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Aviation History
1942
1942 - 1352.PDF
646 FLIGHT JUNE 25TH, 1942 BATTLESHIPS or CARRIERS ? The Latest American Shipbuilding Programme : Lessons of Coral Sea and Midway Battles By MAJOR F. A. de V. ROBERTSON, V.D. THE change in the United States naval building programme, as a result, we are told, of the lessons taught by the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway Island, makes one hope that the Americans have not jumped too hastily to conclusions. Mr. Vincent, chair man of the Naval Affairs Committee, is reported to have said that events had proved conclusively that '' the air craft carrier was the backbone of the fleet." According to the reports so far published, in each battle there was little or no ship-to-ship fighting, and the losses inflicted by both sides were wrought by aircraft. The Americans had much the best of the exchanges; in fact, they won two splendid victories. These battles, it should be noted, were not in the same class as that in which H.M.S. Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk. Then the British warships had no air assistance at all, and it is now generally recognised that an air component is as necessary to a fleet as are destroyer screens or any other of the various naval weapons now employed. Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, for example, has recently said that '' an indispensable ingredient of sea power in modern war is the air." Both in the Coral Sea and at Midway Island the Japanese fleets were not without that indispensable in gredient. In the Coral Sea two Japanese carriers have been mentioned, the Ryukaku, which was definitely sunk, and the Shokaku, which was set on fire. There were probably others, for the Japanese have never shown a niggardly spirit in the use of their carriers. At the Midway battle they seem to have had at least five of these craft, and, again, there may have been more, for the American pilots have claimed five as sunk or badly damaged. At the second battle the Japanese had at least three - battleships present, all of which were damaged, while nothing has been published about the American naval strength in either battle. We only know that their great 35,000-ton carrier Lexington was sunk in the Coral Sea. Shore-based and Ship-borne Aircraft Great stress has been laid in some quarters on the fact that at Midway the Americans • were able to use shore-based aircraft, and that such machines must always be superior to carrier-borne aircraft. Class for class, this is undoubtedly correct. Shore-based bombers can carry a heavier load of bombs than ship-borne bombers can carry. Land-based fighters of the short- range class ought always to be superior to the fighters which can be stowed in the hangars of a carrier. More over, if some reports about the Malayan fight are to be credited, the two British warships were sunk by Jar nese aircraft which discharged more powerful torpedoes than the i8in. variety which are the standard load not only of the naval Swordfish and Albacores but also of the' Beauforts. The Grumman Avenger, which was used by the Americans for the first time in the Midway battle, may carry a still more powerful torpedo than any pre viously discharged from aircraft. But air supremacy is a matter of fighters, and, accord ing to all precedent and theory, the fighters from a carrier. or rather from several carriers, ought to be able to give substantial protection to a fleet against the attacks of bombers and torpedo-aircraft, even though the latter are based on the land. Unless the action occurs close to the land, the bombers cannot have escorts of short-range fighters, which are the most formidable of all, and w& carrier-borne fighters ought to be able to deal with long- range fighters from the shore. At the very least, they ought to be able to put up a good enough fight to prevent the shore-based machines from achieving clear supremacy in the air. A slight superiority by the American short-based machines, so long as that superiority was resolutely contested, ought not to have left the Japanese fleet completely at the mercy of the Americans, as it seems to have been off Midway. In the Coral Sea the Americans effected a surprise, but they can hardly have repeated it at Midway. The Probable Lesson of Midway So far as the facts are known at present, the con clusion to be drawn from Midway would appear to be, not that the American air strength proved inevitably stronger than the Japanese fleet, but that the Japanese Admiral showed lack of enterprise and skill. With at least three battleships and five carriers at his command he surely ought to have been able to get within gun range of the American warships. The Americans won the two battles by air power alone, and yet neither was a clear- cut case of air versus navy, for there were considerable air forces on both sides in each case. If, however, further information proves that the American victory at Midway was due to the shore-based aircraft which were able to intervene, that hardly makes a case for proclaiming the carrier as '' the backbone of the fleet." In their earlier operations, e.g., Pearl Harbour, the Japanese have been very clever and very daring in the use they have made of their carriers, but these ships are undoubtedly vulnerable, and the Japanese have suffered even heavier losses in this c\^s than the Americans and we ourselves have suffered, T^k any case, the exploits of the Japanese carriers have always been based on the supremacy of the Japanese battle fleet in the Pacific. Naturally, the disposition of the American battleships has not been disclosed, but it is commonly supposed that the majority of them are in the Atlantic. If the Japanese battle fleet were disposed of, the tentacles of the octopus, spread out as they are throughout the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, Indo-China, Siam and Burma, would be left limp and lifeless, cut off from all supplies, and unable to advance or retreat. Even the narrow seas between Nippon and China would be dominated by the sea power of the United Nations. Battleships Provided All these considerations, however, do not mean that the naval authorities in the United States have lost ttMr sense of proportion, whatever Mr. Vincent may have said. They have not decided to provide no more battle ships ; several are already in hand and some of them will be launched this year. The programme already in hand
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