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Aviation History
1942
1942 - 1047.PDF
MAY 14TH, 1942 FLIGHT 489 Correspondence The Editor does not hold himself responsible for the views expressed by correspondents. The names and addresses of the writers, not necessarily for publication, must in all cases accompany letters. SCIENCE IN "OPS" Plea for a Special R.A.F. W.ing M AY I appeal to readers of Flight to help secure support for the development of a powerful Experimental Opera tions Wing in the R.A.F. to carry out operations that will astound those who believe that the technique of aerial warfare has little scope for extension? Science in operations is just as important as science in aerobatics or technical science. EDWARD MILNER. ^ RADIATOR DRAG Point of Academic Interest I AM grateful to P. A. S., Darwen, for his admirably clear exposition of the way in which a radiator can function as a heat engine and develop a forward thrust (Flight. April 30th). In the case which he considers, the passages of the radiator are so shaped that (so it is assumed) the preliminary compression of the air takes place by streamline retardation involving no loss of energy. In practice, of course, there will be some departure from this condition, and there, is one particular departure which— at any rate from an academic point of view—may be worthy of attention, and that is the case of a radiator with passages of uniform cross-section from entry to exit. In its simplest form this radiator can be visualised as a straight parallel tube heated from the outside. In this case it would appear that the work done by the heat engine would do no more than compen sate for the destruction of some of the kinetic energy of the entering air. It would be interesting to learn from your readers whether a thrust can be developed in this case and, if so, in what way the force would be <:ommunicated to the walls of the radiator. J. W. CROFTS. BOMBER ARMAMENT Mixed Guns Advocated I HAVE been interested to note for some time a '' cannon con troversy " in the Correspondence pages of your most excellent journal. Particularly interesting to me has been the letter from B. T. Howard. Mr. Howard seems to be concerned at our apparent lack of foresight or ingenuity in fitting cannon in the power-operated turrets of our big bombers; and also appears to think that, armed as they are at present, they are at a disadvantage when they encounter cannon-aimed fighters. Perhaps this is partly true, but it is offset to a certaiii degree 4***rne heavy armour carried by our bombers. However, I will not argue the point, as I merely wish to point out, as a practical engineer, some of the difficulties in fitting cannon in bombers' turrets. The first difficulty is the much greater space needed by the cannon, which are at least half as long again as the machine- guns. This suggests a bigger and heavier turret, as does the greater space required for the larger ammunition boxes and feed arrangements. This, in turn, leads to heavier turret- operating gear and improved arid elaborate gun mountings to take the recoil of the heavy ordnance. This cannot be accom plished without added weight. The extra weight and drag of these necessarily massive turrets would have a marked effect on the aircraft's performance. I can almost hear Mr. Howard remark, "Would all this have to happen if a turret were to have only one or at the most two cannon fitted ? '' My answer to that would be '' rate of fire." The cannon may have a long range, but the rate of fire from a 20 mm. cannon is only about half that of the Browning machine-gun, which constitutes the main armament of our bomber force. With the slower rate of fire, the gunner has legs chance of hitting his target because of the smaller area covered by his fire. I think this points out-that two cannon are not sufficient in a turret. Added to this the cannon-armed fighter has a much bigger and slower target than the cannon- armed bomber, which has much less chance of hitting a fast- moving and small fighter with its comparatively slow-firing cannon. Finally, I think that the only practical position to fit cannon W in a big bomber is in blister turrets, as in the Fortress I, as a secondary armament to the machine guns. There the gunners have plenty of room, and the guns could be mounted singly on power-operated mounts. This mixed armament would, I think, prove the most suc cessful as the cannon would be brought to bear at close range, which would prove deadly to the attacker. G. S. HENDERSON. HOME GUARD AIR ARM A Welcome Innovation '"PHANKS to Flight for bringing notice to what undoubtedly -»- could be invaluable assistance to Home Guards, namely, an Air Corps. I feel certain that the controlling powers of the Home Guard would welcome ttiis innovation, small though it might be. The training of H.G.s is being carried out, in spite of obvious difficulties, with extreme efficiency and versatility is their strong point; they could tackle the organisation of such a corps in their stride. G. S. Freeman and H. W. G. in their recent letters have certainly "hit the nail on the head," and I, lor one, as an "A" licence pilot and H.G., would be interested to hear if the powers that be consider the idea. \V. J. SANDERSON. More Suggested Duties ITH reference to "1935 Amateur Pilot's" letter in your issue of Apiil 23rd, there must be many spheres of useful ness, both before and during an attempted invasion, in which amateur pilots, flying club machines, can be employed. Train ing H.G. machine gunners to keep their sights on a moving plane, with cross, oblique, and head-on sighting, would no doubt be of immense value to those who have had little or no practice in this respect. Taking local commanders round their positions by plane would probably result in a good many new ideas for camouflaging. Training H.G.s in concealment from aircraft, dropping messages, etc., during schemes, and several more uses which have not been thought of yet. There must be scores of private and club aircraft stowed away somewhere which could be used. The hangar of my late lamented club was full in September, 1939. Why not form H.G. co-operation squadrons run by the R.A.F. until the H.G. were strong enough to run their own ? The expense, from a petrol and maintenance point, would be far less than if R.A.F. types were used. In battle they would be easy prey to a loose fighter or two, but there should be some combatant service, such as dumping a load of grenades on an enemy post, or ammunition on one of our own, or with a Lewis mounted, last war fashion, on gliders or marching troops, besides communications already referred to. . " 1937 AM. PT." * Advantages During Invasion I AM glad to see that the Heme Guard Air Arm idea is finding its way into print at last. Although this scheme presents many difficulties to the official mind, i.e., aircraft maintenance, housing, training, etc., I consider that there is available suffi cient talent to maintain light aircraft in a reasonably airworthy condition; the latest ultra-modern hangars are not required, and a dozen hours dual would be'ample for the really interested candidate. The aircraft, under these conditions, might be forbidden to fly over industrial and built up areas, and so safe guard all. The advantages in the event of invasion are obvious—local reconnaissance, communications, gas spraying, etc. (The Hun, we are told will use gas so why not be ready first for once?) If some of these planes were armed with light machine guns or grenades, they would have a tremendous harrying effect upon enemy troops deploying after glider and troop-carrier landings, and perchance, if, in some parts of the country glider landings were attempted, far from the main battle area in daylight, and a few lightly equipped sporting types were available, what would be more effective for dealing with the gliders? Gliders moving at Go m.p.h. would be difficult targets
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