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Aviation History
1942
1942 - 1139.PDF
MAY 28TH, 1942 FLIGHT 535- has borne the brunt of the difficulties, in having had a very hard task to fulfil under hazardous conditions of life. During the battles of the winter, the Luftwaffe suffered not only because it was badly prepared for a winter campaign, but also because of the pressure brought to bear on it by the Russians. The havoc wrought by the Russians on the enemy's airfields, particularly on the central front, added to these difficulties. This particularly affected such units which were called to succour the hard-pressed German ground forces. Indeed, during this period the Luftwaffe's main task was to interfere in the ground battle to relieve the Wehrmacht and to use trans port planes for the despatch of reserves and supplies to advanced zones. Transport aircraft attached to the nth Air Corps, which were held in readiness for parachute operations, were re leased in mid-winter for other purposes. The air-borne units attached to the above Corps were used as infantry to close up the gaps, and an " express service " was estab lished for carrying troops from deep in the rear to the front. ^"January fresh troops from Denmark and Yugoslavia were transported by plane to the front. On many occa sions when reserves were badly needed, they were trans ported from one front sector to another by air, and supplies despatched to encircled or exposed units. Losses in Transport Aircraft Thus, in the Briansk area, towed gliders were used to deliver supplies to the encircled German garrison in Sukhinichi. Since the poor armament and manoeuvrability of these transport planes have made them a particularly easy prey for Soviet air units, their main operations were either at dusk, sometimes at night or in bad weather. Nevertheless, the toll taken by the Red Air Force of the nth Air Corps was very heavy ; for these operations necessi tated the despatch of heavy transport aircraft to advanced positions, involving landings in the immediate vicinity of fighting, or beyond it, constantly in danger of the swift advance of the Soviet units. Great numbers of the JU52 (which, despite the presence of some Ju 90 and Fw 200 types, were the main equipment) were destroyed by the Soviet Air Force on these advanced airfields. These systematic raids on German airfields have seriously contributed towards a further crippling of the enemy's air activities. It is significant that over 36 per cent, of German aircraft destroyed by the Soviet Air Force in February was smashed on the ground. The air fleets of Generals Kellers, Leers and Stumpfs have suffered im portant losses in Ju 87, Me 109 and no, Ju 83, He 126. The Soviet Air Force seized on the offensive, and relent lessly kept on the pressure. Starting troubles in the cold. A -Henschel 126 army co operation machine with quilted engine cover has hot air pumped in to thin the oil. While the Russian armies were driving wedges and gaps into the main body of the enemy, the Soviet Air Force played a no less important role in the advance. Not only did air units, by continuous reconnaissance, facilitate the planning of operations and the most advantageous tactical employment of the ground forces. All Soviet operations showed a matchless collaboration of the Air Arm with the land forces, throwing their weight on vital points of thrust and relentlessly hammering the enemy's ground positions. Of particular value to the Russian offensive was the em ployment of air units in attacks on enemy supply columns, on retreating forces, in striking in his rear, and on new positions taken up in the retreat. The Luftwaffe, having received rein forcements from the hinterland, struck out again and again. In February air fighting flared up again, the Germans trying to wear down Soviet air resources and to relieve their pressure on the ground forces. But the margin of advan tage already gained by Russian flyers was apparently too much for the Luftwaffe to overtake. The Soviet Air Forces con tinued to exercise their air superiority over the front, as demonstrated by their frustration of vigorous attempts by the encircled German garrison in the Yukh- nov area to withdraw to the north-west. With the improved weather the Ger mans had to intensify further their activi ties. While in February they operated in small units, they have now gone back to the employment of larger numbers of aircraft, in units of about 50. In the ensuing operations the Luftwaffe spared no efforts to recapture the superiority gained by the Russians during the winter Continued on page 536.)
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