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Aviation History
1942
1942 - 0558.PDF
23° FLIGHT MARCH 12TH, 1942 THE AIR ESTIMATES Sir Archibald Sinclair's Speech : New Fighter Types Foreshadowed : Work with the Navy and Army THE Air Estimates were introduced into the House of Commons on Wednesday, March 4th, by Sir Archibald Sinclair, Secretary of State for Air. He said that during recent months there had always been a very substantia! number of German bombers within easy reach of all the cities of this country. Since June the main task of the R.A.F. had been to give the utmost pos sible help, to Russia. He said it had never been the inten tion that our fighter Wing should remain at Murmansk during the winter. Increasing numbers of our aircraft were working on the Russian front. We could not man them ourselves. It was not easy for us to spare them, but they were helping the Russians to maintain the air superiority which they nrw enjoyed on their entire front. By our agressive action from Malta, in Africa, and over France, we had kept a large number of German fighter squadrons facing west. In offensive fighting from this country during the last 12 months we had destroyed 823 enemy fighters for a loss of 537 of our own. Work With the Other Services The Air Minister then dealt with co-operation with the Navy and Army. It would not be appropriate, he said, for him to deal with the passage of the enemy warships up the Channel, but the Navy and Air Force together had virtually closed the Straits of Dover to enemy merchant ships, which had been no easy task. They had also driven the U-boats right out of the Western Approaches. Our East Coast convoys had been so well protected that be tween Harwich and Newhaven (the most difficult part of the Straits) they were coming through with clocklike regu larity. Bomber Command had kept three of the most fcrmid- ;ilj3e warships in the German navy ignominiously confined in" the harbour of Brest while the battle raged outside. During the past year 40 per cent, of Bomber Command's total effort had been against targets which the Navy had asked it to bomb. The two Services had worked together willingly, loyally and effectively, and both were constantly striving to improve the methods of co-operation. The main aspect of air operations in recent months had been co-operation with the other Services in the Middle and Far East. In spite of their extreme tactical mobility, air forces were not strategically mobile. The maintenance crews and equipment had all to be moved by sea. Never theless, we had sent large numbers of aircraft to the Far East and had taken extreme risks to get them there. We had lost some on the way, and many in heavy fightirfg, but reinforcements continued to arrive in that theatre. Co-operation With the Army In the Middle East during the six months preceding Gen. Auchinleck's advance, R.A.F, and naval aircraft had sunk some 175,000 tons of enemy merchant shipping in the Mediterranean. To send a ship to the bottom with 50 tanks on board was a big contribution to success in the land battle. Continuing, the Right Hon gentleman said that to Hon. members who would show him how the co-operation be tween the Royal Air Force and the Army could be still further improved he would listen with respectful atten tion. He was sure it could still be improved. The word "satisfaction " was unknown in the Royal Air Force. They lived in an atmosphere of swift development and revolu tionary change; they welcomed new ideas. But they most strongly deprecated that mischievous agitation which mis represented the willingness of the Royal Air Force to work with its sister Services. Night after night at the proper behest of the Admiralty, crews flew into the world's heaviest anti-aircraft barrage at Brest. Night after night Bomber and Coastal Command crews had sallied out on dangerous expeditions—bombing, mining, recon noitring, and photographing—and glad to help the Royal Navy win the battle of the Atlantic. It had been a poor reward for them to read that their work was being con tinuously disparaged, and to be told that they were stub bornly refusing to help the Navy, and that the Royal Air Force ought to be dismembered. So with the Army. In the Middle East The pilots and crews in the Middle East knew that their job was to do all they could to help the Army win its battles in the Western Desert. They were not sparing themselves. General Auchinleck had given them full praise. The success of the advancing Eighth Army, he stated, "would never have been achieved without the wholehearted co-operation of the Air Force, whose work has been magnificent through out." But they had received other unsolicited testimonials to the effectiveness of the co-operation between the Army and the R.A.F. The following was an extract from the diary of a German officer: "The night was terrible, the English bombers came in force and dropped their eggs. We had no cover, not a hole nor a building, and when they had dropped their bombs they made low-flying attacks and shot us up. So it goes on night after night. In broad day light the English fighters attack our motorised columns with success." A captured German Army intelligence summary said: "On all parts of the front the enemy continues to have marked air superiority. Our own air reconnaissance has beer, considerably"hindered." Another German intelligence summary said: "The enemy continues to have air super iority and his air forces are co-operating with his land forces with great'effect." This work for the Army was danger ous. Royal Air Force pilots and crews did not grudge the risk, but when they got back and read in their newspapers that the Air Force was not out to help the Army, and that the squadrons they were proud to serve in ought to be handed over to the Army, they resented it deeply and bitterly. It was doing harm. The Right Hon. gentleman continued: "The Com mander-in-Chief in the Middle East and officers of the Royal Air Force at home have represented to me that unless this criticism is moderated and brought into some relation to the facts, co-operation between the Air Force and the Army will become less cordial. It makes for the very fault—ill-feeling between the Services—which it affectsv to condemn. . . . The Royal Air Force has beaten the Germans in every other form of air fighting, and it means to beat them at Army co operation. Together with the Army we mean to go on getting better at it—not only in Africa but here at home. ' We are determined to improve the methods and efficiency of the squadrons in Army Co operation Command. Substantial numbers of squadrons of Bomber and Fighter Commands are being constantly practised in Army co-operation. Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons "The Army Co-operation squadrons, because their primary role is to train with military formations, have been deprived for the most part of the opportunities of meeting the enemy for which they are eager. I am glad to inform the House that, with the agreement of the Com-# mander-in-Chief, Home Forces, these squadrons will be given an increased measure of reconnaissance activity over enemy territory across the Channel. The status of Army Co-operation Command is no whit inferior to that of the other three operational commands. They will have their share of the fighting, and we are now about to re-equip the tactical reconnaissance squadrons with aircraft of a new
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