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Aviation History
1942
1942 - 0463.PDF
FEBRUARY 26TH, 1942 Topics of the Day FLIGHT 177 IGNORANCE IS NOT BLISS "Indicator" Discusses the Unified Command Idea and Considers the End of Alt This AT one time, and long before this war started, one or f-\ two of the daily papers ran a prolonged " let youth •*• •"• be served" series of features. There was, at the time, quite a strong general idea that everything would go a great deal better if all the important jobs in the world vv.»re held- by young men and young. Women of 30 years of age or less. I think that this sort 61 loose thinking annoyed " Youth " at least as much as, and probably more than, it annoyed the older people, who felt that they deserved to )^>kl the reins of industry and what-not. r The average young persons are certainly not experienced enough or sufficiently sure of trje/r own decSions to tafte on important jobs—though theypcan hold their, own iqf a time, until they are found wanting. At about the same period one of the newspapers, I fclieve, ca/fied out a vast Blitz on itself, and was newly staffed by a mass of younc and extremely enthusiastic, but somewhat overcome your people who proceeded to make it a most '' advanced,''' <»d exciting, but quite vhtceliable journal. When it earner to the point, the youngsters couldn't make the long^mge grade ; they rushed into print and talked volubly about this and that, without regard to the facts. Newspaper Howlers It seems to be true—with one or two marked exceptions '—that whenever an ordinary journal starts to talk about specialised subjects it makes the most frightful bloomers, but these bloomers are, of course, only noticed by the very tongue-tied few who can't be bothered to answer back, and the howlers remain unhowled-down. Of course, the specialists lose heart; they feel that if the paper in ques tion is so inaccurate about their subject, then it is reason able to suppose that it is equally inaccurate about every thing else. The fault does not apply to newspapers only. Until the war, a greater proportion of people must have been more ignorant and consistently ill-informed about aviation than they were about any other subject. Most extraordinary errors were made and passed over by the great journals and by writers who should have known a good deal better. Unfortunately, this colossal ignorance is not confined to the ordinary person, and this fact has always seemed to me to be the most powerful argument in favour of a separate Air Force. The men whose wholetime job it has been-to deal with men, tanks, and battleships may quite easonably be expected to ask impossibilities of its air arm. I'm not at all sure that the Germans themselves haven't suffered from the effects of this ignorance. In a general way it has been nice for their High Command to be able to call on masses of dive-bombers just when they needed them, but it may also explain their losses. No doubt the aforesaid H.C. engineered the initial raids on this country by daylight; the Luftwaffe chiefs must have known that the losses would be crippling, but they had to go ahead in preparation for a vast land and sea assault. Possibly the H.G. banked on more air support during the winter in Russia ; they were not to know any thing much about the difficulties involved in operations (luring intense cold—the engines which can't be. started, the ground crews who cannot work, and the aircraft which cannot even take off until runways have been cleared. The H.C. imagined that it would only be necessary to order machines into the air and, hey presto, they would be in fcie air. No, I don't much believe in a unified command, though it is none of my business to say so. My very little experi ence in peace and war of walking military persons about airfields gives me a.bias against the idea. I would myself hate to feel that my life and future were in the hands of someone who knew next to nothing about my job. Of course, decisions waiffd be taken between the chiefs of the two or three fighting services in use during any particular operation, but w the operatiens were on land, then the military chiefsjK'Ould have the "final say, and if over sea then the navar chief would have one more ring and might be able fojffowbeat the commander of the air support. Perhaj^more important still, the people in this country have cdpidence in the Air Force and the Navy, but not so vvjW'much confidence in the Army. The latter have alwa^ rj^en forgiven for failing to winf all the time again** imipossiblft odds, and the majority oFthe ordinary people aw very sorry indeed that the Arrn^ has hardly yet been jen a chance to show what it Can do. But the Army 'hVsfs have not yet been forgiven for being old-fashioned in their ideas of arms and armaments. . Now that it is all ancient history and the whole picture is different, I cannot be hauled over the coals for saying that I met an Army officer soon after the collapse of France who to'.d me that he had had innumerable arguments with his superior officers about the possible type and strength-— of the enemy's armoured divisions. He was apparently told to mind his own business and informed that, on tin- best possible authority, the Germans had no tanks worth talking about. That, in fact, there was nothing to worry about. Meanwhile, this officer's own crowd had about one Bren gun between them—but that wasn't the Army's fault. I am merely giving this gossip (for what it is worth) iu order to show why the general public wants to see results before the Service which is undoubtedly their favourite is handed over to be used by other people. The Great British-— Public often have some very odd ideas and are certainly not in a position to know anything about it all—but they can make it very unpleasant for all concerned if things go wrong. That's.the one right remaining to the G.B.P. in wartime. Too Soft-hearted To the average person, looking into the future of this war is rather like standing on the edge of a very cold bath, knowing that, sooner or later, it will be necessary to get in. It becomes more and more obvious that some tremendous efforts will have to be made and hardships undergone before we can hope to make an end of it. The Prime Minister— repeatedly tells us something of the kind, but it doesn't really sink in. Unfortunately for us, we haven't had an invasion since 1066—or not one worth talking about—and we are much too easy-going and soft-hearted about the whole thing. Not about the possibility of invasion here, but about the idea of invading other people. We don't hate very easily because we've not been through the endless hell of war and invasion generation by generation. Unfortunately, too, the crucial moments had necessarily to be passed without action—such action simply wasn't possible. Those crucial moments were such as those du*«— ing the first few days of the war, when we were all on tip toes and ready for anything; during the period of the Battle of Britain ; and during the time of the massed night raids on this country. During each of those times people were hard and angry—and to invade and win we must be hard and angry, feeling neither fear nor pity. A million men must be produced with the attributes of the good Commando or Paratroop, each reckless, each angry and tired of it all, and each armed with just the right kind of weapons. A Germany weakened by more than two^^ years of war and by the losing battle in Russia can be invaded and defeated by the right kind of army. No doubt the time will come, but we must be tough. We must be ready to die for the things that' really matter. "INDICATOR." J
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