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Aviation History
1942
1942 - 1138.PDF
534 FLIGHT MAY 28TH- X942 AIR FIGHTING IN RUSSIA the important ground battles. The beginning of autumn marked the opening of the second phase in air fighting. The Luftwaffe's task was to force Moscow and Leningrad to submission, or at least to render their defences useless and pave the way for the capitulation of these cities. During this phase of fighting the Germans used their air units in mass employ ment, attacking in waves of about ioo planes. But just as their ground forces-^vere pinned down within the sight of Moscow and Leningrad, so has the Luft waffe experienced at the gates of the capital a most serious re verse. Moscow and Leningrad just were not like some other cities of the Continent; they could not only "take it," but what is in fact more important, "give it," •^and give it in full measure. The *" solute operations of the Soviet ; charged with the protec tion ^f these two cities, and their A.A. ^defences, have enforced their su\eriprity on the Luftwaffe. With the approaching winter t»£ German Air Force had to face, therefore, a ierto/*experienced situation—that of being strategic- A Messerschmitt Me no shot down in the snow. Deep snow and cold must have made it impossible to rescue many of the injured air crews. A vee formation of L.16 Rata single-seat fighters. Top speed varies with the type of engine fitted. Early models of 650 h.p. could only manage 280 m.p.h. as a maximum, but with a 1,100 h.p. engine over 300 m.p.h. is obtained. ally on the offensive and within easy reach of an important objective, but being compelled gradually to fold theii*wings. The bad weather setting in, turned their advanced land ing grounds into waterlogged fields and, except for airfields .captured from the Russians, the mobility of the Luftwaffe was thus substantially reduced. It is to the credit of the Command of the Soviet Air Force that the advantage ^so gained was turned into something even more serious; the Soviet Air Force contested bitterly for superiority of the local air space and has succeeded in wresting the initiative from the Luftwaffe. This transition from the defensive into an offensive was perhaps the turning point of the campaign. Clearly, the Russians could not have achieved what they have done without considerable losses. But the end well deserved the price paid. The Luftwaffe, deprived of the offensive advan tage, had to fall back, and a new phase of the air fighting began. At the beginning of November came a considerable reduction in the activity of the Luftwaffe. While in j November 2,500 sorties were made on the Northern and Central Sector, only 1,550 were made in December, the figure including patrol flights. The same slackening of operations was observed in the Central and Southern sectors of the front, where 1,047 sorties were made by the Luft waffe compared with 2,038 in November. In the attacks on Moscow only 20 to 30 machines were raiding in the first half of December, and as few as 10 to 15 in the second. "Luftwaffe" Checked What was the reason for this sharp reduction of offensive activity? Maj.-Gen. Grendal, of the Soviet Air Force, writing in the Red Star, attributes it not to a shortage of aircraft, but to operational difficulties resulting from bad airfields, difficulties in starting and maintenance caused by the severe cold and the unprepared ground organisation. This has been confirmed not only by pictures released by the German Air Ministry showing the difricultiesiof operations and maintenance under Russian winter condi tions, but in German reports, in the despatches of their correspondents from the front, and, finally, in the utterings of their official spokesmen. Indeed, these reports purport to show that the ground organisation of the Luftwaffe
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