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Aviation History
1942
1942 - 0493.PDF
AIRCRAFT ENGINEER FIRST AERONAUTICAL WEEKLY IN THE W6JRLD .• FOUNDED 1909 Editor C. M. POULSEN Managing Editor G. GEOFFREY SMITH, M.B.E. Chief Photographer JOHN YOXALL Editorial, Advertising and Publishing Offices: DORSET HOUSE, STAMFORD STREET, LONDON, S.E.I Telegrami ; Truditur, Sedist, London COVENTRY : 8-10, CORPORATION ST. Telegrams: Autocar, Coventry Telephone: Coventry 5 2 10 Telephone: Waterloo 3333 (35 lines). BIRMINGHAM, 2 : GUILDHALL BUILDINGS, NAVlGATrON ST. Telegrams: Autopress, Birmingham. Telephone: Midland 297 1 (5 lines). MANCHESTER, 3 : 260, DEANSGATE, Telegrams: lliffe, Manchester. Telephone : Blackfriars 4412. GLASGOW, C.2 : 26B, RENFIELD ST., Telegrams : lliffe, Glasgow. Telephone- Central 4857. SUBSCRIPTION RATES Home and Abroad : Year, £3 10. 6 months, Registered at the G.P.O. as a Newspaper. £1 10 6. 3 months, 15s. 3d. No. 1732. Vol. XLI. MARCH 5th, 1942. Thursdays, One Shilling. The Outlooks Bombing Policy I N his first speech as leader of the House of Commons Sir Stafford Cripps made a very good impression. When a major change' is made in the composition of the Government, one hopes to see evidence that draughts of fresh air are blowing through the offices in Whitehall, and particularly that the advent of new men means consideration of new ideas. Sir Stafford showed that these hopes will be fulfilled. It usually ^happens that a change of policy is dis appointing to many who have come to think entirely along well-worn grooves, and Sir Stafford must have ^Cven a severe shock to all who have pinned their faith to the theory of final victory by strategic bombing. Flight has always protested against that theory7, and was gratified to note that Lord Trenchard the other day agreed that the Air Force cannot win the war by itself. There are signs that this doubt about the overwhelming effect of strategic bombing is making headway among thinking men, and in the debate on the day before Sir Stafford made his speech two Honourable Members, Col. Macnamara and Professor A. V. Hill, had expressed doubts, or rather more than doubts, about the efficacy of the effort expended in bombing German production. When, a few days before, the Prime Minister put it down that one of the advantages which we derived from **e escape of the German warships from Brest was that Bomber Command would no longer be diverted from its campaign against German production by the need to make frequent visits to Brest, we may take it that he was trying to extract what comfort was possible from ar i uncomfortable position. Sir Stafford Cripps was very frank. He said that our bombing policy was initiated at a time when we were fighting alone against the combined forces of Germany and Italy, and it then seemed the most effective way in which we, acting alone, could take an initiative against the enemy. That is a confession that the policy was from the outset one of faute de mieux, not regarded as a certain road to victory. Now that the Russian armies were shaking Hitler's land power, the original policy, said Sir Stafford, had come under review. The Government were fully aware of the other uses to which our resources-could be put, and when they decided that a change of policy ought to be made, that change would be made. The Needs of the Army W E have many times commented in these columns on the phenomenon that the British strategic bombing of Germany has never prevented Hitler from moving his armies wherever he wanted them, and that they have always had a sufficiency of all descrip tions of supplies. Other points to which we have drawn attention have been the immunity of many German air craft factories from British air attack, and the invari able shortage of suitable air support from which every British field force has suffered, and suffered grievously. Even in Libya, where the co-ordination of Army and Air Force has been far better than in any other theatre, the battle was engaged without aircraft suitable for dealing with German heavy tanks. To the first of these points the reply of the enthu siastic exponents of the bombing policy has been that the numbers of our heavy bombers must be multif lied by x, and that when that had been accomplished we
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