt less studied the subject with care. The only aspect of army work to which the R.A.F. has given careful atten tion in the inter-war years has been tactical reconnaissance.
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